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Abstract
A fundamental transformation is taking place in the basic approach to regulating
network industries. Policy makers are in the process of abandoning their century-
old commitment to rate regulation in favor of a new regulatory approach known as
access regulation. Rather than controlling the price of outputs, the new approach
focuses on compelling access to and mandating the price of inputs. Unfortu-
nately, this shift in regulatory policy has not been met with an accompanying shift
in the manner in which regulatory authorities regulate prices. Specifically, policy
makers have continued to base rates on either historical or replacement cost. We
argue that courts and policy makers have largely ignored the fact that this fun-
damental shift in regulatory approach demands an equally fundamental shift in
the approach to setting prices. Economic theory suggests that regulatory author-
ities should base access prices on market prices. In addition, because compelled
access to most telecommunications networks requires that competitors be per-
mitted to place equipment on the network owner’s property, access requirements
constitute physical takings for which market-based compensation must be paid.
Although the unavailability of market-based determinants once justified basing
prices on some measure of cost, the shift in regulatory policy (especially when
combined with the emergence of direct, facilities-based competition made possi-
ble by technological convergence) has caused the justifications for refusing to set
rates on the basis of market prices to fall away. We then use these insights to ana-
lyze access pricing with respect to three emerging regulatory issues: (1) access to
unbundled network elements mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
(2) the access to utility poles compelled by the 19996 amendments to the Pole
Attachments Act, and (3) open access to digital subscriber line (DSL) and cable
modem networks providing high-speed broadband services.
1 A fundamental transformation is taking place in the basic approach 
to regulating network industries.  Policy makers are in the process of 
abandoning their century-old commitment to rate regulation in favor 
of a new regulatory approach known as access regulation.  Rather than 
controlling the price of outputs, the new approach focuses on 
compelling access to and mandating the price of inputs.  
Unfortunately, this shift in regulatory policy has not been met with an 
accompanying shift in the manner in which regulatory authorities 
regulate prices.  Specifically, policy makers have continued to base 
rates on either historical or replacement cost. 
 
 We argue that courts and policy makers have largely ignored the 
fact that this fundamental shift in regulatory approach demands an 
equally fundamental shift in the approach to setting prices.  Economic 
theory suggests that regulatory authorities should base access prices on 
market prices.  In addition, because compelled access to most 
telecommunications networks requires that competitors be permitted 
to place equipment on the network owner's property, access 
requirements constitute physical takings for which market-based 
compensation must be paid.  Although the unavailability of market-
based determinants once justified basing prices on some measure of 
cost, the shift in regulatory policy (especially when combined with the 
emergence of direct, facilities-based competition made possible by 
technological convergence) has caused the justifications for refusing to 
set rates on the basis of market prices to fall away. 
 
 We then use these insights to analyze access pricing with respect 
to three emerging regulatory issues:  (1) access to unbundled network 
elements mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, (2) the 
access to utility poles compelled by the 19996 amendments to the Pole 
Attachments Act, and (3) open access to digital subscriber line (DSL) 
and cable modem networks providing high-speed broadband services. 
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Access is becoming a potent conceptual tool for rethinking 
our world view as well as our economic view, making it the 
single most powerful metaphor of the coming age. 
 
        Jeremy Rivkin1   
INTRODUCTION 
 One of the most striking economic developments of the last decade has 
been the growing importance of telecommunications networks.  Scientific 
breakthroughs have allowed the information and communications sectors to 
explode to the point where they now comprise more than eight percent of the 
nation’s total economic production2 and have been responsible for a 
disproportionate share of the country’s overall economic growth over the 
past several years, having expanded at roughly twenty percent each year, a 
rate more than five times faster than the economy as a whole.3  
Telecommunications companies have also played a starring role in a 
significant number of the recent megamergers that have transformed the 
business environment, with six of the ten largest mergers in history involving 
telecommunications-related companies,4 and also served as the driving force 
                                                     
1 JEREMY RIVKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS 15 (2000). 
2 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, DIGITAL ECONOMY 
2002, at 26 (Feb. 2002), at http://www.esa.doc.gov/508/esa/pdf/DE2002r1.pdf. 
3 Id. at 25, 27 tbl.3.4 (reporting that the information technology sector has been responsible for 
between twenty-five and thirty-two percent of annual GDP growth between 1996 and 2000). 
4 The top ten mergers in world history include Mannesman-Vodafone (no. 1, $184 billion), America 
Online-Time Warner (no. 2, $150 billion), SBC-Ameritech (no. 5, $63 billion), AT&T-MediaOne (no. 7, 
$61 billion), Vodafone-AirTouch (no. 8, $60 billion), AT&T-TCI (no. 9, $54 billion), and Deutche 
Telecom-VoiceStream Wireless (no. 10, $50 billion).  Other significant telecommunications-related 
mergers include Bell Atlantic-GTE ($49 billion), as well as the failed merger between WorldCom and 
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3behind the spectacular rise and equally spectacular fall of the NASDAQ 
index.  The increase in the importance of the telecommunications sector has 
been matched by an increase in its volatility.  Perhaps most dramatically, the 
failure of WorldCom has produced the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.  
As FCC Chairman Michael Powell has noted, these developments have left 
the telecommunications industry in a state of “utter crisis,” with banks 
worldwide contemplating industry write-offs of up to half a trillion dollars 
and telecom operators and vendors in the U.S. laying off half a million 
workers in the space of a year and a half.5   
 The importance and the instability of the telecommunications sector have 
only served to heighten the importance of understanding how this sector is 
regulated.  Not only does government policy play a key role in shaping 
returns and investment incentives, a growing number of commentators have 
suggested that regulation has played a decisive role in precipitating much of 
the turmoil that has wracked the industry of late, having shaped both the 
recent wave of mergers6 and the WorldCom bankruptcy.7  The direct linkage 
between regulation and industry performance has made understanding the 
economic implications of current regulatory policy all the more imperative. 
 For more than a century, telecommunications regulation was marked by 
a remarkable degree of segmentation and invariability.  Since each 
communications service was available only through a single technology, 
each medium of communications could be governed by its own, discrete 
regulatory system that did not have to take into account the impact of other 
technologies.  In addition, because policy makers tended to regard each 
medium as a natural monopoly, their basic approach was to subject 
telecommunications networks to the now-classic regime of common carriage 
regulation, in which state and federal regulatory authorities imposed 
nondiscrimination and mandatory service requirements, monitored quality, 
supervised investments, and restricted competitive entry.  Most importantly, 
this approach focused on the rates that telecommunications providers could 
charge end users for purchasing outputs.  The primary policy issue centered 
on whether such rates should be based on historical cost or replacement 
cost.8 
 Two forces have emerged that have begun to destabilize this century-old 
regulatory consensus.  The first force is technological.  It follows from the 
                                                                                                                             
Sprint ($120 billion).  Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin, Inc., 100 Largest Announcements in History, 
MERGERSTAT REV. (Jan. 2000) (available on Lexis).   
5 Too Many Debts; Too Few Calls, ECONOMIST, July 20, 2002, at 59. 
6 See Jim Chen, The Magnificent Seven:  American Telephony’s Deregulatory Shootout, 50 
HASTINGS L.J. 1503 (1999). 
7 For example, noted telecommunications expert Peter Huber has argued that “Washington created 
WorldCom” on the grounds that “[m]uch of the telecom industry’s current woes can be traced to 
government accountants who set interconnection tariffs at levels completely divorced from economic 
reality.”  Peter Huber, Washington Created WorldCom, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2002, at A14.  See generally 
PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE (1997).   
8 See infra notes 41-56 and accompanying text. 
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4fact that scientific advances are rendering different communications media 
increasingly interchangeable.  Not only has technological convergence 
provided consumers and firms a dazzling variety of ways to access network 
services, it has begun to put pressure on the historical regulatory distinction 
among voice, video, and data communications, in which each type of service 
was governed by a separate regulatory regime.9 
 The second driving force is the fundamental shift in regulatory approach 
exemplified by the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.10  The 
heart of the 1996 Act is designed to introduce competition into local 
telephone service by compelling every incumbent local telephone company 
to interconnect with its competitors on reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
terms and to provide them with unbundled access to every element of its 
network.11  Initially hailed as a major deregulatory change,12 it has become 
increasingly apparent that, rather than representing a shift towards 
deregulation, the 1996 Act marked a shift towards a different style of 
regulation known as “access regulation.”  Rather than regulating the terms 
under which consumers purchase outputs, access regulation instead regulates 
the ability of competitors to obtain access to inputs.  A recent study revealed 
that the 1996 Act is part of a broader shift in regulatory philosophy that 
spans at least six network industries.13  As the author of the quote that opens 
this Article aptly acknowledges, we do indeed live in “the Age of Access.”14   
 These two forces have economic and constitutional implications that 
should fundamentally transform the manner in which policy makers 
approach network industries.  Somewhat surprisingly, however, regulatory 
authorities have failed to take into account the full ramifications of 
convergence and the shift to compelled access and have instead reflexively 
adhered to the cost-based approaches associated with traditional rate 
regulation without adequately considering whether the shift to compelled 
access as the primary regulatory approach requires an equally fundamental 
change in the means of implementation.  Because of the protracted nature of 
the legal proceedings regarding the implementation of compelled access, 
these issues have not yet been fully addressed by the courts, with the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC15 
                                                     
9 See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE 
J. ON REG. 171, 284-89 (2002). 
10 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. 
11 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(2)-(3). 
12 See, e.g., Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing S. 652, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
228-1, 228-4 (praising the Act for “providing a roadmap for deregulation in the future”); Congress Maps 
a Telecom Future, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 1996, at 14 (calling the overall thrust of the Act “clearly 
deregulatory and pro-competitive”). 
13 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Grand Transformation of Regulated Industries 
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1340-57, 1364-83 (1998). 
14 See RIVKIN, supra note 1. 
15 122 S. Ct. 1646 (2002). 
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5and National Cable and Telecommunications Ass’n v. FCC16 representing 
only a few rounds of what will undoubtedly be a protracted series of major 
court decisions addressing these issues. 
 The debates about access to telecommunication networks have been 
further obscured by academic writings that have made networks seem like 
increasingly complex and exotic phenomena.  Many of the basic concepts 
about networks remain poorly defined and misunderstood.  In addition, 
networks tend to be characterized by sunk costs as well as economies of 
scale and scope that many theorists mistakenly believe distinguish the 
economic analysis of networks from other forms of production.  A 
burgeoning literature argues that networks are susceptible to unique types of 
market failures, so-called network externalities, which in turn require 
regulators to intervene in ways not required in other industries. 
 This argument advanced in this Article is designed to place the issues 
surrounding access pricing on a sounder economic and legal foundation that 
takes into account the full import of the recent changes in technology and 
regulatory theory.  Part I demystifies networks as an economic phenomenon 
by offering a more precise definition of what constitutes network access.  As 
we will explain in greater detail later, network access is properly viewed as 
third-party use of the transmission services provided through the network.  
Basic economic theory indicates that efficiency would best be promoted if 
access to those network services were based on their market value.  Reliance 
on market-based pricing mechanisms tends not only to allocate goods to their 
highest and best use; it also provides the proper signals to parties who are 
thinking about investing in network technologies.   
 Rather than basing access prices on the market value of the network 
services provided, regulators are currently employing access pricing 
methodologies that focus instead on the cost of the inputs used to establish 
the physical network.  For the reasons we further explain in Part I, we find 
this approach to be quite problematic.  It is true that in a static world, the 
costs of production would represent a good approximation of the earning 
potential and thus the market value of those inputs.  In a dynamic world, 
however, improvements in production technology, innovations in goods and 
services, shifts in consumer demand, entry and exit of producers, and 
changes in factor prices can cause the cost of inputs to deviate from their 
market value.  The greater the rate of change of technology and other forces, 
the greater this disparity is likely to be.  Given the unpredictability of such 
changes, the deviations from market value caused by basing access prices on 
the cost of the inputs used to create the network will tend to lead to gluts or 
shortages and will eventually induce entrants to over- or under-invest in 
certain types of network capacity.  Furthermore, basing access prices on 
input costs ignores the fact that the whole is typically greater than the sum of 
                                                     
16 122 S. Ct. 782 (2002). 
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6its parts.  So long as a firm is efficient and creative, the value of the services 
provided by the firm is likely to exceed the cost of the inputs it uses.   
 The only plausible justification for basing regulated prices on cost in the 
past was that the fact that the absence of external markets caused by the lack 
of technological substitutes made it impossible to base rates on market 
prices.  By stimulating direct facilities-based competition, the two forces that 
we have identified (technological convergence and the shift to access 
regulation) have made market-based pricing both feasible and desirable.  Part 
I closes by refuting arguments advanced by other scholars suggesting that 
network industries are somehow prone to unique forms of market failure that 
would justify adhering to cost-based pricing.  Our analysis shows that 
economies of scale and scope, sunk costs and network economic effects do 
not generally cause market prices to deviate from levels that promote 
efficiency and do not change the basic analysis.   
 Part II describes the constitutional implications of the transformations we 
have identified by evaluating the limits that the Takings Clause places on the 
regulation of access pricing.  Because rate regulation simply limits the terms 
of the contracts for finished goods and services, it represents the type of 
“adjustment of economic burdens”17 traditionally subject to the more 
permissive analysis applied to nonpossessory takings.  Access regulation, in 
contrast, typically requires network owners to permit third parties to place 
equipment on their property.  As a result, access regulation necessarily falls 
within the Supreme Court’s physical takings jurisprudence, which mandates 
that the government reimburse property owners for the market value of their 
property without regard to the economic impact of the regulation or whether 
the regulation in question furthers important public interests.18  Therefore, 
just compensation for compelled access exactly corresponds to the 
economically efficient prices for compelled access. 
 Part III applies the analytical framework developed in the preceding 
sections to three emerging policy problems:  (1) unbundled access to 
elements of local telephone networks that underlay the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC; (2) access to 
networks of utility poles that formed the basis for the Court’s decision last 
Term in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co.; 
and (3) open access to high speed broadband systems, encompassing both 
cable modem systems and DSL systems, that represents the focus of two 
ongoing proceedings before the FCC.19  We conclude that the steps taken to 
implement each of these access regimes violates the economic and 
constitutional principles that we have identified.  Established principles of 
                                                     
17 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
18 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
19 See infra notes 512-515, 535-539 and accompanying text. 
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7economics and constitutional law instead require that regulators adopt 
methodologies that base access rates on market prices. 
I. EFFICIENT PRICING OF ACCESS TO NETWORKS 
 This Part focuses on removing some of the perceived mystery 
surrounding the economics of network access.  It begins in Section A by 
offering a definition of what constitutes a network and access to a network.  
Section B lays out the basic case for basing access rates on market pricing.  
Section C discusses the various methodologies for determining market 
prices.  Section D offers a review of the various features of networks that 
have led some commentators to suggest that reliance on market prices in 
network industries might not constitute the best way to promote economic 
efficiency.   
 In short, conventional economic principles dictate that access prices 
should be based on the market value of the relevant input.  Although the 
absence of comparable transactions in external markets has historically led 
regulatory authorities to eschew market-based pricing in favor of cost-based 
pricing, technological convergence and the shift to access regulation have 
drained this justification of its vitality.  The emergence of direct facilities-
based competition from alternative telecommunications networks has created 
market-based benchmarks that can serve as independent bases for setting 
rates.  Contrary to the suggestion of some commentators, distinctive 
economic features of networks such as sunk costs, economies of scale and 
scope, and network economic effects, do not alter this core conclusion. 
A. Defining Access to Networks 
 At its most basic level, a network is a system of nodes and links between 
them.  The nodes of a traditional telecommunications network are the 
company’s switches and customer premises connections, while the links are 
the wires.  For a wireless network, the nodes are the receivers, transmitters, 
and the links are the radio spectrum.  Networks have many different 
configurations.  A star-shaped network is a simple configuration in which 
there is a single hub and all lines are spokes.  Hub-and-spoke networks have 
multiple hubs with high-capacity trunk lines connecting the main hubs and 
lower-capacity spokes reaching terminal points.  The high-capacity trunk 
lines aggregate traffic and offer cost economies in comparison to a network 
that provides connections between every individual point.  
Telecommunications networks have high-capacity trunks or backbones and 
lower-capacity distribution lines such as the local loop to the individual 
home or business.  Economic life is critically dependent on many types of 
privately owned networks: for communications (broadcast television and 
radio, cable television, telephone, broadband data, utility poles), for energy 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art38
8(electric power transmission and distribution, natural gas and petroleum 
pipelines), for transportation (airlines, railroads, bus and trucks, shipping), 
and for distribution systems (postal services, product wholesale services). 
 The type of networks on which we are focusing generally are physical 
production facilities that encompass factors of production such as land, 
capital equipment, and technology.20  Construction of these facilities 
necessarily requires network owners to invest in substantial fixed assets that 
should be viewed in the same way as other types of capital equipment, such 
as manufacturing plants, office buildings, and commercial structures.  Like 
other long-term assets the network’s physical production facilities do not 
vary directly with output in the short-term.  Like other capital investments, 
the configuration of the network’s physical assets cannot be changed in the 
short-term.  Given sufficient time, however, the network’s capital equipment 
is variable and can be adjusted to create different capacity levels.  The 
operation of a network’s facilities often requires variable inputs as well, such 
as the labor used to maintain its facilities and to monitor its operations.   
 In combination, these productive inputs that constitute the network are 
used to create a stream of services that are the outputs of the network, such 
as the transmission and distribution of communications.  Just as natural gas 
transmission does not consume the physical pipeline, usage of a 
telecommunications network does not consume the network itself but instead 
only temporarily precludes the use of the network for providing services to 
some other user.  Of course, network use does impose some wear and tear on 
the network’s physical production facilities.  The measures of depreciation 
employed under generally accepted accounting principles do not provide an 
accurate indication of the value of the services provided by the equipment, 
however.  As a result, the applicable depreciation rules typically do not 
provide an accurate reflection of the economic life of the equipment. 
 Access to a network refers to the usage of the network’s services, which 
are the outputs of the network.21  Thus, access to a network does not 
represent simply a physical connection to the network, which is but a means 
to an end.  Rather, access refers to the opportunity to benefit from the 
services generated by the usage of the network.  Since usage of network 
elements by another company potentially reduces the services that the 
                                                     
20 Our focus is on physical facilities in transportation, energy, and communications networks.  We 
do not consider other usages of the term networks that refer to interconnected relationships between 
people such as social or business relationships.  
21 Although more general definitions of “access” exist, they seem too broad to provide guidance for 
pricing access to network.  See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 13 (6th ed., 1990) (defining access as 
“an opportunity or ability to enter, approach, pass to and from, or communicate with”); OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (defining the noun, access, as a “way or means of approach” such as “entrance, channel, 
passage, or doorway” or the action of “coming to or towards; approaching,” and identifies the verb, “to 
access,” as “to gain access to (data, etc., held in a computer or computer-based system, or the system 
itself)”).  We do not consider the notion of access as an entitlement, as is the case with access to facilities 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, or access to education or housing under antidiscrimination 
statutes. 
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9network owner can provide, the correct price of access depends on what the 
company could have obtained by using those network services itself or by 
selling network services to some other party.  The proper measure of the 
value of network access is thus the value of the network services provided, 
which in turn is determined by the value of the final output of the network. 
B. Making the Economic Case for Market-Based Pricing of Network Access 
1. Market Prices, Regulated Prices, and Efficiency  
 The modern consensus economic position is that market prices represent 
the best reflection of value.  The market price is the outcome of the forces of 
supply and demand.  The supply side of the market reflects the costs to 
sellers of providing a good.  The demand side of the market reflects the 
benefits to buyers from consuming the good.  At market equilibrium, prices 
are thus determined by the marginal cost to sellers of providing the good and 
the marginal benefit to buyers of consuming the good.  Prices are adjusted 
through the process of exchange to balance supply and demand and clear the 
market so that prices are further reflections of scarcity—the meeting of 
consumer wants and supplier capacities.22  
 Because the services of a network are comparable to the output of any 
other type of production facility, they can be allocated by market processes.  
Markets refer to the interaction of buyers and sellers,23 with market prices 
mediating between what buyers are willing to pay and what sellers are 
willing to accept.  Market prices are determined through the activities of 
suppliers, customers and intermediaries such as retailers and wholesalers.  In 
the short run, producers increase prices when demand exceeds supply and 
lower prices when supply exceeds demand.  In the long run, suppliers make 
production decisions based on the incentives provided by the prices of goods 
in comparison with costs and the prices of alternative goods the supplier 
might provide.  Firms that supply a good at some price are those whose cost 
of each unit provided and the cost at the margin (the last unit provided) equal 
or exceed the market price.  Conversely, consumers make purchasing 
                                                     
22 The determination of market equilibrium prices and of value by the interaction supply and 
demand, at least in the short run, were well understood by the classical economists, including Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo.  The classical economists had various cost-based explanations for the determination 
of the long-run prices of land, labor, and capital.  Beginning in the Nineteenth Century, the marginalist 
revolution that led to the neoclassical economies of today extended the supply and demand analysis 
consistently to output and input markets both in the short and long run.  See WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS, 
THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (London MacMillan 1871); CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF 
ECONOMICS 119 (James Dingwall & Bert Hoselitz trans., 1950) (1871); LEON WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF 
PURE ECONOMICS (William Jaffé trans., Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1954) (1874); ALFRED MARSHALL, 
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (London, MacMillan 1890).  See generally MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC 
THEORY IN RETROSPECT 302 (1968). 
23 On the role of intermediaries in market allocation mechanisms, see DANIEL F. SPULBER, MARKET 
MICROSTRUCTURE:  INTERMEDIARIES AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM (1999). 
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decisions based on the benefits that they derive from that good and the 
availability of substitute goods.  The consumers that purchase a good at some 
price are those whose benefits of each unit consumed at the margin (the last 
unit consumed) equal or exceed the market price.  The price will eventually 
adjust until the market clears, at which point supply and demand will be in 
balance and the benefits to consumers will equal or exceed the costs to 
suppliers.  The market price equals the marginal benefit of the good and thus 
indicates its economic value. 
 Markets are effective mechanisms for pricing not only physical products 
such as automobiles and food but also services such as transportation or 
restaurant services.  Many types of services are routinely purchased and sold.  
For example, video rental stores supply their customers with entertainment 
services corresponding to viewing a movie at home.  Movie theaters provide 
similar entertainment services that require viewing the movie at the theater.  
Automobile renting and leasing supplies customers with the transportation 
services of a vehicle.  There is no distinction in economic theory between the 
market allocation of physical products and the market allocation of services.  
Accordingly, markets can allocate services that are generated by networks 
just as they do any other type of physical product or service. 
 Market prices promote allocative and dynamic efficiency.  Allocation of 
goods is said to be efficient when the purchasers of a particular good are 
those who obtain the greatest benefit from consumption and when the 
suppliers of the good are those who incur the lowest cost of production.  By 
allocating the good or service to the person or firm willing to pay the most 
for it, the price mechanism also ensures that goods and services are placed in 
the hands of those able to put them to their best use.  The price mechanism 
further insures that goods and services are provided by the most efficient 
suppliers. 
 Dynamic efficiency is attained when economic actors make efficient 
investment decisions.  Investment decisions are efficient when the present 
discounted value of the marginal returns to invest equal the marginal cost of 
investment.  Market prices provide incentives for efficient investment 
decisions because the market prices of services created by capital facilities 
are the best measure of the marginal benefit derived by users of those 
services.  A firm deciding whether or not to invest in production facilities to 
produce a good or service makes efficient decisions by considering the 
market value of the products and services to be created with those facilities 
in comparison with the cost of investment.  A firm choosing whether to 
purchase a good or service or to construct its own production facilities makes 
efficient decisions by comparing the market price of purchasing the good or 
service with the investment costs of constructing its own facilities and the 
costs of operating those facilities.  Because market prices allocate productive 
capacity efficiently, signaling marginal benefits and marginal cost, they 
provide an accurate guide for investment decisions. 
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 Regulated prices based on costs tend not to represent an accurate 
reflection of either the value of a good or services or the economic costs of 
producing the service.  This is because regulatory authorities are less 
effective at processing information about costs and benefits than are the 
many buyers and sellers that make up a market.24  Even worse, the 
government typically must rely on the regulated entities, which of course 
have a vested interest in the outcome, for much of the critical information.   
 As a result, it is not uncommon for regulated prices to cause allocative 
inefficiency.  To the extent that the regulated price deviates from the market 
price, it sends incorrect signals to both users and suppliers of access.  For 
example, regulation that compels access to networks at regulated prices that 
fall below market rates in effect requires network owners to subsidize 
competitors.  This in turn leads those competitors to demand more network 
capacity than would be allocatively efficient.  In addition, because access is 
an input used in the production of other goods and services, pricing it below 
market rates can cause competitors to make inefficient decisions about which 
markets to enter, since below-market pricing may mislead competitors into 
believing that the benefits of serving a particular market exceed the costs by 
understating the true economic costs associated with entering that market.  In 
addition, the artificial reduction in input prices will cause secondary 
distortions.  If regulators set the price of network access below market levels, 
competitors will naturally adjust the mix of inputs so that they employ 
reduced quantities of other inputs and greater quantities of network access.  
The result not only creates allocative inefficiency in the primary market by 
stimulating excess demand for network access; it also creates secondary 
distortions in the markets for the other inputs by increasing or reducing 
demand for those inputs.  To the extent that the suppliers of access are 
regulated utilities, the burden will be borne by customers as well as the 
utilities. 
 In addition to impeding allocative efficiency, imposition of regulated 
pricing can also impede dynamic efficiency.  Pricing access at below-market 
levels discourages existing network owners from investing in additional 
network capacity.  At the same time, it also discourages competing 
companies from investing in alternative capacity, including substitute 
network technologies.  This effect underscores the extent to which access 
requirements represent something of a policy anomaly.25  The central focus 
of competition policy is to prevent monopolies from emerging and to break 
them up whenever they occur.  Access requirements, in contrast, leave the 
bottlenecks in place and instead simply require the monopolist to share its 
facilities.  In addition, by rescuing competing firms from having to supply 
                                                     
24 See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT (W.W. Bartley III ed., 1988); Friedrich A. 
Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
25 See Yoo, supra note 9, at 246-47, 269. 
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the relevant input for themselves, compelled access destroys their incentives 
to invest in alternative network technologies and thus deprives providers of 
emerging substitute technologies of their natural strategic partners.  As a 
result, compelled access can have the perverse effect of entrenching any 
supposed bottleneck facility by forestalling the emergence of the alternative 
facilities.  This is particularly problematic in technologically dynamic 
industries, in which the prospects of developing new ways either to 
circumvent or to compete directly with the alleged bottleneck are the highest.   
 Finally, there is good reason to question the extent to which ratemaking 
authorities will in fact make the pursuit of economic efficiency their primary 
goal.  As the burgeoning literature on public choice has demonstrated, 
governmental institutions are subject to a wide variety of pressures that can 
cause them to redirect competition policy towards noneconomic ends.26  The 
system of cross subsidies in telephone pricing provides an apt illustration of 
how governmentally established pricing can be directed towards political and 
social goals and thus provide an imperfect guide for allocation of goods and 
services or for investment decisions.  A review of the FCC’s previous 
attempts to use access requirements to promote competition provides little 
basis for optimism in this regard.27 
 The end result is similar to any system of rent controls, with demand for 
the service exceeding supply at the regulated price.  Prices do not fully serve 
their function of rationing capacity among users and stimulating the 
provision of capacity among suppliers.  Market prices, in contrast, send 
correct signals to companies that seek access as well as to utilities that 
provide access.  Competing companies will have incentives to make 
economically correct decisions about the amount of services to obtain from 
the network access supplier and the extent to which the competing company 
should invest in its own network services. 
2. The Difference Between Market Prices and Unit Costs 
 As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the market price of a good is 
the best indication of its value.  The market price of a good can differ from 
the costs incurred in obtaining the inputs used to produce the good.  This is 
because there are many types of forces that affect market prices through 
changes in demand and supply.  New methods of production that increase 
                                                     
26 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 347-64 (1978); Fred S. McChesney, Be 
True to Your School:  Chicago’s Contradictory Views of Antitrust and Regulation, in THE CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST 323 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995); William J. 
Baumol & Janusz Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. & ECON. 247, 256-59 (1985); 
Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard A. 
Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 622 (1969); George Stigler, The 
Theory of Economic Regulation 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971). 
27 See Donna M. Lampert, Cable Television: Does Leased Access Mean Least Access?, 44 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 245 (1992). 
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efficiency are likely to increase supply at any given price.  Changes in the 
relative prices of inputs, including finance capital, wages, land rents, and the 
prices parts and components have complex effects on supply.  The entry and 
exit of producers and decisions to expand or contract production capacity 
also impact supply.  The introduction of innovative products can create shifts 
in both demand and supply toward new products.  Changes in consumer 
tastes and income can also change demand at any give price.  Changes in the 
prices of substitute and complementary goods also shift demand.  
Accordingly, the market prices of output are unlikely to correspond to the 
past costs incurred to produce that output.  Even if individual producers try 
to anticipate output prices in their decisions, market uncertainty will defeat 
their efforts, leading to randomness in profit margins. 
 Even if market prices were to reflect accurately the costs of the marginal 
producer, they would depart from the costs of the inframarginal producer.  
Costs tend to differ across firms; there are differences in business methods, 
management techniques, production processes and technological knowledge 
across firms.  Moreover, the value of output can depart from the costs of 
inputs because firms combine those inputs in different ways, creating 
different products and addressing customer needs differently.  Firm 
heterogeneity strongly implies that the unit costs of any individual firm are 
likely to differ from the market price.  Under the textbook paradigm of 
perfect competition with identical firms and static demands, efficient entry 
guarantees that the market price eventually equals the unit cost of firms.  
This cannot be the case when unit costs vary across firms. 
 Because of uncertainty regarding changes in output markets, there are 
likely to be deviations between output prices and unit costs.  Some firms will 
earn economic profits and others will suffer economic losses.  Moreover, 
firms often change prices in anticipation of developments since they respond 
to the expectations of buyers and sellers about future market conditions.  
Thus, prices are likely to depart from costs.28 
 Even though competitive forces tend to move market prices toward cost 
through the exit of improvement of inefficient producers, the past costs of 
producing a good are likely to differ substantially from current and future 
costs.  Costs change due to technological change and changes in input prices.  
Market prices correspond more to current and forward-looking demand and 
supply conditions than to past costs.  Traditional cost-of-service regulation at 
best adjusts prices to reflect past costs, thereby permitting regulated rates to 
depart substantially from market prices.  The fundamental reason for this 
departure is that the economic cost of inputs used to produce some output is 
not the same as the market price or economic value of an output produced 
                                                     
28 “The question of fact is thus whether entrepreneurs as a class receive on the average more or less 
than the normal competitive rate of return on the productive services of person or property which they 
furnish to the business.  The question does not admit to any definitive answer on inductive grounds.”  
FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 364 (1921). 
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with those inputs.  This is why regulated rates based on the costs of 
production are necessarily second best. 
C. Determining Market Price 
 Saying that regulatory authorities should base rates for network access 
on market prices leaves open the question of how to determine the prevailing 
market price.  Market transactions constitute the most (if not the only) 
reliable indicator of individual preferences.29  Thus, regulators should 
develop market benchmarks if they choose not to defer to market 
mechanisms for allocation. 
1. Pricing Based on External Market Transactions  
 Under standard valuation techniques, the most reliable indicator of 
market price tends to be the comparable sales approach, in which the price 
charged for the hypothetical transaction in question is determined by prices 
changed in actual market transactions involving similar goods.  Two types of 
market transactions can serve as external benchmarks for comparable sales.  
The easiest case occurs when network owner also sells the same type of 
access mandated by the government into an external market.  When that is 
the case, determination of market value is easy, since comparable sales can 
serve as a reliable proxy for the services provided.   
 In addition, market value may be inferred from the price charged for 
access to a substitute transmission technology that provides similar services.  
Although the historical balkanization of communications has long made such 
determinations impossible, technological convergence has made resort to this 
type of external benchmark increasingly feasible.  Admittedly, transactions 
involving substitute technologies can be slightly more difficult to apply as 
benchmarks than can transactions using the same type of network.  
Differences in network configuration can complicate direct comparisons 
between alternative technologies.  For example, although cable television 
and digital broadcast satellite systems (DBS) have emerged as direct 
competitors, the wire-based distribution of cable operators is necessarily 
restricted to a limited geographic area, whereas the footprint of DBS 
providers is inherently national in scope.30  In addition, network performance 
and reliability levels provided by different types of network technology often 
differ.  As a result, prices must be adjusted to reflect differences in the type 
of network before any comparisons can be drawn.  Although such 
                                                     
29 See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference, 15 
ECONOMICA 243 (1948). 
30 The fact that DBS is inherently national in scope makes it uniquely well suited to taking 
advantage of the economies inherent in national distribution of video programming.  See Christopher S. 
Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2003),  
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adjustments can be somewhat complicated, they are by no means so 
intractable as to render transactions occurring on alternative networks useless 
as external benchmark for inferring market prices. 
 The other principal market-based valuation method is known as the 
income capitalization approach.  When commercial property is involved, 
regulators can use a discounted cash flow analysis to determine the present 
value of the income that the input is projected to earn.  Because the earnings 
are based on the prices charged in the output markets, it is possible to apply 
this method even if the input being priced is not sold in any external markets 
whatsoever.  In addition, because the income capitalization approach is based 
from data derived from actual market transactions, it is still generally 
regarded as a reliable means for determining market value.   
2. The Second-Best Solution in the Absence of External Markets 
 If a market benchmark is not available, then an estimate based on the 
economic costs of providing the service may be necessary.  Such an estimate 
should approximate the market value of all the inputs used to create and 
operate the network, with the understanding that the market price of network 
access can be greater or less than that estimate.  Over time, the market price 
of access should reflect the economic cost of all of the inputs used to provide 
network services.  In the short run, however, market prices may deviate from 
economic cost.  With scarcity of network access, the market price of access 
would likely be greater than the replacement cost of the network.  
Conversely, with a glut or network capacity or obsolescence of network 
technology, the market price of access would likely be less than the 
replacement cost of the network.  For example, a glut in fiber optic capacity 
would be expected to reduce the price of access to below the cost of the 
network.  Accordingly, it is important to distinguish the market value of a 
good from the economic costs of providing that good.  However, the 
economic cost of providing that good properly estimated provides a second-
best alternative. 
 The economic cost of producing a product or service is the total 
opportunity costs of all the inputs used to produce that product or service.  
The economic cost of producing network services in telecommunications 
includes the opportunity costs of such inputs as capital, land and land rights, 
wires, utility poles, towers and fixtures, switches, control systems, 
construction costs as well as operation and maintenance expenses and 
management costs.  The opportunity cost of an input refers to the value of the 
best opportunity necessarily foregone, that is, the return from the best 
alternative employment of that input.  The user costs of capital associated 
with owning plant and equipment is equal to the foregone return from the 
best alternative investment of expenditures made for plant and equipment. 
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 For most productive inputs, the most accurate measure of opportunity 
cost is the market value of that input, which is simply the current market 
price of the input less the avoidable direct costs associated with providing the 
input.  For those inputs for which there is no market price that is readily 
available, it is necessary to impute or estimate the market value.  The best 
estimate is based on the opportunity cost of the input.  For example, if a 
company owns a plot of land that it could rent to another company for the 
$500, that is the opportunity cost of using the land. 
 Replacement cost of an input, which is the cost of purchasing that input 
in the market at current market prices, is in turn provides a reasonable 
approximation of market value.  Accordingly, the market value of the inputs 
used to create a network includes the replacement costs of facilities and 
equipments as well as the user cost of capital evaluated using the market cost 
of capital; land and land rights evaluated using current market rents, and 
current operation and maintenance expenses.  Replacement costs refer to 
forward-looking costs of constructing the network and include all costs that 
the utility would incur to rebuild its system including the costs of capital, 
land, labor services, and management costs.31  A good proxy for replacement 
cost is a recent purchase cost of the input.  It is not a perfect measure, since 
the market price may have increased or decreased since the most recent 
purchase.  Nonetheless, in the absence of indicia that measure market value 
more directly, estimates of replacement cost based on comparable 
transactions provide a useful and workable estimate of market value. 
 It is now generally accepted that replacement cost is superior to 
historical cost as a measure of market value, because, as noted by then-
Professor Stephen Breyer, “[a] competitive marketplace values assets, not at 
their historical price, but at their replacement value—the present cost of 
obtaining the identical service that the old asset provides.”32  Historical costs 
suffer from several well-recognized infirmities.  For example, the market 
value of an input may have increased or decreased since its purchase.  In 
addition, historical costs will typically be based on the book values of plant 
and equipment (also known as “embedded costs”).  The depreciation 
schedules allowed under the applicable accounting rules and tax laws often 
fail to constitute proper economic measures of depreciation.  Replacement 
                                                     
31 Scholars and policy makers have disputed whether the replacement cost determination should be 
based on the network as it is currently configured or on a hypothetical network employing the most 
efficient technology and configuration available.  Resolution of this debate, while undoubtedly important 
in implementing any access regime, falls outside the scope of this Article, which focuses primarily on the 
importance of making sure that any access prices set by regulatory authorities include some measure of 
the market demand for access.  For an early argument in favor of hypothetical networks, see Missouri ex 
rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 276, 312 (1923) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring in the judgment).  For a modern argument in support of basing replacement cost on the 
configuration of existing networks, see J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY 
TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT 419-25 (1997); J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, 
Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068 (1997).  
32 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 38 (1982) (emphasis in original). 
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costs, in contrast, more accurately reflect changes in value.  It is true that 
replacement cost is not without its own complications and that short-term 
changes can temporarily cause replacement cost to rise above or fall below 
equilibrium levels.  On the whole, however, replacement cost provides a 
reasonably reliable measure of the direct costs of providing the services of a 
network. 
 The costs of supplying network access also include transaction costs.  
The network operator must devote management and employee resources to 
handling the provision of network services including arranging network 
connections, monitoring usage, and billing for use of the network.  In the 
face of mandated access, the owner of the network must determine what are 
the existing demands for capacity and make arrangements to provide 
additional capacity to meet regulatory requirements.  For example, in the 
case of pole attachments, the FCC requires that a utility take steps to expand 
the capacity of its poles, ducts, conduits, and even rights of way upon request 
by telecommunications carriers and cable operators.33  The provision of pole 
attachment services also may involve actions that generate convenience or 
transaction cost savings for the telecommunications or cable TV companies 
seeking access in comparison with producing their own system of poles.34  
Transaction costs may be difficult to recover when rates are regulated 
because they may appear intangible to regulators.  Despite this fact, 
transaction costs significantly affect prices and decisions in competitive 
markets. 
3. The Efficient Component Pricing Rule 
 As emphasized thus far, pricing access to a network refers to the prices 
attached to the services generated by the entire network.  An alternative 
regulatory approach to network access grants users the services of particular 
inputs to the network rather than the output of services from the network as a 
whole.  This originates with trackage rights in railroads, whereby rights were 
given to third party operators of trains on a railroad’s track, and is reflected 
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which mandates a very different 
type of network access based on usage of the services of individual 
components of the network rather than the services of the network itself.  
Thus, this approach focuses on the services of inputs to the network rather 
than the outputs of the network.  For example, with regards to network 
components such as the local loop, switches, or other facilities (called 
“network elements”), the 1996 Act requires that incumbent local exchange 
                                                     
33 Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in Telecomms. Act of 1996, First Report and 
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 16075-76 ¶¶ 1162-1163 (1996). 
34 Id. at 16076-77 ¶ 1164 (declining to require companies seeking access under the Pole Attachments 
Act to exhaust the possibilities of leasing capacity from other providers before requesting the pole owner 
to expand its capacity). 
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carriers (LECs) to provide “nondiscriminatory access . . . on an unbundled 
basis at any technically feasible point.”35  In the case of collocation, 
incumbent LECs have the duty to provide “physical collocation of equipment 
necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements at the 
premises of the local exchange carrier.”36  Access to unbundled network 
elements corresponds to a manufacturer providing another company with 
usage of a piece of capital equipment, such as a machine tool.  Collocation 
corresponds to a manufacturer allowing another company to locate its 
equipment in the manufacturer’s factory. 
 Regulatory pricing of access to isolated network inputs raises some of 
the same issues that came up in a connection with pricing of access to 
services provided by the network as a whole.  The best way to price access to 
inputs is to consider the market price of similar access.  If a market 
benchmark is not available, there is a need to resort to cost-based estimates 
of providing access to the input.  Again, the market value of the input is a 
desirable benchmark if available. 
 It would be misleading to assume, as does the FCC, that the cost of 
providing usage of an input to the network is confined to the direct cost of 
that input.37  The input is part of a network and, accordingly, the usage of a 
network component by another company necessarily has an impact on the 
output of services using the network.  The capacity of the network element to 
provide network services is correspondingly diminished, thus reducing the 
output of services by the network itself.  To take a simple example, a set of 
tires for an automobile may cost only $400, but allowing another motorist to 
use the tires would preclude usage of the automobile.  The foregone value of 
the automobile might be say $20,000.  In the same way, the cost of allowing 
competing telecommunications companies access to unbundled network 
elements would depend not on the direct cost of providing that element but 
on the indirect cost of removing the services of that element from the 
network of the incumbent telephone company.  Accordingly, the cost of 
providing access to unbundled network elements should not be measured in 
terms of the cost of obtaining the input.  Rather, the cost depends on the 
reduction in overall network services that result from using a network 
element for another purpose by another company.   
 The proper valuation of the cost of making an input available is the 
direct cost of the input plus the value of the diminished output.  Thus, prices 
set at economic cost of an input must represent the sum of the direct 
                                                     
35 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3). 
36 Id. § 251(c)(6). 
37 As will be discussed in greater detail later, the FCC issued regulations that prices for the 
unbundled access to network elements be based on each element’s Total Element Long Run Incremental 
Cost (TELRIC).  This cost notion corresponds with the direct cost that a manufacturer would incur in 
providing another company with the usage of a piece of capital equipment in the manufacturer’s factory.  
It does not include any factors designed to capture opportunity costs. 
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incremental cost of providing the input and the opportunity costs associated 
with providing the input to a competitor.  The analytical methodology for 
setting input access prices at these levels is known as the Efficient 
Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), which would set access prices according 
to the following formula: 
access price = incumbent’s per-unit incremental cost of 
providing access + the incumbent’s opportunity cost of 
providing the unbundled input. 
Since usage of network elements by another company potentially reduces the 
services that the network can provide, the correct price of those network 
elements depends on what the company could have obtained by selling 
network services.  Thus, the market price of network services, the outputs of 
the network, should be used as the basis for determining the value of access 
to the services of network components, the inputs of the network.38  In the 
absence of market prices for network output, the opportunity cost calculation 
can be based on the regulated rates for the incumbent firm’s output. 
 We acknowledge that allocating the retail markup among multiple 
products using ECPR (or any other access pricing method) poses conceptual 
and administrative problems.  For example, if a competitor were to lease two 
or more network elements from an incumbent LEC, it would be improper, of 
course, to include the entire retail markup in the opportunity cost component 
for both elements, since that would in effect allow the incumbent LEC to 
recover twice for the same markup.  The retail markup could be divided 
among the various elements, but doing so would require some method 
(probably based in cost accounting) for apportioning the markup to particular 
elements.  While this problem is most easily posed when the same 
competitor leases both elements, the same problem arises if two different 
competitors were to lease the same elements or even two different elements 
in the same chain of production.  Although the allocation of foregone retail 
margin to particular components is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, such 
problems are endemic to any system of establishing prices for inputs.  
Apportioning the foregone retail margin should not prove any more 
intractable than the apportionment of common costs that must inevitably 
occur under any regulatory scheme that relies on compelled access.39  In any 
event, the pricing of the element should at least cover its direct incremental 
cost to avoid cross subsidization.   
 The market-determined efficient component pricing rule (M-ECPR) 
adjusts the calculation of opportunity costs by using a benchmark market 
                                                     
38 Cites to ECPR literature here. 
39 See Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in Telecomms. Act of 1996, First Report and 




price (if one exists) rather than using regulated rates for the incumbent firm’s 
output.  It is again likely that regulated rates for network services will not 
correspond to the market price of competing alternatives.  Thus, the M-
ECPR provides a method of adjusting access prices to reflect market prices 
of network services.  This promotes efficient allocation of network services 
as well as dynamic efficiency of investment decisions.40 
 Opportunity cost is the means by which access pricing attempts to reflect 
market demand for the network services in question.  Any regime that bases 
access prices solely on production costs without taking market demand into 
account would lead to allocative inefficiency and dynamic inefficiency.  It 
would ignore the importance of a demand component that formed the 
foundation for the emergence of neoclassical economics. 
4. Traditional, Cost-Based Approaches to Setting Rates in Regulated 
Industries 
 Conventional economic theory thus suggests that access rates in network 
industries promote economic efficiency only if they are set on the basis of 
market prices.  If market-based pricing is unavailable, the appropriate 
second-best solution is to base rates on the economic costs of providing 
access, which is a concept that embraces both direct incremental costs and 
opportunity costs.  Historically, however, regulatory authorities have 
established rates solely on the basis of direct costs without taking opportunity 
costs into account.  The dominant initial position was the “fair value” 
principle associated with the landmark decision in Smyth v. Ames,41 which 
required that rates be based on the replacement cost of the assets used to 
provide the service.  The preference for replacement costs was based on the 
recognition that if the regulated entity constituted a natural monopoly, by 
definition no external transactions would exist that could serve as the basis 
for market-based pricing.  At the same time, parties who obtain service under 
a regulated rate always had the option of constructing a substitute facility.  
This meant that in the long run replacement cost would tend to reflect market 
demand.  Although technological and functional obsolescence could cause 
replacement cost to be a misleading reflection of market value in some 
circumstances, in the absence of data based on actual transactions 
replacement cost remained a useful proxy.42  
 The primary alternative to the replacement cost methodologies 
associated with Smyth v. Ames was the historical cost methodologies 
                                                     
40 See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 31, at 307-33. 
41 169 U.S. 466 (1898).  On its face, Smyth v. Ames appeared to offer a laundry list of considerations 
to guide the ratemaking determination.  Id. at 546-57.  When placed in context, it becomes clear that 
Smyth v. Ames and its progeny firmly endorsed the replacement cost approach to rate regulation.  Stephen 
A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era:  Lessons from the Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate 
Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 227-28 (1984). 
42 See Siegel, supra note 41, at 221-22, 229, 231; supra note 31-32 and accompanying text. 
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associated with Justice Brandeis’s separate opinion in Missouri ex rel. 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission.43  Although 
Brandeis recognized that the comparable sales would represent the most 
accurate methodology for determining the utility’s value for ratemaking 
purposes, he concluded that such prices were impossible to determine, “since 
utilities, unlike merchandise or land, are not commonly bought and sold in 
the market.”44  Brandeis further noted that calculate value by capitalizing the 
utility’s earnings necessarily embroiled regulatory authorities in a “vicious 
circle.”45  As the Court later noted, “The heart of the matter is that rates 
cannot be made to depend upon ‘fair value’ when the value of the going 
enterprise depends on earnings under whatever rates may be anticipated”; the 
result is that fair value becomes “the end product of the process of rate-
making not the starting point.”46 
 In the absence of some market-determined basis for setting rates, 
Brandeis believed that rates necessarily must be based on some measure of 
cost.  Brandeis recognized that replacement cost might well represent the 
best evidence of present value, since replacement cost constituted a better 
reflection of technological improvements.47  In the end, however, pragmatic 
considerations led Brandeis to advocate relying on historical costs.  
Determining replacement cost was an inherently speculative endeavor 
fraught with unnecessary uncertainty.48  In addition, basing value on 
replacement cost would expose both consumers and investors to the risks 
associated with fluctuations in market prices.49  In comparison, relying on 
historic cost allowed for less variable and subjective determinations of 
value.50   
 Brandeis’s argument quickly became one of the focal points in the 
debate over rate setting methodologies.51  The Supreme Court has frequently 
invoked it as the definitive explanation for the decision of various regulatory 
                                                     
43 262 U.S. 276, 292-94 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).   
44 Id. at 292. 
45 Id. 
46 FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944); accord Verizon Communications, Inc. v. 
FCC, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 1658 (2002); Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308 n.5 (1989); FPC v. 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 603 (1942) (Black, J., concurring); St. Louis & O’Fallon Ry. v. 
United States, 279 U.S. 461, 505 n.23 (1929) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Jim Chen, The Second Coming of 
Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1556 (1999); Siegel, supra note 41, at 246. 
47 Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 300. 
48 Id. at 293-302. 
49 Id. at 302-08.  To the extent that Brandeis’s opinion evinces a strong desire to insulate both 
consumers and investors from the dislocation caused by market fluctuations, it exhibits some strikingly 
anti-economic tendencies.  His position is perhaps explained by the desire to promote classical-style 
democracy that permeates his jurisprudence.  See L.S. Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way:  The 
Decline of Developmental Property, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 596, 634-38 (1988).  A more cynical observer 
might suggest that his interest in protecting investors from market fluctuations followed more from the 
fact that he held a substantial amount of his wealth in commercial paper issued by utilities.  See id. at 637-
38. 
50 Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 308-10. 
51 Siegel, supra note 41, at 240 n.227. 
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authorities not to use market-based pricing when setting rates.52  Eventually, 
however, the controversy between historical and replacement cost ended in a 
somewhat inconclusive draw.  Rather than resolving this dispute on its 
substantive merits, in the end the Supreme Court invoked notions of 
administrative deference and judicial restraint to reject the notion that rates 
must be set in accordance with any particular approach.  Instead, the Court 
resolved to uphold any rate determination regardless of methodology so long 
as it fell within a fairly broad zone of reasonableness.53  Applying these 
principles allowed the Court to sustain a wide variety of ratemaking 
methodologies based on increasingly complicated versions of historical or 
replacement cost.54  Eventually, formal ratemaking gave way to the 
imposition of price caps, in which the maximum rates that utilities could 
charge in any particular year did not depend on costs, but rather on the rates 
set the previous year, reduced by a fixed percentage to reflect increases in 
productivity.  Price cap methodologies did not cure the basic flaw of failing 
to reflect demand considerations, since the rates charged for the initial year 
in the typical price cap scheme were based on historical cost.55 
 The unifying thread to all of these approaches was their consistent 
commitment to basing rates on direct cost (whether historical or replacement 
cost) and their consistent refusal to include a component taking opportunity 
cost or market-based influence into account.56  Fortified by this background, 
regulators charged with implementing access regimes have tended to follow 
their traditional patterns and based access rates solely on either historical or 
replacement cost.  As the foregoing discussion reveals, however, that 
regulatory approaches that base rates solely on direct costs suffer from a 
fundamental conceptual flaw.  In failing to incorporate some dimension that 
reflects the earning potential of the regulated input, approaches based on 
                                                     
52 See Verizon, 122 S. Ct. at 1657-58; Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 308-09 & n.5; Natural Gas Pipeline 
Co., 315 U.S. at 603 (Black, J., concurring). 
53 As the Court noted in Hope Natural Gas, “it is the result reached not the method employed which 
is controlling.  It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. . . . The fact that the method 
employed to reach that result may contain infirmities is not then important.”  320 U.S. at 602 (citations 
omitted); accord Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 314-16; Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. at 586.  See 
generally Siegel, supra note 41, at 252-59.  It should be noted that the approach taken by the Court in 
Hope Natural Gas was itself circular.   
54 See, e.g., Verizon, 122 S. Ct. at 1665-76, 1679-80 (upholding replacement cost methodology as a 
matter of statutory construction, but declining to address the overall reasonableness of rates on ripeness 
grounds); Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 310-12 (upholding rates based on modified historical cost methodology); 
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 761, 768-74 (1968) (upholding rates based on composite 
cost data from an entire area rather than prevailing field prices); Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 596-98, 
603-05 (upholding rates based on historical cost). 
55 Verizon, 122 S. Ct. at 1660 (citing United States Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 188 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 
1999); and Alfred E. Kahn, Timothy J. Tardiff, & Dennis L. Weisman, The Telecommunications Act at 
Three Years:  An Economic Evaluation of its Implementation by the Federal Communications 
Commission, 11 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 319, 330-32 (1999)). 
56 Verizon, 122 S. Ct. at 1659 (citing ALFRED KAHN, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 40-41 (1988)). 
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direct cost, whether historical or replacement cost, fail to reflect the basic 
insight that has guided economics for the last century.57 
 The only conceivable justification for failing to base rates on market 
prices is that the absence of comparable transactions rendered any attempt to 
base rates on market value inherently circular.  Indeed, as the foregoing 
discussion reveals, that was precisely the reasoning upon which Justice 
Brandeis and the regulatory authorities and courts that followed his lead 
relied to justify their advocacy of cost-based approaches.58  What modern 
regulatory authorities have failed to recognize is the manner in which 
technological convergence and the shift from rate regulation to access 
regulation has now made it possible to base rates on market benchmarks.  
The possibility of input substitution allows external markets for inputs to 
exist even when external markets for final goods do not.  In addition, the 
raison d’etre of access regulations is to foster the emergence of competition 
in final goods markets.  Any success in doing so will only serve to further 
undercut the justification for refusing to base rates on market transactions.  
The shift from output to input regulation has also undermined the previously 
proffered reasons for rejecting the income capitalization approach.  When 
regulation focuses on the rate charged for an input rather than for a final 
good, the regulated price is only one of many factors that determines the 
good’s overall earning potential rather than its sole determinant.  So long as 
the input remains only one component of the overall good, it can no longer 
be said that the income capitalization approach will is inherently tautological.  
The degree of circularity will be limited to percentage of the total cost of the 
final good represented by the regulated input. 
 Equally important is the manner in which technological change has also 
allowed for competition among different network platforms to develop.  The 
availability of substitute networks employing alternative means of 
transmission has in turn created external markets that now make it possible 
for regulatory authorities to base rates on prices charged in actual market 
transactions.  In addition, the advent of facilities-based competition in turn 
can lead to deregulation of the rates charged for the final good, which in turn 
will eliminate the circularity inherent in the income capitalization approach.   
 Simply put, the two fundamental changes that we believe are 
transforming the basic approach to regulating network industries are both in 
the process of eviscerating the reasons underlying ratemaking authorities’ 
longstanding decision to base rates on some measure of direct costs and to 
                                                     
57 Siegel, supra note 41, at 251-52 (noting that although some jurists used neoclassical economics to 
attack the replacement cost methodology associated with Smyth v. Ames, the critique ultimately proved 
too much by also undermining attempts to base rates on historical cost); Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND. L. REV. 305, 325 (1993) (noting that neoclassical 
economics affected the debate between basing rates on historical cost as opposed to an alternative 
measure that were based either a capacity to earn a profit or replacement cost). 
58 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
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exclude from their ratemaking calculus components designed to reflect the 
regulated good’s earning potential.  Together the shift to access regulation 
and the development of technological convergence have rendered continued 
adherence to that position untenable and mandate as a matter of economic 
policy that regulatory authorities begin to base access rates on market prices. 
D. Demystifying Network Economics 
 Fundamental economic principles thus indicate that efficiency would 
best be promoted if network access prices were based on the market value of 
the relevant inputs.  If direct, market-based indicia are not available, 
regulatory authorities should use a methodology such as ECPR that includes 
both the direct costs as well as the opportunity costs of providing the input.  
Recent academic commentary, however, has suggested that network 
industries possess features such as sunk costs, economies of scale and scope, 
and network economic effects that may cause market prices to deviate from 
levels that promote efficiency.  The analysis that follows refutes those 
arguments.  Most of these features are not unique to network industries and 
are easily taken into account by traditional price mechanisms. 
1. Economies of Scale and Scope  
 There are economies of scale and scope in networks, but these do not 
prevent markets from allocating the services that networks provide.  
Economies of scale are said to exist for a single product firm if unit costs 
decline as a function of output.  For a multiple-product firm, economies of 
scale means that total costs of production exceed the total of each output 
times its marginal cost.  Economies of scope are said to exist if a company 
achieves cost economies by producing goods in combination rather than 
separately.  
 Networks certainly exhibit economies of scale.  Large-scale networks 
can employ advanced high-capacity switches.  Moreover, building and 
operating a large network benefits from economies of scale since the firm 
can spread out the overhead costs associated with constructing and 
maintenance over a larger set of activities.  Economies of scale may also be 
present because of volume-surface relationships, so that the volume of a 
conduit can be expanded with a less than proportional increase in the surface.  
Moreover, the unit costs of capacity in a transmission line decline because 
there are fixed costs of constructing the conduit that must be incurred which 
are somewhat invariant to the number of transmission wires inside the 
conduit.  This is why telecom companies find that the incremental cost of 
installing additional fiber capacity at the time of the initial installation is less 
than the unit cost of installing fiber capacity. 
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 Economies of scope are also present in networks, since multiple services 
can be provided using common facilities.  For example, the same switch can 
be used to provide many different services such as call waiting and call 
forwarding.  Economies of scope in networks also derive from network 
structure.  Suppose that the products of the network are viewed as 
connections between pairs of network users.  Rather than operating a point-
to-point network, traffic can be aggregated in trunk lines with points reached 
by distribution or feeder lines.  By realizing economies of scale in the trunk 
lines, the firm achieves economies of scope in the production of multiple 
connections. 
 Economies of scale and scope exist in practically any industry.  For 
example, in the automobile industry, the unit costs of producing automobiles 
are lower the more automobiles are produced.  Producing only a few cars 
requires making them practically by hand.  Producing many cars allows the 
development of a large plant that takes advantage of automation as well as 
the benefits of specialization and division of labor recognized by Adam 
Smith.59  Economies of scope are also familiar.  They explain why a 
company can obtain costs savings from producing multiple types of 
automobiles.  The company shares common costs of manufacturing, 
engineering, and management across multiple products.   
 The presence of cost economies in manufacturing does not prevent 
markets from allocating goods and services that are produced with 
economies of scale.  Multiple producers can have economies and scale and 
scope and compete with each other in supplying goods and services.  For 
example, automobile manufacturers compete with each other to sell cars 
unhindered by the presence of cost economies in manufacturing.  There is no 
a priori reason that markets for telecommunications services should differ in 
any way.  Multiple networks can operate with economies of scale and scope 
and compete to supply services to customers.  Market prices continue to be 
an accurate measure of value. 
 Sufficient scale relative to the size of the market results in natural 
monopoly.60  A given industry is said to exhibit natural monopoly 
                                                     
59 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 3-16 (Random House 1965) (1776). 
60 Economies of scale are said to be present if the marginal costs of production are less than the 
average costs of production over the relevant range of output.  Economies of scale can be due to many 
different technological factors, such as specialization of function and division of labor permitted by 
increased output.  Fixed costs are a source of economies of scale that is particularly significant to the 
telecommunications industry – and to all other industries that require networks, such as railroads, oil and 
natural gas pipelines, electricity, and water services.  Fixed costs are costs that do not vary with 
fluctuations in output, unlike operating or “variable” costs.  The fixed costs of establishing a network 
system are the costs of facilities such as transmission lines, which are not sensitive to the level of 
transmission on the lines.  The firm’s average cost function refers to the cost per unit of output evaluated 
at each output level.  The firm’s marginal cost function refers to the additional cost of producing one more 
unit of output, evaluated at each level of output.  Economies of scale at a given output level is not 
necessary for natural monopoly.  The natural monopoly property can be present at an output level at 
which the cost function exhibits decreasing returns to scale.  For further discussion, see DANIEL F. 
SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 117 (1989). 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art38
26
characteristics if the cost function derived from the underlying technology is 
“subadditive,” i.e., if a single firm can supply the entire market at lower cost 
than can two or more firms.61  If the technology of local telephone service 
were to exhibit natural monopoly characteristics, then a single firm could 
construct and operate that network at a lower cost than can two or more 
firms.  Multiproduct cost functions are said to exhibit natural monopoly 
characteristics if and only if the cost function derived from the underlying 
technology is subadditive across products, that is, the costs faced by a single 
firm producing the entire set of products is less than the costs that would 
result if the same production were divided between two firms.  There is some 
controversy over whether the technology of existing telecommunications 
networks fall within this definition.62   
 The existence of natural monopoly does not necessarily preclude 
competitive entry, however.  For example, even if a particular 
telecommunications technology were to exhibit natural monopoly 
characteristics, efficient retail prices could still be achieved if providers were 
required to compete through periodic auctions for the right to serve the 
market.63  Moreover, proponents of “contestability” theory have 
demonstrated that so long as entry and exit are easy, the potential for new 
entry can drive prices towards competitive levels even if the technology 
makes it most efficient for a single firm to serve the entire market.64  Even if 
the incumbent prices at cost there are thus still some situations in which an 
incumbent monopoly cannot find prices that sustain its position against entry.   
                                                     
61 The concept of natural monopoly is generally credited to John Stuart Mill, who emphasized the 
problem of wasteful duplication of transmission facilities that can occur in utility services.  1 JOHN S. 
MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 132-54 (W.J. Ashley, ed., Augustus M. Kelly 1961) (1848).  
The connection between natural monopoly and regulation is developed by Leon Walras with reference to 
the construction and operation of railroads.  LEON WALRAS, ETUDES D’ECONOMIE SOCIALE:  THEORIE DE 
LA REPARTITION DE LA RICHESSE SOCIALE (1936). 
62 Statistical studies showing that costs are not subadditive include Richard Shin & John Ying, 
Unnatural Monopolies in Local Telephone, 23 RAND J. ECON. 171 (1992), who find that the costs of local 
exchange carriers were not subadditive before the AT&T divestiture using data from 1976 to 1983, and 
David S. Evans & James J. Heckman, A Test for Subadditivity of the Cost Function with an Application to 
the Bell System, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 615, 620 (1984), who show that AT&T’s costs were not subadditive.  
Estimating telecommunications network costs is problematic for companies that have been regulated 
because data is obtained from regulatory accounting information.  Also, the data are often presented at a 
aggregate level that is not suited to evaluation of cost functions.  The estimation of cost functions using 
standard econometric techniques is difficult at best since an established legacy system built up over 
decades is not likely to be optimized.  Engineering cost models that make assumptions about system 
configurations need not describe the costs of existing systems.  Moreover, the notion of comparing the 
costs of two identical systems serving the same geographic area is likely to be counterfactual.  For a 
review of the literature analyzing whether costs in the cable television industry are subadditive, see 
Thomas W. Hazlett, Duopolistic Competition in Cable Television:  Implications for Public Policy, 7 YALE 
J. ON REG. 65, 71-75 (1990). 
63 See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968) (arguing that with 
sufficient bidders and absent collusion, periodic auctioning of monopoly franchises can yield competitive 
pricing); Richard A. Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, 3 
BELL J. ECON. 98 (1972) (applying Demsetz’s analysis to cable television). 
64 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR, & ROBERT D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND 
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (rev. ed. 1988). 
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 Moreover, natural monopoly technology need not impede competition 
because the technology of entrants can differ from that of incumbents.  In the 
standard textbook definition of natural monopoly, which also underlies most 
public policy discussions, it is presumed that incumbents and entrants have 
the same cost function and presumably the same underlying technology.65  
The assertion is that all firms have the same technology and that there is not 
enough room in the market for more than one firm, so that there is little that 
an entrant could add to productive capacity.  Even if the incumbent’s 
technology were to exhibit natural monopoly characteristics, assuming that 
an entrant would need to construct the same network certainly assumes the 
conclusion.  It is unrealistic, however, to presuppose that the incumbent and 
the entrant will employ the same technology.66  Entrants may employ capital 
equipment of more recent vintage than the incumbent so that their systems 
embody different technologies.  Given the rapid pace of technological 
change in telecommunications, an entrant can operate a network with a 
different configuration.  
 Thus, an incumbent might operate a traditional telecommunications 
network with twisted copper pair to the home, a technology that is over a 
century old, while an entrant might offer wireless service.  There are many 
transmission technologies including coaxial cable television systems, fiber-
optic cable, various land-based wireless systems, and satellite-based systems.  
Each of these transmission approaches has different properties in terms of 
costs and performance.  The many uses of transmission networks, including 
telephony, mobile communications, data transmission, and video, suggest 
that different transmission technologies are suited to different uses.  Entrants 
that offer specialized networks targeted to particular applications are likely to 
have different technologies than the incumbent.  Moreover, the entrant can 
target specialized market segments without the need to duplicate the 
incumbent’s system.67  Competition from Internet telephony, cable 
telephony, and wireless provides alternatives to the traditional telephone 
system.  Thus, competitive markets for network services can form and  
market prices continue to be an accurate measure of value. 
2. Sunk Costs 
 The substantial sunk costs in establishing certain types of 
telecommunications networks, particularly the traditional wireline network, 
do not prevent markets from allocating network services or prevent market 
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67 The discussion in this section draws upon id. at 45-50; and Daniel F. Spulber, Competition Policy 




prices from representing an accurate measure of value.  Sunk costs are 
present in most industries to a greater or lesser extent.  Expenditures for 
research and development and marketing are generally regarded as sunk 
investment.  Generally, the inability to recover expenditures is a fact of life 
otherwise known as business risk with few implications for the performance 
of market transactions.  Moreover, most forms of manufacturing entail sunk 
costs in the form of capital equipment, whether it is used for manufacturing 
automobiles or extracting crude oil.  This does not prevent in any way the 
market allocation of the products manufactured using that capital equipment.  
The method of manufacture does not alter the ability of market transactions 
to allocate a good or service.  Telecommunications is not different even if it 
requires nonrecoverable expenditures in plant and equipment, namely wires 
and switches. 
 The notion often put forward in public policy discussions and legal cases 
involving telecommunications is that sunk costs prevent competition in 
telecommunications services and hence result in market failure.  In 
particular, sunk costs are often said to be a barrier to entry if entrants need to 
make irreversible investments in capacity, while incumbents have already 
incurred these costs.  The standard reasoning is as follows.  The incumbent 
need only price to recover operating expenses and incremental capital 
expenditures, since the irreversible investment costs of entry can be written 
off.  An entrant, in contrast, must anticipate earnings exceeding operating 
costs, incremental investment as well as the irreversible costs of establishing 
its facilities before it will decide to enter.68   
 In the AT&T case, Judge Greene observed with regards to barriers to 
entry, “The evidence introduced at the trial of this case clearly demonstrated 
that duplication of the ubiquitous local exchange networks would require an 
enormous and prohibitive capital investment, and no one seriously questions 
that this is true.”69  Richard Posner points out, however, that nonrecurring 
costs of entry are “irrelevant if there are small firms in the market that can 
grow to be large firms.”  He continues, “In any event, there is grave doubt 
whether there are important nonrecurring costs of entry-barriers to entry in 
the true sense.”70  Posner further notes that costs of capital are not a barrier 
since the costs should be comparable for firms already in the market.   
 There are many ways for potential entrants into an industry to reduce the 
risks associated with making nonrecoverable expenditures, including 
contracting with customers before irreversible investments are made and 
entering into joint ventures or mergers with incumbents.  Furthermore, in 
                                                     
68 See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers, and 
Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 Q.J. ECON. 405 (1981).  According to George Stigler, barriers to entry are 
long-run costs imposed on entrants that are not present for incumbents.  GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE 
ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY  67 (1968) 
69 United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 538 (D.D.C. 1987). 
70 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 92 (1976). 
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competitive markets, duplication of investment often occurs.  The entry of 
excess or insufficient capacity can take place as a consequence of uncertainty 
regarding costs, technology, or market demand.  Overcapacity in automobile 
manufacturing or restaurants is part of the competitive process and certainly 
does not indicate the presence of market failure.  Indeed, periods of 
excessive capacity so often observed in a wide variety of industries 
demonstrates that sunk costs are unlikely to deter vigorous competition.  The 
same is true in telecommunications, of course in the absence of regulatory 
intervention that favors or penalizes incumbents. 
 Technological change further mutes the impact of sunk costs on 
entrants.71  Entrants commit capital resources in those markets or market 
segments where they expect to earn competitive returns on their investments.  
The sunk costs involved in establishing a telecommunications system, given 
currently available technologies, are not different from irreversible 
investments in any other competitive market.  Concern over sunk costs in 
telecommunications may be due to the substantial level of investment needed 
to establish a traditional telecommunications network, in particular due to the 
ubiquity of the regulated Bell System monopoly.  This is a quantitative 
difference but hardly a qualitative one.  Entrants can invest smaller amounts 
to create networks targeted at particular customers and specific services. 
 The argument that sunk costs are a barrier to entry also depends in part 
on the similarity of the technology of the incumbent and entrant, as in the 
earlier case of natural monopoly discussions.  Yet, an entrant need not 
duplicate the incumbent’s network.  An entrant with lower operating costs 
could be assured of recovering at least the difference between the 
incumbent’s operating costs and the entrant’s own operating costs, which 
could well be sufficient to recover the costs of entry.  This scenario is likely 
since technological change in telecommunications, such as the application of 
microprocessors in switching, potentially lowers the costs of operating 
networks.  Moreover, even if the entrant’s operating costs are greater than 
the incumbent’s, entrants can generate incremental revenues to offset the 
costs of entry by offering enhanced or specialized services.  By 
differentiating its offerings through branding, customer service and location, 
entrants gain incremental revenues to cover the costs of entry.  New 
technologies offer enhanced performance including switched services, the 
mobility of wireless services and the increased bandwidth of coaxial and 
fiber-optic systems, thus allowing competition with established networks that 
have different technologies. 
 Even the need to sink costs into a telecommunications network has been 
altered by technological change.  For example, wireless technologies avoid 
customer-specific irreversible investment for the “last mile” to the 
customer’s location.  Wireless transmission towers can be relocated.  Thus, 
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even if substantial sunk costs are required to reproduce the incumbent’s 
wireline network, a wireless alternative is an effective competitor without the 
same sunk costs.  Thus, sunk costs in telecommunications need to impede the 
market allocation of telecommunications services.  
3. Compatibility and Interconnection 
 Although there are clear benefits from compatibility and interconnection 
of networks, these benefits do not prevent markets from allocating network 
services so that market prices continue to be an accurate measure of value.  
The interconnection of networks is necessary for a call placed by a customer 
served by a network to reach a customer served by another network.  
Because the number of connections enhances the value of a network, it is in 
the interest of network operators to interconnect.  
 There is an extensive set of network interconnections.  Local networks 
have access to most if not all long distance and international networks.  
Wireless services are connected to both local and long distance networks.  
Local telecommunications networks, wireless systems, digital subscriber 
lines, and broadband cable can be used to access the Internet.  The Internet 
itself as a network of networks represents a vast number of interconnections.  
The terms of such interconnections are established both through market 
agreements and through regulated charges.  Given this set of interconnection 
agreements, access to the services of a network implicitly entails access to 
the connections offered by the network.  The customer may obtain some of 
these connections as part of the network service or the customer may pay for 
individual connections, just as retail telecommunications customers purchase 
local and long-distance services separately.  Accordingly, the benefits from 
interconnecting networks enhance the ability of competitive firms to provide 
network services and do not conflict with market pricing of network services. 
4. Network Economic Effects 
 Many networks have the property that the number of people connected to 
them determines their value.  The classic example of a network that exhibits 
such an effect is the telephone system, since the value of a telephone network 
is determined in large part by the number of people with whom one can 
communicate through that network.  The more people that are part of the 
network, the more valuable the network becomes.  The result is that the value 
of network access depends not only by the access price charged, but also on 
the number of users who have access to the network.  This economic 
literature refers to this characteristic as a network economic effect.   
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 Some economists consider network economic effects to be a kind of 
externality.72  Externalities occur whenever individuals do not bear all of the 
economic consequences of their actions.  Proponents of the network 
externalities view suggest that network users’ inability to capture all of the 
benefits generated by their usage represents a positive externality that will 
cause overall utilization of the network to drop below efficient levels.73  
These theorists also suggest that network externalities can turn network 
access into a competitive weapon.  By refusing to interconnect with other 
networks, network owners can force users to choose one network to the 
exclusion of others.  Forcing users to commit to one network naturally leads 
users to flock to the largest network.  It is argued that network owners can 
thus use network externalities to create or reinforce a monopoly position. 
 In addition, other scholars argue that network effects can adversely affect 
technological adoption and product selection decisions.74  In their view, 
network externalities can cause a different market failure known as 
technology lock-in, in which markets adhere to previous technology 
commitments notwithstanding the arrival of new, more efficient network 
technologies.  If users cannot capture all of the benefits created by their 
decision to adopt a new technology, they may refrain from making a 
technological change even when doing so would increase total welfare.  
These considerations have led some to argue that compelled access is 
required to ensure that the early leaders in any network technology and 
owners of large networks do not use their leading position to stifle 
technological innovation.75  It also provides a basis for questioning whether 
basing access rates on market prices would in fact promote efficiency. 
 The concept of network externality thus suggests that network industries 
are uniquely susceptible to market failures that prevent the price mechanism 
from playing its usual role in generating efficient outcomes.  If network 
externalities prevent markets from functioning efficiently, then it might 
follow that the market equilibrium market price of network access might 
somehow be distorted as well.  Although formal models developed by 
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proponents of the network externality view have demonstrated that such 
market failures are possible, we believe that claims of widespread market 
failure are exaggerated.  A critical review of the economic literature reveals 
that network externality theories are subject to several conceptual limitations 
that suggest that network externalities do not in fact cause markets to fail and 
that even if markets do fail, other features of the market exist that can 
mitigate, if not eliminate, such problems.  In addition, theoretical models 
simply demonstrate that a particular type of market failure is possible.  
Determining whether such a market failure is likely depends upon a close 
empirical evaluation of whether the preconditions underlying any particular 
theory actually exist.  To date, network externality theorists have relied on a 
handful of supposedly classic examples of technology lock-in as the sole 
empirical support for their positions.  A close review of those examples 
reveals that they do not properly represent examples of market failure.  The 
absence of even a single documented case of technology lock-in raises 
significant skepticism about the propriety of these claims.  And lastly, these 
proponents must answer the question whether the cure might be worse than 
the disease.  More specifically, resolution of the regulatory question depends 
not just on whether a market failure exists, but also on whether government 
intervention is likely to do better or worse than private ordering. 
 a. Network Economics as a Questionable Source of Market Failures — 
As noted above, theories that rely on the supposed presence of network 
externalities to justify more intrusive regulation of network industries suffer 
from several conceptual shortcomings.76  On closer inspection, it becomes 
clear that arguments that network externalities tend to entrench incumbents 
and existing technologies is far too simplistic.  As Joseph Farrell and Garth 
Saloner have pointed out, a consumer’s decision to adopt a new technology 
actually gives rise to two distinct and countervailing externalities.  When the 
value of a network depends on the number of people using the network, any 
decision to adopt a new technology enhances the value of the new network 
for those who have already joined the network as well as to those who will 
join it in the future.  It is the presence of this externality that can cause 
markets to become locked in to obsolete technologies, a phenomenon that 
Farrell and Saloner refer to as “excess inertia.”77 
 At the same time, the adoption of a new technology also gives rise to a 
countervailing negative externality that tends to produce precisely the 
opposite effect.  This is because any decision to adopt a new technology 
simultaneously lowers the value of the old technology by reducing the 
number of people using it.  In effect, adoption of the new technology tends to 
strand the installed base in the old technology.  Individuals who adopt a new 
technology thus do not fully internalize all of the costs created by their 
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Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
33
actions.  This may make that individual willing to adopt a new technology 
even when the costs to society exceed the benefits, a situation variously 
called “excess momentum”78 or “insufficient friction.”79  It is thus 
theoretically possible that the presence of network economic effects may 
prevent network providers from realizing all of the available economies of 
scale and may accelerate the pace with which new technologies are adopted 
beyond levels.  Whether network externalities would in fact cause a market 
failure thus depends upon which of these two countervailing effects 
dominates. 
 Even if the balance of these two network externalities tends to produce 
excess inertia, a series of insightful articles authored by Stan Liebowitz and 
Stephen Margolis demonstrates that such effects are unlikely to lead to 
market failure.80  Their explanation distinguishes between two different types 
of network externalities that were identified by the seminal articles in the 
literature, but not developed therein.  Direct network externalities are those 
generated “through a direct physical effect of the number of purchasers on 
the quality of the product,”81 with the leading example being the number of 
subscribers attached to a telephone network.  Indirect network externalities, 
in contrast, involve instances that do not involve a direct physical 
connection.  Instead, the value of a good is determined by the number of 
other people who purchase the same good, with the examples commonly 
cited including the network of users of a particular type of format of video 
cassette recorder (VCR), a particular type of software, or a particular 
computer operating system.82 
 With respect to direct network externalities, Liebowitz and Margolis 
argue that private ordering can easily resolve any of the problems that may 
exist.  This is because direct network externalities have the benefit of 
occurring within a physical network that can be owned.  Thus, although 
individual users may not be in a position to capture all of the benefits created 
by their demand for network services, the network owner will almost 
certainly be in a position to do so.  The existence of a single network owner 
allows the problems associated with this type of externality to be solved 
through the same mechanism used to solve externality problems that arise in 
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other contexts, i.e., by placing property in the hands of a single owner and 
protecting it with well-defined property rights.83  Any benefits created by 
network participation can thus be internalized and allocated through the 
interaction between the network owner and network users.84 
 Reliance on unitary ownership of a network to internalize any network 
externalities that may exist does not necessarily mean that competition 
cannot emerge.  In many cases, a network need not occupy the entire market 
in order to realize all of the available demand-side economies of scale.  
When this occurs, no unexploited gains from trade regarding network size 
remain, and the equilibrium solution is competition among multiple 
proprietary networks.  The point can be illustrated through the now classic 
problem presented by overfishing of a lake.  Because individual anglers do 
not internalize all of the costs of their actions, they lack sufficient incentives 
to undertake efficient levels of conservation and investment.  The solution is 
to vest property rights to the entire lake in a single owner.  Doing so will not, 
however, eliminate competition in the market for fish, since giving owners 
unitary property rights over a particular lake is not the same thing as giving 
them control over all lakes and the various owners of different lakes will 
continue to compete with one another. Placed in the context of networks, the 
proper policy question becomes one of defining property rights in away that 
insures that networks achieve sufficient size to realize all of available 
network economies.  It does not necessarily mean that only one network will 
emerge and that government indiscretion is required to ensure that that 
network is the “right” one.85 
 Indirect network externalities pose a somewhat different problem, since 
the lack of a direct physical connection among users means that policy 
makers cannot simply rely on network ownership to internalize the relevant 
externalities.86  To date, scholars have focused primarily on the fact that 
indirect network externalities typically arise in markets that involve 
complementary goods and that proprietary control of a network provides 
network users with some assurance that a ready supply of complementary 
goods will remain available.87  Although these concerns are correct as far as 
                                                     
83 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Garrett Hardin, The 
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
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85 Liebowitz & Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy, supra note 80, at 140-42; see also Liebowitz & 
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models of network externalities in effect assume away this problem by positing inexhaustible economies 
of scale). 
86 Note that to the extent that key network elements receive some degree of patent, copyright, or 
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to some types of indirect network externalities.  Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 80, at 
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87 See James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules 
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supra note 72, at 103-04). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
35
they go, the work of Liebowitz and Margolis has demonstrated that theories 
of market failure based on indirect network externalities theories typically 
suffer from deficiencies that are far more fundamental. 
 In order to understand the nature of this conceptual shortcoming, it is 
necessary to review the basic flaws contained in A.C. Pigou’s classic 
analysis of increasing-and decreasing-cost industries.88  Pigou erroneously 
believed that the industry marginal cost curve represented the true social cost 
of production.  Because prices tended to be uniform, he concluded that all 
industries that did not involve constant costs required either a tax or a 
subsidiary in order to attain efficient levels of output.  The mistake in 
Pigou’s analysis is that markets produce efficient outcomes whenever the last 
unit produced (i.e., the marginal unit) is priced at marginal cost.  Pricing 
other units (i.e., inframarginal units) above marginal cost simply effects a 
transfer of wealth from consumers to producers without affecting price and 
output levels.  Although this redistributes total surplus, it does not have any 
impact on efficiency.  Indirect network externalities are essentially no 
different from the type of wealth transfer mistakenly decried by Pigou.  
Markets will set network outputs at efficient levels so long as the price 
charged to the marginal network user at marginal cost.  Although charging 
inframarginal users higher prices has distributional consequences, it has no 
impact on efficiency.  Indeed, internalizing these externalities may actually 
be harmful, since doing so would create monopsony power.89 
 Furthermore, it is often impossible to distinguish an indirect network 
externality from the results of a properly functioning market.  Even if prices 
fall as networks grow in size, it is not necessarily indicative of a market 
failure.  It may represent nothing more than the declining costs associated 
with a classic natural monopoly.  If so, the drop in price would simply reflect 
movement along the cost curve rather than an externality that caused a 
deviation from the cost curve.  In addition, any decline in price may also 
represent the type of ordinary technological progress that typically occurs 
when participation in a particular technology increases.  In either event, there 
is no efficiency loss to be abated.  Any remedies imposed in the name of 
compensating for a network externality would thus be the cause of, rather 
than the solution to, market failure.  Even worse, the true source of the 
decline in cost may lie in one of the input markets rather than the output 
market.  Positing that the problem is an indirect network externality 
operating in the output market may thus prompt an incorrect policy response 
by focusing attention away from the input markets that may be the true locus 
of whatever market failure that may exist.90   
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 At the same time, it is important to recognize the adoption of a new 
technology carries significant costs.  The standardization associated with the 
existence of an established technology can create real benefits by facilitating 
compatibility between complementary products that would be lost if a new 
technology were adopted.  In addition, changes in technology necessarily 
impose significant transaction costs, since production of new technological 
platforms and adaptation of existing network infrastructure to incorporate 
innovations can be quite costly.91  Accordingly, some delay in the 
introduction of new products may reflect efficiency, not market failure.  
Absent a compelling reason to believe that network externalities are causing 
efficiency losses that the market cannot properly redress, regulations 
designed to counteract network economic effects cannot be justified. 
 Even assuming for the sake of argument that the type of network 
externalities that tend to cause monopolistic dominance and technology lock-
in actually exist, it is far from clear that other features of the market and the 
structure of consumers preferences might not serve to mitigate, if not 
eliminate, these adverse effects.  For example, the market can dislodge an 
existing network technology so long as the additional value provided by the 
new technology exceeds the value of the network externalities supporting the 
old technology.92  As Steven Kaplan and Mark Ramseyer succinctly put it, 
“an entrenched inefficient technology is potentially a twenty-dollar bill lying 
on the sidewalk.”93 
 In addition, network externalities may be substantially mitigated if user 
preferences are nonuniform.  As Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro have noted: 
Customer heterogeneity and product differentiation tend to 
limit tipping and sustain multiple networks.  If the rival 
systems have distinct features sought by certain customers, 
two or more systems may be able to survive by catering to 
consumers who care more about product attributes than 
network size.  Here, market equilibrium with multiple 
incompatible products reflects the social value of variety.94   
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 The existence of large users may further mitigate any problems caused 
by network economic effects.  If a single user controls a significant portion 
of the network, that user would be able to internalize more of the benefits of 
its adoption decision, which would help minimize any slippage caused by the 
existence of the network externality.  Furthermore, because large users are in 
a position to capture a disproportionate share of the benefit resulting from the 
adoption of a new technology, they have has a significant incentives to make 
the investments needed to begin the shift towards the new technology.95  
Indeed, formal models of such market structures indicate that “the sponsor of 
a new technology earns greater profits than its entry contributes to social 
welfare.  In other words, markets with network externalities in which new 
technologies are proprietary exhibit a bias towards new technologies.”96  Far 
from being a bane, the existence large network players may be a blessing in 
disguise. 
 Finally, significant growth in market size can render any network 
externalities that lead markets to tend towards market dominance and 
technology lock-in irrelevant.97  If a market is undergoing explosive growth, 
market outcomes are determined by the commitments that future users will 
make and not the decisions of the users who have already committed to a 
particular technology.98  In such cases, the fact that a particular firm may 
currently dominate a market is of little consequence.  People concerned 
about lock in will focus on the network that will exist in the future, not the 
one that exists today. 
 b. The Lack of Empirical Support for Market Failures Caused by 
Network Economics — The fact that markets seem fully capable of resolving 
most of the supposed market failures identified by the theoretical literature 
on network economics suggests that any attempt to remedy these supposed 
problems should be approached with considerable caution.  Indeed, it would 
seem appropriate to insist on empirical proof that such problems actually 
exist before authorizing governmental action to redress them.  Proponents of 
network externality theories have yet to offer any systematic evidence to 
support their theories.  Instead, most of these theorists have opted instead to 
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invoke a handful of well-known anecdotes concerning supposed technology 
lock-in.  The example most commonly cited is the persistence of the 
conventional typewriter keyboard layout (called the Qwerty keyboard for the 
after the arrangement of letters in the upper left-hand corner of the array) 
despite the emergence of a rival layout known as the Dvorak keyboard that is 
supposedly more efficient.99  The next most popular example cited is the 
emergence of VHS as the standard format for videocassettes despite the 
supposed technical superiority of the Beta format.100 
 The lack of systematic evaluation has allowed the proponents of network 
externality theories to be maddeningly imprecise about what constitutes lock-
in.  The lack of clear definition of terms ignores the fact that no technological 
standard is permanent and that over a long enough time horizon all 
technological standards are subject to change.  Whether a technology has 
become locked in is thus in no small part a function of the period of time 
deemed relevant for evaluating such a change.  The failure to explain terms 
essentially renders the concept of lock in currently employed in the literature 
arbitrary and obscures any attempt to prove or falsify its existence 
empirically. 
 Furthermore, close analysis of the historical record reveals that none the 
key examples that form the empirical basis for network externality theory 
can properly be regarded as market failures.  Specifically, the evidence 
suggests that the Qwerty keyboard does not represent an obsolete technology 
locked into place by network externalities.  On the contrary, it appears that 
the Qwerty keyboard first emerged as the winner of a vibrant competition on 
the merits, in which various keyboard designs were tested against one 
another in a series of typing contests.  Modern ergonomic studies suggest 
that any technical difference between the Qwerty and the Dvorak keyboard 
remains nominal.  In addition, the evidence supposedly demonstrating the 
Dvorak keyboard’s superiority is riddled with conflicts of interest, since all 
of the key studies, including the Navy tests that represent perhaps the 
primary support for these claims, were conducted by the person who 
invented and patented the Dvorak keyboard.101 
 The historical record also belies any suggestion that VHS’s emergence as 
the prevailing standard for videocassettes represents the perseverance of an 
obsolete technology.  The evidence suggests that the final resolution of the 
competition between Beta and VHS turned on a design tradeoff, with Beta 
incorporating a smaller cassette in order to enhance portability and VHS 
opting for a larger cassette in order to provide for longer playing and 
recording time.  VHS’s victory over Beta thus seems to have resulted from 
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consumers’ preference for videotapes capable of recording a two-hour movie 
on a single cassette rather than from any market failure that frustrated the 
efficient outcome.  In fact, any suggestion that VHS’s victory was the result 
of inefficient lock-in effects is contradicted by the fact that Beta was 
deployed first and was the early leader in VCR technology.  If anything, 
then, the final outcome is more properly regarded as an example of how 
markets can use differences in product value and the availability of an 
expanding customer base to displace an existing technology rather than an 
example of lock in.102   
 The other anecdotal examples upon which network externality theorists 
rely have been similarly debunked.103  Moreover, against the absence of 
empirical evidence indicating that network externalities have caused markets 
to fail is arrayed a large number of instances in which new technologies have 
displaced incumbent technologies that were firmly entrenched.  For example, 
vinyl and cassette recordings have been displaced by compact disks, and the 
VHS video format is in the process of being displaced by the digital video 
disc (DVD) format.  In short, the empirical record provides little reason to 
believe that networks are in any way sufficiently prone to market failure to 
justify more intrusive regulation than any other type of industry.  If anything, 
the history of technological change suggests the contrary. 
 c. The Limits of Regulation as a Solution to Market Failure — Lastly, 
even if it were proven that certain economic features of networks can cause 
markets to fail, it would not necessarily support regulatory intervention.  As 
noted earlier, solutions imposed by the government often fall short of 
efficient outcomes even when they are imposed in the name of correcting a 
market failure.104  Not only can imposition of an access regime harm 
allocative efficiency if access prices are set at inefficient levels, regulation 
can also harm dynamic efficiency by causing incentives to invest in network 
technologies to fall below efficient levels and by creating de facto entry 
barriers.105  Thus, regulatory authorities confronting a market failure must 
ask themselves the logically subsidiary question whether governmental 
intervention is likely to improve matters or make matters worse.  
 Consider, for example, the particular regulatory decisions associated 
with any state-sponsored attempt to solve the problems of technological 
lock-in.  Such intervention would necessarily require the government to 
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replace clear winners in the technology marketplace with what it believed 
represented the superior technology.  Moreover, in order to be effective, the 
government must do so at a fairly early stage in the technology’s 
development, when making such determinations is the most difficult.  
Regulators would also typically have to make such determinations on 
extremely thin information that in most cases would be provided by parties 
with a direct interest in the outcome of the regulatory process.  In addition, 
decisionmakers would have to insulate themselves from the types of 
systematic biases traditionally associated with political decisionmaking 
processes.  It is for these reasons that even supporters of network externality 
theories caution that governmental intervention might well make the problem 
worse, not better.106   
*  *  * 
 In short, there appears to be ample reason to be skeptical of claims that 
network economic effects will cause widespread market failure in network 
industries.  Not only are such claims problematic as a theoretical matter, they 
also appear to be essentially devoid of any empirical support.  There thus 
appears to be little justification for believing that basing access rates on 
actual market transactions would lead to inefficient outcomes.  On the 
contrary, basic economic principles indicate that market-based pricing 
represents the most appropriate way for ratemaking authorities to ensure that 
access rates are set at levels that promote both allocative and dynamic 
efficiency.  The only plausible justification for failing to do so—that the 
absence of technological substitutes rendered market-based pricing a 
practical impossibility—has been drained of its vitality by the feasibility of 
direct, facilities-based competition made possible by the two fundamental 
transformations that we have identified (i.e., technological convergence and 
the shift to access regulation). 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE PRICING OF ACCESS TO NETWORKS 
 Just as regulatory authorities have largely failed to recognize the 
economic significance of both technological convergence and the shift from 
rate regulation to access regulation, so also have they failed to appreciate that 
these transformations compel a different constitutional analysis as well.  
Because rate regulation simply adjusts the terms under which parties can 
contract, it represents the type of nonpossessory regulation traditionally 
subjected to a rather permissive standard of review under the Taking Clause 
that only requires that the rate set fall within a zone of reasonableness.  
Compelling access to a physical network, in contrast, invariably requires the 
network owner to permit third parties to locate equipment on its property.  
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As such, access regulations are subject to the more restrictive standards 
associated with the Court’s physical takings jurisprudence.  Unlike 
nonpossessory regulations, in which reductions in the value of property are 
not necessarily compensable, physical takings necessarily command market 
value compensation.  Principles of constitutional law thus reinforce the basic 
economic conclusion that network access should be priced at market levels.   
A. The Distinction Between Physical and Nonpossessory Takings 
1. The Emergence of Nonpossessory Takings Doctrine  
 Initially, it was generally believed that the Takings Clause only protected 
against direct appropriations of private property by the government or 
invasions that effectively ousted the owner of possession to the same extent 
as would have occurred had the government formally condemned the 
property.107  Governmental actions that merely reduced the value of property 
did not qualify.108  The Court subsequently recognized two types of takings 
that can arise without a physical occupation.  First, the Court acknowledged 
that a rate regulation may effect a taking if the rate is set so low as to be 
“confiscatory.”  Second, the Court has recognized that the government may 
effect a “regulatory taking” even if no physical occupation or appropriation 
is involved, if the government “goes too far”109 in limiting the manner in 
which owners can use their property. 
 a. Confiscatory Ratemaking — Confiscatory ratemaking doctrine is 
rooted in the notion that, although regulatory authorities may limit the 
amounts that regulated industries may charge for their services, “it is not to 
be inferred that this power of limitation or regulation is itself without limit.  
This power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the 
equivalent of confiscation.”110  As a result, the Court early on acknowledged 
that the Constitution forbid rates that are set so low as to be confiscatory.111  
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Although the Court was initially unclear regarding whether its confiscatory 
ratemaking doctrine was based on takings or due process principles, 
subsequent decisions have since made clear that its conceptual home lies in 
the Takings Clause.112   
 Whether a particular rate is confiscatory cannot be determined solely by 
examining at the methodology on which it is based.113  Instead, determining 
whether a particular rate falls within the zone of reasonableness required by 
the Court’s confiscatory ratemaking jurisprudence involves a “balancing of 
the investor and the consumer interests.”114  Rates are constitutional so long 
as they provide a return on equity that is sufficient to cover operating 
expenses, allow for returns that are “commensurate with returns on 
investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks,” and are 
“sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so 
as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.”115  In so holding, the Court 
made clear that the mere fact that a particular rate reduced the value of the 
utility’s property more was not by itself sufficient to render a rate 
confiscatory.  As the Court acknowledged, “Rate-making is indeed but one 
species of price-fixing.  The fixing of prices, like other applications of the 
police power, may reduce the value of the property which is being regulated.  
But the fact that the value is reduced does not mean that the regulation is 
invalid.”116 
 In the process, some Justices have emphasized that the Court’s 
confiscatory ratemaking jurisprudence occupied a sphere that was distinct 
and separate from its physical taking jurisprudence.  For example, Brandeis 
recognized that the Court’s decisions regarding the determination of value in 
condemnation cases did not serve as precedents for confiscatory ratemaking 
purposes, and vice versa.  Such considerations played no part in determining 
value for ratemaking purposes.117  Justice Black offered a similar observation 
in FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.118  In condemnation cases, “ ‘the value 
of property, generally speaking, is determined by its productiveness,—the 
                                                     
112 JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910, at 104 (1995). 
113 As the Court concluded, “an otherwise reasonable rate is not subject to constitutional attack by 
questioning the theoretical consistency of the method that produced it.  ‘It is not theory, but the impact of 
the rate order which counts.’ ”  Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 314 (1989) (quoting FPC v. 
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944)). 
114 Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603; see also supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
115 Id.; accord id. at 605 (holding that rates are constitutional so long as they “enable the company to 
operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors 
for the risk assumed”); Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 312 (holding that rates are constitutionally 
unobjectionable so long as they do not “jeopardize the financial integrity of the companies, either by 
leaving them insufficient operating capita or by impeding their ability to raise future capital” and are 
adequate “to compensate current equity holders for the risk associated with their investments”). 
116 Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 601; FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 603 (1942) 
(Black, J., concurring).   
117 Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 310-11 (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment). 
118 315 U.S. 575 (1942). 
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profits which its use brings to the owner.’ ”119  In addition, “when property is 
taken under the power of eminent domain the owner is ‘entitled to the full 
money equivalent of the property taken, and thereby to be put in as good 
position pecuniarily as it would have occupied, if its property had not been 
taken.’ ”120  Those principles, Black pointed out, “have no place in rate 
regulation.”121  All rate regulation necessarily reduces the value of the 
property, but that fact had not been construed as “stay[ing] the hand of the 
legislature or its administrative agency in making rate reductions.”122   
 b. Regulatory Takings — Regulatory takings represent the second type 
of nonpossessory taking recognized by the Supreme Court.  As the Justice 
Holmes explicitly acknowledged in his seminal opinion in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon,123 regulatory takings necessarily involve a difficult 
balance of interests.  On the one hand, the government must have wide 
latitude in regulating the use of property, even if such regulation reduced the 
property’s value.  Indeed, “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some 
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for 
every such change in the general law.”124  On the other hand, the 
government’s ability to impose limits on the use of property “must have its 
limits” if the constitutional protection of property was to be at all 
meaningful.125  Without some restriction on the government’s ability to 
qualify the manner in which owners can use their property, “the natural 
tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the qualification more and 
more until at last private property disappears.”126  Thus, “[t]he general rule at 
least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”127  Although the Supreme 
Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence originally emerged in the context of 
land use restrictions, it has since been applied more generally to any 
governmentally imposed nonpossessory restriction on property.128 
                                                     
119 Id. at 603 (Black, J., concurring) (quoting Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 
328-29 (1893)). 
120 Id. (quoting United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343 (1923)). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 260 U.S. 393 (1922).  Although Pennsylvania Coal is generally regarded as the seminal opinion 
on regulatory takings, see, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992), it was not 
without its historical antecedents.  See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); 
Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 123 (1891) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
124 260 U.S. at 414. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 415. 
127 Id.  For more recent restatements of the same rationale, see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014; and Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1480 n.21 (2002). 
128 See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (interest on attorney trust accounts); 
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (pension 
plans); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (welfare payments); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986) (pension plans); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) 
(pesticide formulas); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984) (pension 
plans); United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982) (liens on real property); Andrus v. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art38
44
 In the landmark decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,129 
the Court squarely held what it had frequently noted in dicta in other 
cases130:  that a nonpossessory regulation may constitute a per se taking if it 
deprives the owner of all economically beneficial or productive use of its 
land.131  When a restriction reaches this level, it can no longer be considered 
a regulation “simply adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life” and 
instead is more properly regarded as “the equivalent of a physical 
appropriation.”132 
 The more difficult issue is when a restriction that falls short of 
eliminating all economically beneficial use nonetheless constitutes a 
regulatory taking.  Holmes did not elaborate on the proper way to balance the 
interests of property owners and the government aside from noting that “this 
is a question of degree.”133  The Court did not offer much additional 
guidance until 1978, when the Court issued its opinion in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York134 recognizing that, although 
determining whether a particular governmental action constituted a taking is 
an “essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y]” that turns on the particular 
circumstances of each case,135 it was possible to identify three factors that 
have particular significance.  Specifically, the Court focused on (1) “the 
economic impact of the regulation” on the property owner, (2) “the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations,” and (3) “the character of the governmental action.”136  The 
Court immediately thereafter emphasized that “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily 
be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a 
physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some 
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
promote the common good.”137 
 What is perhaps most striking about Penn Central is its suggestion that 
physical and regulatory takings might be governed by the same analysis.  
The Court’s observation that a taking may “more readily” be found when the 
regulation affects a physical invasion arguably implied that the presence of a 
physical invasion of property was not dispositive of whether a taking had 
                                                                                                                             
Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (eagle feathers); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) 
(black lung benefits); see also E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522-37 (1998) (plurality opinion) (retiree 
benefits in the coal industry). 
129 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
130 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n 
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 
264, 295-96 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
131 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
132 Id. at 1017 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
133 260 U.S. at 416. 
134 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
135 Id. at 124. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. (citation omitted). 
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occurred.  Instead, it was simply one consideration that could be overcome if 
the other factors weighed in the opposite direction.  This conclusion seemed 
to be confirmed in the Court’s subsequent decision in PruneYard Shopping 
Center v. Robins,138 in which the Court upheld the California Supreme 
Court’s decision requiring that the owner of a shopping center allow a group 
of high school students to engage in political speech on his premises.  In 
holding that this requirement did not violate the Takings Clause, the Court 
flatly stated that the fact that the students may have physically invaded the 
shopping center owner’s property “cannot be viewed as determinative.”139  
Many noted scholars have downplayed the importance of this language and 
argued that PruneYard can be explained solely on First Amendment 
grounds.140  Nevertheless, a number of lower courts followed this reading of 
PruneYard and held that the Penn Central factors governed takings that 
effected physical invasions as well as nonpossessory restrictions on the use 
of property.141 
 The Supreme Court would soon remove any remaining doubts about the 
issue.  In the first of two leading cases on the proper takings analysis applied 
to attempts to compel access to communications networks, the Court’s 
landmark decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.142 
firmly reestablished the distinction between the Court’s physical and 
regulatory takings jurisprudence. 
2. Loretto and the Distinction Between Physical and Regulatory 
Takings 
 At issue in Loretto was the fact that the deployment of cable television in 
Manhattan depended on the cable operator’s ability to string coaxial cables 
on apartment buildings.  Such cables served two distinct purposes.  First, 
they allowed cable operators to provide service to each building’s tenants.  
Second, even if no tenant in a particular building subscribed to cable, the 
cable operator still often needed to string a “crossover” line in order to 
service customers in buildings that lay on the other side of the building from 
the cable operator’s central facility, commonly called the “headend.”143  In 
1970, a building owner agreed to allow the local cable operator to install a 
thirty-five foot crossover line on its property that was less than one-half inch 
in diameter and which ran eighteen inches above the building’s roof.  The 
                                                     
138 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
139 Id. at 84.   
140 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.5, at 600 (2d ed. 1988); cf. 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 450-51 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(implying that Loretto overruled the takings rationale of PruneYard). 
141 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320, 330-34 (N.Y. 1981), 
rev’d, 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
142 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
143 Id. at 422. 
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operator also attached cubical directional taps measuring four inches on each 
side on the front and rear of the roof along with two silver boxes along the 
roof cables measuring eighteen inches by twelve inches by six inches.  When 
some of the building’s tenants eventually subscribed to cable service, the 
cable operator also installed another cable running down the front of the 
building to the first floor to provide that service.144 
 The cable operator originally compensated building owners for such 
access by paying them a standard rate of five percent of the gross revenues 
realized from the particular property.  A new statute went into effect in 1973 
requiring that landlords permit the cable operator to install equipment on 
their property and providing that the rate of compensation would be set by a 
state regulatory agency.  The agency eventually set the compensation for 
such incursions at a one-time payment of one dollar.  The owner of the 
building at issue brought a takings challenge to the statute.145  Consistent 
with the suggestion of the language in Penn Central and PruneYard quoted 
above, the New York Court of Appeals held that a physical occupation 
authorized by government is not necessarily a taking.146 
 The Supreme Court responded with a ringing reaffirmation of the 
distinction between physical and regulatory takings.  In particular, the Court 
rejected the conclusion that the takings determination should in all cases be 
governed by the ad hoc standards announced in Penn Central.  Instead, the 
Court held that any regulation that authorizes a permanent physical 
occupation of property constitutes a per se taking.  It made no difference 
whether the government itself occupied the property itself or simply 
empowered a third party to do so.  As the Court reasoned, “A permanent 
physical occupation authorized by state law is a taking without regard to 
whether the State, or instead a party authorized by the State, is the 
occupant.”147   
 The Court based its decision on three considerations.  The first was 
based on precedent:  a review of the Court’s prior decisions revealed that that 
“when the character of the governmental action is a permanent physical 
occupation of property, our cases have uniformly found a taking to the extent 
of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important 
public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner.”148  
Indeed, the Court referred to treating a permanent physical occupation as a 
per se taking as the “historical”149 and “traditional” rule.150  In so holding, the 
                                                     
144 Id. at 422, 438 n.16. 
145 Id. at 423-24. 
146 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320, 330-34 (N.Y. 1981). 
147 458 U.S. at 433 n.9. 
148 Id. at 434-35; accord id. at 437 (“When faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent 
physical occupation of real property, this Court has invariably found a taking.”); see also id. at 427-34 
(reviewing precedents). 
149 Id. at 435. 
150 Id. at 436, 441. 
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Court explicitly limited or disavowed language in Penn Central and 
PruneYard suggesting the contrary.151   
 Second, the Court drew support for its conclusion from the general 
policies underlying the existence of property rights.  Permanent 
appropriation of property “is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an 
owner’s property interests.”152  In so reasoning, the Court invoked the now 
familiar metaphor that conceives of property as a bundle of rights 
encompassing three separate strands, i.e., the rights to possess, use, and 
dispose of the property.  Unlike regulatory takings, which affect only the 
strand relating to the use of the property, physical invasions “chop[ ] through 
the bundle, taking a slice from every strand.”153  Specifically, physical 
occupations necessarily foreclose owners from either possessing or using the 
occupied portion of property themselves.154  Even though the owner retains 
the theoretical right to dispose of the occupied space, the presence of 
equipment attached to that space essentially empties that right of any value.  
In addition, the Court concluded that these injuries are particularly severe 
when the government authorizes a stranger to invade and occupy the owner’s 
property, since doing so vitiates the longstanding expectation that a property 
owner “will be relatively undisturbed at least in the possession of his 
property.”155  As a result, the Court concluded that a permanent physical 
occupation “is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of 
property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, 
since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the 
invasion.”156   
 Lastly, the Court invoked practical considerations.  Treating permanent 
physical invasions as per se takings “avoids otherwise difficult line drawing 
                                                     
151 The Court reasoned that nothing in the Court’s opinion in Penn Central “repudiate[s] the rule that 
a permanent physical occupation is a government action of such a unique character that it is a taking 
without regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily examine.”  Id. at 432.  The Court emphasized 
that the “permanence and absolute exclusivity” of the physical occupation at issue in Loretto served to 
differentiate it from the “temporary limitations on the right to exclude” at issue in PruneYard.  Id. at 435 
n.12.  In addition, the Court distinguished PruneYard on the grounds that the invasion in that case was 
“temporary and limited in nature” and because “the owner had not exhibited an interest in excluding all 
persons from his property.”  Id. at 434.  The Court further narrowed PruneYard’s scope in Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987), in which the Court held that because 
easements grant individuals “a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro,” they constitute a 
permanent physical occupation under Loretto, even though no particular individual is permitted to station 
himself permanently upon the premises.  The Court further emphasized that in PruneYard “the owner had 
already opened his property to the general public, and in addition permanent access was not required.”  Id. 
at 832 n.1.  For a recent analysis of PruneYard, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech:  
The Legacy of PruneYard v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 33-50 (1997). 
152 458 U.S. at 435; accord id. at 441 (concluding that a permanent physical occupation “is 
qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other category of property regulation”). 
153 Id. at 435. 
154 Id. at 435-36.  The Court emphasized that “[t]he power to exclude has traditionally been 





problems.”157  Unlike the necessarily ad hoc quality of the Penn Central 
balancing test, “whether a permanent physical occupation has occurred 
presents relatively few problems of proof.  The placement of a fixed structure 
on land or real property is an obvious fact that will rarely be subject to 
dispute.”158  As a result, when the government action takes the character of a 
permanent physical invasion, that factor by itself becomes 
“determinative.”159  Although the size and economic impact of the 
occupation is relevant in ascertaining the amount of compensation due,160 
those considerations play no role in determining whether a taking has 
occurred.161  
 In so holding, the Court was careful to emphasize that its holding did not 
contradict the “substantial authority upholding a State’s broad power to 
impose appropriate restrictions upon an owner’s use of his property.”162  
Citing Penn Central, the Court observed that “[s]o long as these regulations 
do not require the [property owner] to suffer the physical occupation of a 
portion of his building by a third party, they will be analyzed under the 
multifactor inquiry generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental 
activity.”163  The reference to Penn Central indicates that by this the Court 
meant conventional regulatory takings doctrine. 
 Loretto thus established two principles that play a central role in our 
analysis.  First, it articulated a strong rationale for subjecting physical takings 
to the highest degree of protection under the Takings Clause.  If a regulation 
requires a property owner to allow third parties to install equipment on its 
property on an indefinite basis, it constitutes a per se taking without regard to 
the size of the physical invasion or the public purposes advanced by the 
regulation.164  Second, it reasserted the sharp distinction between the Court’s 
physical takings and regulatory takings jurisprudence.  When a physical 
taking is involved, the regulatory takings precedents simply do not apply. 
                                                     
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 437; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001) (noting that when a 
physical taking is involved, “the fact and extent of the taking are known.”). 
159 458 U.S. at 426. 
160 Id. at 437-38. 
161 See id. at 430, 434-35, 436.  As Justice Marshall quipped, “whether the installation is a taking 
does not depend on whether the volume of space it occupies is bigger than a breadbox.”  Id. at 438 n.16. 
162 Id. at 441; accord id. at 440 (“[O]ur holding today in no way alters the analysis governing the 
State's power to require landlords to comply with building codes and provide utility connections, 
mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, and the like in the common area of a building.”). 
163 Id. at 440 (citing Penn Central). 
164 It bears emphasizing that the argument advanced in this Article is far narrower than the one 
advanced in SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 31, at 229-32, which claimed that Loretto required 
compensation any deviation from investment-backed expectations resulting from a change in regulatory 
systems and that the introduction of a data stream by a third party constituted a physical occupation.  
Instead, the argument advanced in this Article limits itself to what is indisputably the core holding of 
Loretto, which is that regulations authorizing the permanent placement of equipment on another person’s 
property constitute a physical taking.  Thus, even those who question the interpretation of Loretto offered 
in the prior article are unlikely to find the interpretation of Loretto advanced in this Article controversial. 
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3. Florida Power and the Distinction Between Physical Takings and 
Confiscatory Ratemaking 
 The Supreme Court sounded similar themes in the other leading case 
involving a takings challenge to an attempt to compel access to a 
communications network:  FCC v. Florida Power Corp.165  As noted in the 
foregoing discussion of Loretto, the deployment of cable television depended 
on its ability to establish a web of coaxial cables connecting individual 
households.  Although in urban areas this could be accomplished by 
compelling apartment owners to allow cable operators to string cable across 
their properties, in suburban and rural areas the network of existing utility 
poles owned by telephone and electric companies represented the only 
feasible means of establishing the physical infrastructure needed for the 
provision of cable television service.  Congress was concerned, however, that 
utility companies were exploiting their monopoly position by overcharging 
cable operators for the right to attach their coaxial cables to existing utility 
poles.  As a result, Congress enacted legislation in 1978 known as the Pole 
Attachments Act that authorized the FCC to regulate the terms and 
conditions of pole attachment agreements in any state that did not impose 
such regulation itself.166   
 The Court held that the Pole Attachments Act did not constitute the type 
of permanent physical occupation authorized by the government required to 
constitute a per se taking under Loretto.  What was missing was the “element 
of required acquiescence” present in the statute at issue in Loretto.167  
Nothing in the original version of the Pole Attachments Act gave “cable 
companies any right to occupy space on utility poles or prohibit[ed] utility 
companies from refusing to enter into attachment agreements with cable 
operators.”168  Instead, the Act simply regulated the rents charged by those 
parties who voluntarily choose to enter into such agreements.  The Court 
found dispositive the language from Loretto concluding that, “ ‘[s]o long as 
these regulations do not require the landlord to suffer the physical 
occupation of a portion of his building by a third party, they will be analyzed 
under the multifactor inquiry generally applicable to nonpossessory 
governmental activity.’ ”169   
                                                     
165 480 U.S. 245 (1987). 
166 480 U.S. at 247-48.  Although cable companies could theoretically have instead employed the 
underground rights of way owned by natural gas companies, as a general matter underground installation 
of cables was either impossible or impractical.  Id. at 247. 
167 Id. at 252. 
168 Id. at 251. 
169 Id. at 252 (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440).  The Court further noted, “Appellees contend, in 
essence, that it is a taking under Loretto for a tenant invited to lease at a rent of $7.15 to remain at the 
regulated rent of $1.79.  But it is the invitation, not the rent, that makes the difference.  The line which 
separates these cases from Loretto is the unambiguous distinction between a commercial lessee and an 
interloper with a government license.”  Id. at 252-53. 
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 Having held that the original version of the Pole Attachments Act fell 
outside the per se rule announced by Loretto to govern physical takings, the 
Court proceeded to evaluate whether it nonetheless represented a 
nonpossessory taking.  Rather than proceeding to cite the Penn Central 
factors, as its quotation of Loretto suggested, Florida Power held that the 
Takings Clause simply required that the rates set not be confiscatory.170  The 
Court concluded that the pole attachment rates established by the statute 
allowed for sufficient return on investment to satisfy the requirements its 
confiscatory ratemaking jurisprudence.171 
 Florida Power thus reinforced the same key principles that underlay 
Court’s decision in Loretto.  First, although the Court stopped short of 
addressing the issue explicitly,172 the Court’s reasoning strongly implied that 
had the Pole Attachments Act compelled utilities to give cable television 
systems access to their poles, it would have constituted a per se taking under 
Loretto.  Second, Florida Power underscored the sharp distinction between 
the Court’s physical takings and confiscatory ratemaking precedents.  
Echoing the admonitions offered by Justices Brandeis and Black cautioning 
that physical takings and confiscatory ratemaking represented distinct 
jurisprudential spheres,173 the Court established that its confiscatory 
ratemaking precedents did not have any application to cases involving 
physical takings. 
4. Implications 
 a. Towards a Possible Synthesis of Regulatory Takings and 
Confiscatory Ratemaking Doctrine — Although courts and scholars typically 
treat regulatory takings and confiscatory ratemaking as conceptually 
distinct,174 the court’s opinions in Loretto and Florida Power suggest that 
both of those lines of precedent may in fact represent a single concept.  It is 
quite easy to reconceptualize a restriction on the amount that a person can 
charge for access to a piece of property as either a restriction on the 
property’s use or as a “public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of 
economic life to promote the common good” that characterizes the classic 
regulatory taking.175  Moreover, both lines of precedent appear to be 
animated by similar concerns.  Each line of authority recognizes that almost 
every government action necessarily affects the value of private property and 
that imposing too stringent a leash on regulatory action would conflict with 
                                                     
170 480 U.S. at 253 (citing St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 53 (1936), and 
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 761, 770 (1968)). 
171 Id. at 253-54. 
172 Id. at 251 n.6. 
173 See supra notes 117-122 and accompanying text. 
174 See, e.g., SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 31, at 213. 
175 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 
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the exigencies of modern governance.176  At the same time, both attempt to 
balance this concern against the recognition that, if taken to excess, the 
power to regulate can constitute the power to destroy.177  In addition, both 
employ almost identical methodologies that emphasize the fact specific 
nature of the claims178 and focus in large part on the economic impact of the 
restriction both on the regulated entity179 and on the expectations of 
investors.180 
 Finally, certain precedents suggest that these two approaches may be 
fungible.  For example initial discussion in the Court’s Florida Power 
opinion invoked the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence when it 
suggested that, in the absence of some requirement that utilities permit 
permanent occupation of their poles by cable companies, the regulations 
would be “ ‘analyzed under the multifactor inquiry generally applicable to 
nonpossessory governmental activity.’ ”181  Immediately following that 
observation, however, the Court held that, in the absence of such 
compulsion, the Pole Attachments Act was properly analyzed under the 
Court’s confiscatory ratemaking precedents.182  The juxtaposition of these 
two observations in the same opinion indicates that the Court may well have 
viewed these two lines of precedent as simply being variations of the same 
doctrine. 
 The reasoning contained in the Court’s rent control precedents raise a 
similar inference.  For example, the Court analyzed the rent control 
ordinance at issue in Pennell v. City of San Jose183 in terms of the Court’s 
                                                     
176 Compare, e.g., Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413 (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent 
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general 
law.”), with Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 601 (“The fixing of prices … may reduce the value of the 
property which is being regulated.  But the fact that the value is reduced does not mean that the regulation 
is invalid.”). 
177 Compare Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 (noting that without some limit on the government’s ability 
to restrict the manner in which owners can use their property, “the natural tendency of human nature 
[would be] to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears”), with 
Railroad Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886) (“[I]t is not to be inferred that this power of limitation 
or regulation [of rates] is itself without limit.  This power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and 
limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation.”). 
178 Compare Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (calling the regulatory takings standard an “essentially 
ad hoc, factual inquir[y]”), with Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603 (observing that determining whether a 
rate is confiscatory depends upon a series of fact-intensive inquiries focusing on the net effect of the rate 
on the utility’s property). 
179 Compare Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (identifying “the economic impact of the regulation on 
the claimant” as a factor in the regulatory taking analysis), with Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603 
(recognizing the importance of ensuring that the regulated entity receives “enough revenue not only for 
operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business”). 
180 Compare Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (identifying “the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations” as a factor in the regulatory taking analysis), with 
Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603 (noting that investors have “a legitimate concern with the financial 
integrity of the company whose rates are being regulated”). 
181 FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987) (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982)). 
182 Id. at 253. 
183 485 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1988). 
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confiscatory ratemaking precedents.  In contrast, the Court analyzed the rent 
control ordinance in Yee v. City of Escondido184 in terms of its regulatory 
taking jurisprudence, explicitly stating that the rent control ordinance at issue 
“merely regulate[s] petitioners’ use of their land by regulating the 
relationship between landlord and tenant.”185  Indeed, the Court specifically 
equated ceilings on the rents the landlord can charge with other types of use 
restrictions and declared that both types of restrictions were properly 
analyzed under classic regulatory takings precedents such as Pennsylvania 
Coal v. Mahon and the progeny of Penn Central.186  The parallels between 
the two doctrines are further underscored by the fact that the Court’s opinion 
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council187 described the strand of 
regulatory takings doctrine used to invalidate regulations that prohibit all 
economically beneficial use of land as being directed against “confiscatory” 
regulations.188   
 It is thus arguable that amount to the Court’s regulatory takings and 
confiscatory ratemaking jurisprudence actually slightly different aspects of a 
single doctrine.  Unfortunately, the Court has never clearly addressed the 
relationship between these two lines of precedent, and scholarly analysis 
shed little additional light on the issue.189  In addition, it would be somewhat 
anachronistic to suggest that the Court had a unified takings jurisprudence in 
mind from the outset.  The Court’s jurisprudence on confiscatory takings 
long antedates its recognition of regulatory takings in Pennsylvania Coal, let 
alone the announcement of the ad hoc factors in Penn Central.  In fact, since 
rate regulation was primarily state regulation and the Takings Clause was not 
assimilated against the states until 1897,190 the earliest confiscatory 
ratemaking cases arose under the Due Process Clause, rather than the 
Takings Clause.  The historical dichotomy is further reinforced by the views 
of Justice Brewer, who was perhaps the primary architect of the Court’s early 
takings jurisprudence.  His famous speech at Yale Law School on the subject 
clearly evinces his belief that rate regulation and use restrictions represent 
distinct lines of authority.191 
                                                     
184 503 U.S. 519, 522-23 (1992). 
185 Id. at 528 (emphasis in original); see also Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 155-56 (1921) (Holmes, 
J.) (analogizing rent control to restrictions on the use of property, such as limits on building heights or 
billboards). 
186 Id. at 529. 
187 See 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
188 Id. at 1029, 1032 n.18. 
189 See John N. Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power:  The Constitutional Limits on Utility Rate 
Regulation, 65 B.U. L. REV. 65, 98 (1985) (asserting, without analysis, that the Court’s regulatory takings 
and confiscatory ratemaking precedents are “equivalent”); see also Richard Goldsmith, Utility Rates and 
“Takings”, 10 ENERGY L.J. 241, 256-59 (1989) (identifying similarities in the Court’s regulatory takings 
and confiscatory ratemaking precedents, but ultimately concluding that confiscatory ratemaking was 
based on due process). 
190 See Chi., B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
191 David J. Brewer, The Protection of Private Property from Public Attack, 55 NEW ENG. & YALE 
REV. 97 (1891). 
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 b. The Paradigmatic Importance of the Shift to Access Regulation — 
Fortunately, we need not resolve the precise relationship between regulatory 
takings and confiscatory ratemaking in order to press our argument.  
Although the cases do not shed much light on whether or not regulatory 
takings and confiscatory ratemaking represent distinct concepts or instead 
represent slightly different aspects of the same doctrine, for our purposes, it 
is sufficient that the Court has emphasized the importance of keeping both of 
the categories distinct from its physical takings jurisprudence.192  If a 
regulation authorizes a third party to establish a permanent physical invasion, 
Loretto and Florida Power together make clear that it constitutes a per se 
taking without resort to any of the considerations typically invoked under 
both the Court’s regulatory takings and confiscatory ratemaking 
jurisprudence. 
 Equally importantly, the Court has frequently reiterated that its physical 
and nonpossessory takings precedents occupy separate spheres and that its 
decisions involving nonpossessory takings have no application to physical 
takings.  For example, the Court held in Yee v. City of Escondido193 that a 
regulatory takings challenge was not fairly included in a question presented 
focusing on physical takings on the grounds that “[c]onsideration of whether 
a regulatory taking occurred would not assist in resolving whether a physical 
taking occurred as well.”194  In so holding, the Court emphasized that both 
questions “exist side by side, neither encompassing another.”195  The Court 
struck a similar note in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island196 when it recognized that 
physical takings “present[ ] different considerations than cases alleging a 
taking based on a burdensome regulation.”197 
 The Court issued its most recent reaffirmation of these principles last 
Term in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency.198  The Court reaffirmed that whenever a physical taking 
occurs, the government has a categorical duty to compensate the owner, 
regardless of the size of the occupation or whether the government only takes 
part of a larger parcel.199  Echoing its more extended discussion in Loretto, 
the Court found it appropriate to treat physical takings in such categorical 
fashion because “physical appropriations are relatively rare, easily identified, 
and usually represent a greater affront to individual property rights.”200  As a 
result, when determining whether a physical taking has occurred, there is no 
need to evaluate the magnitude of the economic impact of the government’s 
                                                     
192 See supra notes 164, 173 and accompanying text. 
193 503 U.S. 519 (1992). 
194 Id. at 537-38. 
195 Id. at 537. 
196 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
197 Id. at 628. 
198 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002). 
199 Id. at 1478. 
200 Id. at 1479. 
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action on the property owner or to inquire into the substantiality of the 
governmental interest underlying the regulation.  Any physical invasion, no 
matter how small, is sufficient.201  Most importantly for our purposes, the 
Tahoe-Sierra Court emphasized these differences “make[ ] it inappropriate to 
treat cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents for the 
evaluation of a claim that there has been a regulatory taking, and vice 
versa.”202   
 Tahoe-Sierra thus reaffirmed the core substantive holding of Loretto by 
reiterating that permanent physical occupations constitute per se takings 
without regard to the economic impact or the public purpose served by the 
invasion.  Equally importantly, it offered the Court’s plainest statement to 
date that its regulatory takings decisions do not constitute precedent in cases 
involving physical takings. 
B. Physical Takings Jurisprudence Applied to Network Access 
 Determining whether a takings violation has occurred thus requires 
resolution of two separate questions.  First, has the governmental action in 
question effected a taking?  As the foregoing discussion underscores, the 
approach to resolving this question varies depending on whether the 
regulation at issue is alleged to be a physical taking.  Second, if so, has the 
government provided just compensation for its actions. 
1. Determining Whether a Taking Has Occurred 
 In contrast to the analysis applied to both regulatory takings and 
confiscatory ratemaking, which attempt to balance the interests of the public 
with those of the utility and which carefully examine the regulation’s 
economic impact, physical takings are governed by a simple bright line rule.  
As the Court held in Loretto and reaffirmed several times since, government 
action is a per se taking if it authorizes a permanent physical occupation, 
such as occurs when a regulation gives third parties the right to place 
telecommunications equipment on the network owner’s property.203  If a 
permanent physical occupation is involved, it does not matter whether the 
action furthers an important public interest or achieves an important public 
benefit.204  Nor does it matter that the size or economic impact of the 
invasion may be minimal.205  Indeed, a permanent physical invasion is still a 
                                                     
201 Id. 
202 Id. (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). 
203 See supra notes 147-164 and accompanying text. 
204 Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1479; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1028 
(1992);  
Yee, 503 U.S. at 530; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987); Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426, 434-35 (1982)). 
205 See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1479; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001); 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015;  Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435, 437, 438 n.16. 
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per se taking even if it causes the value of the property to increase.206  The 
Court reasoned: 
[This] conclusion . . . [is] premised on our longstanding 
recognition that property is more than economic value; it 
also consists of “the group of rights which the so-called 
owner exercises in his dominion of the physical thing,” such 
as “the right to possess, use and dispose of it.”  While the 
[property] at issue here may have no economically realizable 
value to its owner, possession, control, and disposition are 
nonetheless valuable rights that inhere in the property.207   
 Thus, any regulation that requires a network owner to permit third parties 
to place equipment on its property constitutes a per se taking under Loretto.  
This fact underscores the constitutional significance of the shift from rate 
regulation to access regulation.  As will be discussed in greater detail during 
the application of this analytical framework to three current policy problems, 
regulations that compel access to wireline telecommunications networks 
generally require the placement of third-party equipment on the network 
owner’s property.208  As a result, the shift from rate regulation to access 
regulation generates an equally fundamental shift in the constitutional 
analysis.  Finding that a taking has occurred is only the first step in the 
constitutional inquiry, however.  Whether access regulations violate the 
Takings Clause thus depends on whether the regulation provides for just 
compensation. 
2. Determining Just Compensation 
 Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the constitutionality 
of the regulation in question is determined by whether the government 
provides just compensation for the property taken.  The Loretto Court did not 
address the question of compensation, leaving that for consideration by the 
                                                     
206 See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 169-70 (1998); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 437 n.15.   
207 Phillips, 524 U.S. at 170 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 
U.S. 373, 378 (1945)); accord Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-36. 
208 Interestingly, it is less clear whether a regulation compelling access to a wireless network would 
invariably constitute a physical taking.  In contrast to wireline communications, which depend on having a 
physical connection to the network, spectrum-based communications may require nothing more than the 
appropriate placement of antenna owned by the property holder or occupant.  Regulations mandating 
access to wireless networks thus do not necessarily require the installation of third-party equipment on 
private property.  For example, the D.C. Circuit recently rejected a takings challenge to an FCC order 
intended to ensure access to different forms of television service by in essence requiring property owners 
to allow residents to install antennas needed to receive DBS service, broadcast signals, and other forms of 
television programming.  The court concluded that, since the regulation in question did not compel a 
physical invasion of property, it did not constitute a per se taking under Loretto and was properly analyzed 
as a regulatory taking.  Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass’n Int’l v. FCC, 254 F.3d 89, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2001).   
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state courts on remand.209  In addition, most courts confronted with this issue 
have held the issue not yet ripe for judicial consideration.210 
 a. Market Value as the Preferred Measure of Just Compensation — 
The Court has often averred that the guiding principle in determining what 
constitutes just compensation has been that “the owner shall be put in as 
good position pecuniarily as he would have been if his property had not been 
taken.”211  As a result, the Court established that the predominant measure of 
just compensation should be “market value.”212  As Justice Frankfurter 
reasoned in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States213:  
Most things . . . have a general demand which gives them a 
value transferable from one owner to another.  As opposed 
to such personal and variant standards as value to the 
particular owner whose property has been taken, this 
transferable value has an external validity which makes it a 
fair measure of [just compensation].214 
 The external validity identified by Frankfurter has both a theoretical and 
practical basis.  As a theoretical matter, market value reflects the seminal 
insights of neoclassical economics that effectively transformed value from an 
intrinsic concept into a one based on market-based evidence of the property’s 
earning potential.  This shift was already evident in the very first case in 
which the Court addressed the principles that would guide the just 
compensation inquiry, Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,215 in 
which the federal government condemned a lock and a dam operated by a 
                                                     
209 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441. 
210 See, e.g., Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 1679-80 (2002); Gulf Power 
Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Gulf Power II”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 122 S. Ct. 782 (2002); Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 187 
F.3d 1324, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Gulf Power I”); Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 818 (8th Cir. 
1997), rev’d & remanded in part on other grounds, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); 
Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 911 F.2d 776, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
211 United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510 (1979) (“Lutheran Synod”) (quoting 
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)).  As Richard Epstein has noted, “In principle, the ideal 
solution is to leave the individual owner in a position of indifference between the taking by the 
government and the retention of the property.”  See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY 
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 182, (Harvard University Press 1985).  For the earliest statements 
of this principle, see Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893); Seaboard Air 
Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923). 
212 See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (“Duncanville Landfill”); 
Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 511; 
Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474 (1973); United States v. 
Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950); United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo 
Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949); Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. at 379; United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 336, 
374 (1943); Olson, 292 U.S. at 255; Mitchell, 267 U.S. at 343; United States v. New River Collieries Co., 
262 U.S. 341, 344 (1923).  Although the cases at times refer to this standard as “fair market value,” as the 
Court noted in Miller, the two formulations essentially amount to the same thing.  317 U.S. at 374. 
213 338 U.S. 1 (1949). 
214 Id. at 5. 
215 148 U.S. 312 (1893). 
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private company pursuant to a state franchise.  The issue was whether the 
Takings Clause simply required compensation for the tangible property taken 
or whether the federal government also had to compensate the company for 
the tolls the facility would have earned by using that property.  The Court 
held that the Takings Clause required payment of “a full and perfect 
equivalent for the property taken,”216  which, “generally speaking, is 
determined by its productiveness,—the profits which its use brings to the 
owner.”217  “The value, therefore, is not determined by the mere cost of 
construction, but more by what the completed structure brings in the way of 
earnings to its owner.”218  As a result, it followed that the income that the 
lock and the dam would have earned had to be regarded as an intrinsic part of 
the property’s value.219  The Court has subsequently reaffirmed the principle 
on numerous occasions.220 
 Practical considerations provide additional reasons for preferring 
exchange-oriented approaches over cost-oriented approaches when 
determining just compensation.  As the Court observed, the shift to the 
market value standard was driven in part by the “need for a clear, easily 
administrable rule governing the measure of ‘just compensation.’ ”221  The 
use of external measures of value eliminated many of the “serious practical 
difficulties in assessing the worth an individual places on particular property 
at a given time.”222  Permitting such subjective considerations to determine 
what constitutes just compensation “would enhance the risk of error and 
prejudice.”223 
 The Court has stated that the market value standard is not a constitutional 
mandate and has held out the possibility that the Court might permit some 
deviation from it.224  Indeed, the Court has long recognized that the market 
value fails to give the principle of putting property owners in as good a 
position as if their property had not been taken “its full and literal force.”225  
                                                     
216 Id. at 326; accord id. (alternatively stating the test as “a full equivalent” and “a full and exact 
equivalent” for the property taken). 
217 Id. at 328. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 329. 
220 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992) (“ ‘For what is the land but 
the profits thereof?’ ” (quoting 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES, ch. 1, § 1 (1st Am. ed. 1812) (alterations 
omitted)); Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 9 (“The market value of land as a business site tends to be as 
high as the reasonably probable earnings of a business there situated would justify.”). 
221 Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 10 n.15. 
222 Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 511; accord United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v.  Powelson, 
319 U.S. 266, 280 (1943) (noting that the market value standard avoided “serious practical difficulties in 
assessing the worth an individual places on particular property at a given time”). 
223 Duncanville Landfill, 469 U.S. at 36 
224 See United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949) (cautioning against making a “fetish” of 
market value); see also Duncanville Landfill, 469 U.S. at 29; Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 512; Kirby 
Forest, 467 U.S. at 10 n.14; United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973); United States v. Va. Elec. 
& Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961); Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 338 U.S. at 402; United States v. 
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943). 
225 Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 511. 
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For example, the market value standard fails to require the government to 
provide “compensat[ion] for all values an owner may derive from his 
property.”226  In particular, the Court has frequently observed that just 
compensation does not necessarily require compensation for the special 
value that a piece of property may have for a particular user.227  Furthermore, 
the Court does not allow recovery of any transaction costs imposed by the 
taking.228  As a result, the market value standard has been criticized for 
failing to make whole those whose property is taken.229   
 The Court has nonetheless concluded that the market value standard 
offers an appropriate accommodation for the exigencies of modern 
governance.  In most cases market value “achieves a fair ‘balance between 
the public’s need and the claimant’s loss,’ ”230 thereby mediating “the 
conflict between the people’s interest in public projects and the principle of 
indemnity to the landowner.”231  Although the failure to take subjective 
valuation into account can impose real costs on those whose property is 
taken, such slippage is “properly treated as part of the burden of common 
citizenship.”232  As a result, any exceptions to the market value rule that may 
exist remain very narrow.233   
 b. Determining Market Value under the Takings Clause — Market 
value is defined as the amount that would be paid for the property in a 
transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller.234  Consequently, 
market value must take into account any aspect of the property that would 
affect the price that a reasonable buyer would be willing to pay.235  For 
example, in Boom Co. v. Patterson, the Court held that in determining the 
value of condemned land, “the same considerations are to be regarded as in a 
sale of property between private parties.  The inquiry in such cases must be 
what is the property worth in the market, viewed not merely with reference 
                                                     
226 Id. 
227 Id. (citing Miller, 317 U.S. at 374-75; and Cors, 337 U.S. at 332). 
228 See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motors Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377-78 (1946); cf. supra notes 33-34 
and accompanying text (noting that transaction costs are real costs that should be taken into account when 
compensating network owners for access to their inputs). 
229 See, e.g., James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 
69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1300 (1985).  See generally D. Michael Risinger, Direct Damages:  The Lost Key 
to Constitutional Just Compensation When Business Premises Are Condemned, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 
483, 526-40 (1985) collecting commentary); Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing 
Need for Reform, 46 S.C. L. REV. 579, 579-80 & n.7 (1995) (same).   
230 Id. at 33 (quoting Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 338 U.S. at 402). 
231 Powelson, 319 U.S. at 280. 
232 Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 5. 
233 DeBow, supra note 229, at 581; Ann E. Gergen, Why Fair Market Value Fails as Just 
Compensation, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 181, 195 (1994) ; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation 
for Takings: How Much Is Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721, 729-31, 759-61 (1993). 
234 Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 10; Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 511; Miller, 317 U.S. at 374. 
235 Almota, 407 U.S. at 474 (plurality opinion); Va. Elec., 365 U.S. at 635-36; Olson, 292 U.S. at 
260; Mitchell, 267 U.S. at 343; Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 407-08 (1878).   
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to the uses to which it is at the time applied, but with reference to the sues to 
which it is plainly adapted.”236 
 The Court reiterated these principles in Olson v. United States.237  When 
determining the price upon which a willing buyer and a willing seller would 
settle, “there should be taken into account all considerations that fairly might 
be brought forward and reasonably be given substantial weight in such 
bargaining.”238  The Court involved the concept of opportunity cost when it 
noted that “[t]he highest and most profitable use for which the property is 
adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future is 
to be considered, not necessarily as the measure of value, but to the full 
extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market value 
while the property is privately held.”239  In addition, “to the extent that 
probable demand by prospective purchasers or condemnors affects market 
value, it is to be taken into account.”240   
 Consistent with the economic principles identified above,241 the Court 
has held that an evaluation of comparable sales represents the most reliable 
way to determine how much a willing buyer would have agreed to pay to a 
willing seller had the property been transferred on the open market.  As the 
Court observed in Kimball Laundry, “If exchanges of similar property have 
been frequent, the inference is strong that the equivalent arrived at by the 
haggling of the market would probably have been offered and accepted, and 
it is thus that ‘market price’ becomes so important a standard of 
reference.”242   
 Other measures may be required when the property being valued is so 
infrequently traded that in effect no market for it exists.243  In the absence of 
comparable sales, the Court has sanctioned use of the income capitalization 
approach when valuing commercial property, in which market value is 
determined to be the net present value of the property’s projected income.244  
Although this approach has the advantage of being based on data derived 
                                                     
236 98 U.S. at 407-08. 
237 292 U.S. 246 (1934). 
238 Id. at 257; accord id. at 255 (“Just compensation includes all elements of value that inhere in the 
property . . ..”). 
239 Id. at 255. 
240 Id. at 256 (citing Boom Co.); accord Almota, 409 U.S. at 477-78 (valuing property based on 
every consideration that the market would have included had the property been sold in an open market); 
id. at 479 (Powell, J., concurring) (given weight to every value that would have been given weight in a 
transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller). 
241 See supra Part I.C.1. 
242 338 U.S. at 6. 
243 See, e.g., Duncanville Landfill, 469 U.S. at 29; Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 10 n.14; Lutheran 
Synod, 441 U.S. at 512; United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950); Kimball 
Laundry, 338 U.S. at 6; Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 337 U.S. at 402; Miller, 317 U.S. at 374-75. 
244 See Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 515 (noting that “the uses to which commercial property is put 
can often be valued in terms of the capitalized earnings produce”); Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 16-17 
(“One index of going-concern value offered by petitioner is the record of its past earnings.”).  For an 
application of these principles in the context of telecommunications, see Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. 
FCC, 988 F.2d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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from actual market transactions, the Court has recognized that it does carry 
some risks.  Estimates of value based on capitalization of income are only as 
reliable as the data upon which they are based.  For example, projections of 
future income are typically based on the income that a particular property has 
earned in the past.  While such data are often reliable indicators of future 
earnings, at times they may fail to reflect the full range of technological and 
economic developments.245   
 In addition, the Court has suggested that in the absence of better 
measures of value, it is appropriate for courts to consider replacement cost 
when determining whether the government has provided just compensation.  
As noted earlier, replacement cost is better than historic cost at reflecting 
changes in value across time.246  It also provides a useful ceiling, since all 
those who would purchase access would also have the option of making it 
themselves.  At the same time, approaches that focus on replacement cost 
suffer from several conceptual limitations.  First and foremost, such 
approaches are problematic in that they do not necessarily reflect exchange 
value.247  In addition, by failing to incorporate any element that reflects 
demand, the replacement cost approach may fail to take technological 
obsolescence into account and as a result may require compensation even 
“when no one would think of reproducing the property.”248  Moreover, in 
order to compensate for functional obsolescence, courts must analyze the 
replacement cost of a plant of equal efficiency by including an allowance for 
physical depreciation.  Failing to do so would have the effect of bestowing a 
windfall on the property owner, represented by the difference in quality 
between the new, replacement facility and the older facility actually taken.  
The addition of depreciation as a valuation factor adds considerable 
uncertainty to the valuation process.249   
 The Court reserved its heaviest criticism for the valuation approach upon 
which regulatory authorities have most often relied in network industries:  
historical cost.  The Court’s criticism of historical cost methodologies dates 
back to its earliest takings decisions.250  As the Court explained in United 
States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co.,251 historical cost all 
too often represents a “false standard of the past” that bears no necessary 
                                                     
245 See Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 337 U.S. at 398, 403 (finding earnings record based on ferry 
routes from 1916 to 1932 inapposite when the development of alternative ferry routes in 1928 rendered 
those routes obsolete). 
246 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. 
247 4 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.01[1], at 12-33 to -34 (rev. 3d ed. 
2001). 
248 Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 337 U.S. at 403.  For example, the Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo 
Court determined that replacement cost was misleading in light of the fact that the development of rail 
lines and larger ferries had rendered ships of the type in question obsolete.  Id. at 399-400. 
249 Duncanville Landfill, 469 U.S. at 34-35; Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 518 (White, J., concurring). 
250 See Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 328 (“The value, therefore, is not determined by the mere cost of 
construction . . ..”). 
251 338 U.S. 396 (1949). 
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relationship with present value.252  As a result, the Court condemned 
historical cost as “a backward-looking measure that is unreliable in 
determining a current fair market value.”253  The Court elaborated further in 
Olson, in which it pointed out that market value  
may be more or less than the owner’s investment.  He may 
have acquired the property for less than its worth or he may 
have paid a speculative and exorbitant price.  Its value may 
have changed substantially while held by him. . . . The 
public may not by any means confiscate the benefits, or be 
required to bear the burden of the owner’s bargain . . . He 
must be made whole but is not entitled to more.254   
 Because of the problems associated with these other methodologies, the 
Court has consistently indicated that the comparable sales approach 
represents the best evidence of market value.255  Indeed, the Court has gone 
so far as to refer to other valuation methodologies (including replacement 
cost) as exceptions to the comparable sales approach and to hold these other 
methodologies inapplicable whenever market-based transactions in similar 
properties exist.256  The Court offered its most dramatic statement to this 
effect in United States v. New River Collieries Co.,257 in which the Court 
held that “[w]here private property is taken for public use and there is a 
market price prevailing at the time and place of the taking, that price is just 
compensation.”258  When comparable sales data existed, evidence of income 
and replacement cost was properly held inadmissible.259  The implication is 
                                                     
252 Id. at 403 (footnote and citations omitted). 
253 Id.  
254 292 U.S. at 255; accord 4A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 247, § 15.09[1], at 15-62 
(noting that historical cost “is not a conclusive test, because the money may have bee improvidently 
expended, or by reason of a change in conditions, parts of the works may have ceased to be of value, or 
the cost of labor and materials may have increased or decreased”). 
255 See 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 247, § 12B.04[3], at 12B-22 (calling the 
comparable sales approach “the preferred way to compute market value); DeBow, supra note 229, at 582 
(“it is widely understood that in practice the Supreme Court shows a strong preference for the comparable 
sales approach”); Lunney, supra 233, at 728 (noting that the Court “has preferred that a party establish 
market value through the comparable sales approach”). 
256 See Duncanville Landfill, 469 U.S. at 29; Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 512; Kirby Forest, 467 
U.S. at 10 n.14; Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 338 U.S. at 402.  The Court has also suggested in dicta that 
the market value standard may be set aside when application of the market value standard “ ‘would result 
in manifest injustice to owner or public.’ ”  Duncanville Landfill, 469 U.S. at 29 (quoting Commodities 
Trading Corp., 339 U.S. at 123); The Court has never provided much guidance as to when this exception 
might arise.  In addition, to date the Court has rejected every attempt to invoke this exception in terms that 
gave no suggestions as to the circumstances in which it might actually apply.  See id. at 30-36; Lutheran 
Synod, 441 U.S. at 514-17.  The language of these opinions and the fact that the Court has yet to find a 
case in which this exception applies strongly suggests that this exception is at best extremely narrow and 
possibly even empty. 
257 262 U.S. 341 (1923). 




that whenever equivalent property is regularly traded on an established 
market, comparable sales represent the sole measure of compensation.  Only 
if such data is unavailable may courts resort to other methodologies, and 
even when doing so, it should turn first to the income capitalization approach 
and then the replacement cost approach before evaluating value in terms of 
historical cost.   
 The arguments advanced by Justice Brandeis and later offered by the 
Court to justify reliance on historical cost when evaluating takings 
challenges to conventional rate regulation are not to the contrary.260  At no 
point did anyone suggest that cost-based methodologies are superior under 
the principles of economics and fairness embodied in the Takings Clause.  
Instead, the Court made clear that it was sanctioning the use of cost-based 
methodologies only because of market-based methodologies were 
unavailable.  Implicit in this argument is the recognition that use of cost-
based methodologies was valid only so long as comparable sales did not 
exist and that the emergence of market-based benchmarks would require a 
return to the established principles of constitutional law. 
 The foregoing analysis underscores the constitutional significance of 
both of the transformations that we have identified.  The fundamental shift 
from rate regulation to access regulation makes it far easier for regulatory 
authorities to incorporate external reference points that reflect the demand 
side of the valuation equation.  Because conventional rate regulation set the 
prices charged for the final outputs, any attempt to base rates on the final 
prices charged was hopelessly circular.  Access regulation, in contrast, 
alleviates much of the circularity problem by allowing market-based 
competition to determine the prices charged for final goods.  It is true that 
some circularity remains under access regulations.  Regulatory authorities 
must still establish rates to govern the terms under which incumbent firms 
must provide access to competitors, and the rates set will have some 
influence on the prices charged for final goods.  But the circularity problems 
will be mitigated to some extent by the fact that network access remains only 
one of several inputs required in the production of the final good.  If network 
access comprises only a small percentage of the total cost, access rates will 
not represent a significant determinant of final good prices. 
 The emergence of direct, facilities-based network competition is also of 
considerable constitutional moment.  Indeed, the emergence of direct 
competition undercuts the justifications for imposing access regulation as a 
matter of first principles.  But even setting aside the basic policy question 
about whether access represents good policy, the emergence of substitute 
network technologies has equally profound implications for the 
implementation of any access regime.  By facilitating the emergence of 
alternative networks capable of providing market-based indicia of 
                                                     
260 See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text. 
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competitive pricing, the convergence of telecommunications technology is in 
the process of vitiating the justification for using cost-based methodologies 
to set rates.  As competition allows market benchmarks to emerge, precedent 
indicates that any continued reliance on cost-based methodologies would be 
improper. 
 c. Partial Takings of Utility Property — Although the Supreme Court’s 
takings jurisprudence recognizes that the compensation paid by the 
government should generally reflect earning potential of the property taken, 
it should be noted that the government generally does not need to pay for the 
going concern value of the property when the government takes the entire fee 
and divests the current owner of title, it need not pay compensation for the 
going concern value of the property.261  As the Court explained in Kimball 
Laundry, “the denial of compensation in such circumstances rests on a very 
concrete justification:  the going-concern value has not been taken.”262  In 
such circumstances, “only the physical property has been condemned, 
leaving the owner free to move his business to a new location.”263  The Court 
further reasoned that “[i]n such a situation there is no more reason for a taker 
to pay for the business’ going-concern value than there would be for a 
purchaser to pay for it who had not secured from his vendor a covenant to 
refrain from entering into competition with him.”264 
 The Kimball Laundry Court has identified two circumstances in which 
the compensation for going concern value is nonetheless appropriate.  The 
first occurs when the government takes a public utility that possesses natural 
monopoly characteristics.265  “Since a utility cannot ordinarily operated 
profitably except as a monopoly, investment by the former owner of the 
utility in duplicating the condemned faculties could have no prospect of a 
profitable return.”266  In such cases, “[t]he owner retains nothing of the 
going-concern value that it formerly possessed.”267  Taking over a public 
utility thus “has the inevitable effect of depriving the owner of the going-
concern value of his business,” it properly is regarded as a taking for which 
compensation must be paid.268 
 The second situation identified in Kimball Laundry in which a firm must 
receive compensation for its going concern value arises when the 
government physically takes less than the fee interest in the owner’s 
property.269  The Court elaborated further in United States v. General Motors 
                                                     
261 See, e.g., Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 11; United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 
379 (1945). 
262 338 U.S. at 11. 
263 Id. 
264 Id.  
265 Id. at 12 (citing City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180 (1910); and City of Denver v. 
Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178, 191 (1918)). 
266 Id. at 12-13. 
267 Id. at 13. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 14-16. 
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Corp.,270 in which the Court has recognized that, although the government 
need not pay compensation for a property’ going concern value when it takes 
the full fee interest,271 “[i]t is altogether another matter when the Government 
does not take [the owner’s] entire interest, but by the form of its proceeding 
chops it into bits, of which it takes only what it wants, however few or 
minute, and leaves him holding the remainder.”272  The fact that only part of 
the property was taken in effect made it impossible for the property owner 
simply to reestablish its business elsewhere.  In such cases, the proper 
measure of compensation was not just the cost of the property taken, but 
rather must also reflect the going concern value of the property as reflected 
by rental for use of the property that could be obtained on the open market.273 
 Both considerations underscore the constitutional problems that would 
result from basing network access rates solely on cost and counsel in favor of 
allowing the rates charged to reflect the probable demand for network 
services.  To the extent that access to any particular portion of a network is 
justified, it must be because that portion bears natural monopoly 
characteristics.  Since it is infeasible for the network owner to establish 
similar facilities elsewhere, the physical occupation of those facilities 
requires that the network be compensated for the going concern value of the 
property taken, which in this case is reflected by the value of the network 
services provided.  In addition, the partial nature of the physical taking 
effected by access requirements provides yet another reason for requiring the 
government to compensate network owners for their lost profits.  The fact 
that access necessarily involves a physical taking that is considerably less 
than the full fee interrupts the owner’s use of the property and leaves the 
property inextricably intertwined with others’ use of the property.  Because 
these encumbrances effectively prevent the owner from using its property for 
other purposes, they require that compensation for such a partial physical 
taking include compensation for the property’s going concern value. 
3. Implications 
 It is no doubt tempting for regulatory authorities and courts to resolve 
takings challenges to regulations of network industries according to the same 
principles applied in cases involving conventional rate regulation.  Those 
principles are based on balancing tests that regard regulations backed by 
strong public policy justifications and having minimal economic impact as 
constitutionality unproblematic.  In addition, adherence to the preexisting 
approaches allows regulators to continue to employ the cost-based 
methodologies with which they are by now quite familiar.  It would thus 
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271 Id. at 379. 
272 Id. at 382. 
273 Id.; Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 7. 
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allow ratemaking authorities to maximize the leverage gained from the 
regulatory tools developed in relation to their previous ratemaking efforts. 
 Blind application of existing principles, however, would ignore the 
constitutional import of the shift from rate regulation to access regulation.  
As noted earlier, access regulation typically requires network owners to 
permit permanent physical occupations of their property.  Unlike rate 
regulation, then, access regulation effects a physical taking for which the 
government must pay compensation without regard to the magnitude of the 
invasion, its impact on investment-backed expectations, or the importance of 
the policy interests furthered by the regulation.  The Court has made clear 
that the precedents regarding regulatory takings and confiscatory ratemaking 
upon which regulatory authorities have previously relied in rejecting takings 
challenges have no application to cases in which a physical taking is 
involved.274 
 The Court’s takings jurisprudence also makes clear that the best measure 
of just compensation is market value and that, in turn, market value is best 
determined on the basis of actual market transactions.  Although the absence 
of external, market-determined benchmarks once may have justified reliance 
on cost-based valuation methodologies, technological convergence and the 
shift from regulating outputs to regulating inputs have undercut the 
justification for continuing to do so by making it increasingly possible for 
regulatory authorities to determine value on the basis of actual market 
transactions.  The implication is that the theoretical and technological 
transformation of regulated industries law in turn commands a similarly 
fundamental transformation of the principles used to evaluate takings 
challenges to the imposition of access regulation to network industries.  
Since front-line policy makers charged with implementing access regulations 
have to date largely ignored these implications, the obligation to enforce 
these principles will fall to the courts as they begin to address the merits of 
takings challenges to this type of regulation. 
III. CURRENT POLICY APPLICATIONS 
 This Part applies the framework developed above to the three most 
salient access-related policy issues of the day:  (1) access to local telephone 
networks, (2) access to networks of utility poles, and (3) access to high-speed 
broadband networks.  This analysis will demonstrate how access necessarily 
involves a permanent physical invasion.  It will also show how technological 
developments and the shift to access regulation have now made market-
based pricing possible. 
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A. Access to Local Telephone Networks 
 Access to local telephone systems represented the keystone to the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which has been lauded as the most 
sweeping reconceptualization of telecommunications policy since the initial 
enactment of the Communications Act of 1934.  This subpart will provide an 
overview of the access requirements that have been imposed on local 
telephone networks.  It will then analyze that regulatory regime in light of 
the economic and constitutional principles developed above.  Both sets of 
principles compel the same conclusion:  that the current approach to setting 
rates for access to elements of local telephone networks are flawed and 
should be replaced by an approach that better reflects market pricing. 
1. Regulatory Framework  
 In a typical narrowband network, customers connect to the telephone 
network through a pair of copper wires known as the local loop.  The local 
loops terminate at a circuit switch located in the LEC’s central office, which 
receives calls in analog format and routes them either to another local 
customer whose loop is also connected to the same switch or conveys the call 
a designated interconnection point (called a “point of presence” or “POP”) 
where it can hand the call off to a long distance carrier.  The typical local 
telephone network performs two distinct functions.  It allows customers to 
place local calls to other customers in the same geographic area, a function 
known as “local exchange services” (represented in Figure 1 by the 
connection between Customer Premises A and Customer Premises B).275  It 
also connects customers to long distance carriers by providing what became 
known as “exchange access services” (represented in Figure 1 by the 
connection between Customer Premises A and the point of presence 
maintained by the long distance carrier). 
 Policy makers initially regarded the entire telephone network as a natural 
monopoly.  First, the significant fixed costs associated with constructing the 
initial network of wires, switches, and other equipment necessary to provide 
telephone service caused costs to decline across all relevant volumes.  
Second, the fact that the value of any local telephone network to any 
particular user is determined in no small part by the number of other users 
are connected to the same network caused local telephone systems tend to 
exhibit network economic effects.   
                                                     
275 If a local exchange area is particularly large, the LEC may employ more than one central office 
switch connected together by high-speed trunk lines to serve a single calling area.   
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FIGURE 1 
TYPICAL CONFIGURATION OF A BASIC LOCAL TELEPHONE NETWORK 
POP
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 Over time, policy makers came to realize that portions of the telephone 
network could be competitive.  Usually at the prodding of the courts, the 
FCC eventually began to allow and encourage competition in various 
portions of the overall telephone system, such as the markets for telephone-
related equipment276 and long distance services.277  This initial movement 
culminated in the breakup of AT&T,278 which was aimed at preventing the 
Bell System from using its monopoly control over local telephone service to 
impede competition in the long distance and equipment markets by 
preventing any provider of local telephone service from providing long 
distance or equipment.279  The decision that ordered the breakup, known as 
the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ), did not challenge the idea that local 
telephone service remained a natural monopoly and consequently made no 
attempt to promote competition at the local level.280 
 Over time, dramatic decreases in the cost of switching and transmission 
technology led policy makers to question whether local telephone service 
remained a natural monopoly.  The initial step in fostering competition in 
local telephony was the FCC’s Expanded Interconnection proceeding,281 
                                                     
276 See, e.g., Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Use of 
Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 424 (1968). 
277 See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977); MTS and WATS 
Market Structure, Report and Third Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 81 
F.C.C.2d 177 (1980). 
278 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (“MFJ”), aff’d mem. sub 
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
279 For a complete discussion of the theories underlying the breakup of AT&T, see Roger Noll & 
Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation:  United States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST 
REVOLUTION 290, 295-326 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989). 
280 Implementation of Local Competition Provision in Telecomms. Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 14171, 14173-74 ¶ 4 (1996). 
281 See Expanded Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 7369 (1992) (“Special Access Order”); Expanded Interconnection with 
Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Second Report and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 F.C.C.R. 
7374 (1993) (“Switched Transport Order”). 
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which attempted to promote competition in local telephone service by 
nurturing the development of a new category of carriers known as 
Competitive Access Providers (CAPs).  The increasing feasibility of 
competition in local telephony eventually culminated with the enactment of 
the local competition provisions of the 1996 Act. 
 a. The Expanded Interconnection Proceeding — When they first 
emerged, CAPs focused on offering corporate customers dedicated 
connections with long distance carriers that allowed those customers to 
bypass the incumbent LEC’s facilities by transporting calls all the way from 
the customer’s premises to the long distance carrier’s.282  CAPs also began to 
offer partial bypass services that covered either the segment running from the 
customer’s location to the incumbent LEC’s central office (a service known 
as “special access”) or the segment running from the central office to the 
long distance carrier’s POP (a service known as “switched transport”). 
 CAP-provided services possessed many advantages over those provided 
by the incumbent LECs.  First, CAP networks tended to employ more 
modern technology, such as fiber optic rings, which allowed them to offer a 
greater range of features and a more attractive price structure than could the 
incumbent LECs.283  Unlike incumbent LECs, moreover, CAPs were not 
required to provide uniform services according to published tariffs approved 
by the FCC.  As a result, they were able to respond more quickly to the 
market and to tailor pricing and terms of service to each customer’s 
particular needs.  Lastly, the untariffed nature of CAP services also allowed 
them to avoid the cross subsidies embedded in the system of access charges 
created by the FCC.   
 CAPs were important for a far more fundamental reason, however.  The 
deployment of CAP networks did not only allow for the emergence of 
competition in the market for access to long distance services.  The eventual 
expansion of CAP networks to cover the entire core business districts of 
major metropolitan areas made it possible for CAPs to begin to offer local 
telephone service in direct competition with the incumbent LECs.284 
 The FCC recognized that if CAPs were to compete with the major 
LECs,285 they needed to interconnect with the incumbent LECs’ networks on 
                                                     
282 For a detailed description of regulations designed to encourage the development of CAPs, see 
Alexander C. Larson & Douglas R. Mudd, Collocation and Telecommunications Policy:  A Fostering of 
Competition on the Merits?, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 263, 274-84 (1992). 
283 Specifically, use of fiber optics provided dramatic improvements in amount of bandwidth 
available.  It also decreased service costs in general and made them much less distance sensitive.  Fiber 
optics also allowed CAPs to take advantage of the efficiencies made possible by computer processing, 
such as improved switching and digital compression.   
284 See David J. Teece, Telecommunications in Transition:  Unbundling, Reintegration, and 
Competition, 1 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 47, 66, 78 (1994-1995) (describing CAP entry into 
local telephone service in New York, Chicago, and Grand Rapids). 
285 The FCC limited these expanded interconnection requirements to Tier I LECs, which they 
defined as LECs with revenues of at least $100 million who were not NECA pool members.  See Special 
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the same terms and conditions that the LECs provided for their own circuits.  
As a result, the FCC gave CAPs the right to place any equipment needed to 
terminate calls in the LECs’ central offices.286  The FCC believed that this 
right, which the FCC dubbed “physical collocation,” was necessary to ensure 
that the interconnection provided to the CAPs was comparable to that used 
by the LEC for itself.  If the LEC’s central office lacked the physical space to 
accommodate physical collocation, the LEC could instead provide “virtual 
collocation,” which required the LEC to install and maintain on its property 
equipment that allowed the requesting carrier to interconnect with the LEC’s 
network through a location outside of the LEC’s central office.287  
Interconnection prices for both physical and virtual collocation would be 
governed by price caps.  As in other price cap regimes, initial rates would be 
based historical cost.288  The FCC also rejected arguments that the physical 
collocation requirement violated the Takings Clause on the grounds that 
physical takings doctrine was not applicable to public utility property, which 
was governed exclusively by the framework applied to regulatory takings.289  
Even assuming that physical collocation did constitute a taking, the FCC 
argued in the alternative that the compensation provided was sufficient to 
                                                                                                                             
Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7372 n.1, 7398 ¶ 57; Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7376 ¶ 1 & 
n.1. 
286 See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7389-90 ¶ 39, 7391 ¶ 42; Switched Transport Order, 8 
F.C.C.R. at 7391-92 ¶ 29.  This requirement applied only to central office equipment needed to terminate 
basic transmission facilities.  It did not cover equipment (such as enhanced services or customer premises 
equipment) unrelated to the competitive provision of transmission services.  See Special Access Order, 7 
F.C.C.R. at 7413-14 ¶ 93; Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7412-13 ¶ 63.  This was by no means 
the only obstacle that hindered CAPs from emerging as direct competitors to the LECs.  The existing 
tariffs required customers purchasing partial bypass services from the CAPs to pay for both the special 
access and switched transport segments even though they were using the CAP to bypass one of legs.  This 
had the effect of forcing CAP customers to pay twice for the same service, which in turn rendered CAP 
pricing uneconomical.  In order to cure this problem, the FCC ordered Tier I LECs to unbundle their 
special access and switched transport tariffs.  See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7424-25 ¶ 120; 
Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7418 ¶ 75. 
287 See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7390-91 ¶ 41; Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 
7393-94 ¶ 31.  The FCC also approved virtual collocation should both parties agree that such 
arrangements were preferable to physical collocation or if state regulatory authorities determined either 
that virtual collocation was preferable to physical collocation or that the decision about which form of 
collocation to allow should be made by the LEC.  See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7390-91 ¶¶ 40-
41; Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7393-95 ¶¶ 31-32.  The FCC added specific conditions on 
LEC provision of virtual collocation to minimize any technical differences between physical and virtual 
collocation.  First, the FCC required that LECs permit interconnectors using virtual collocation to 
designate the type of equipment dedicated to their use, although the interconnectors would have to bear 
any additional costs associated with their choice of equipment.  In addition, the FCC required that the 
LECs install, maintain, and repair virtually collocation equipment under at least the same time intervals 
and with the same failure rates that apply to the LEC’s own equipment.  Lastly, LECs must allow 
interconnectors to monitor and control the equipment remotely.  See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 
7392-94 ¶¶ 44-46; Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7392 ¶ 30. 
288 See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7428-29 ¶ 127; Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 
7419 ¶ 79; Expanded Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and 
Notice of Inquiry, 6 F.C.C.R. 3259, 3267 ¶¶ 52-53 (1991). 
289 See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7476-83 ¶¶ 230-40; Switched Transport Order, 8 
F.C.C.R. at 7475 ¶ 144. 
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render it constitutional.290  State regulatory authorities issued similar orders 
in order to facilitate CAP entry into local telephone service.291 
 The D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s collocation rules in Bell 
Atlantic Telephone Cos. v. FCC292 on the grounds that it exceeded the FCC’s 
statutory authority.  The court reasoned that giving CAPs the right to place 
equipment in the LECs’ central offices represented precisely the type of 
permanent physical occupation that constituted a per se taking under 
Loretto.293  As a result, the physical collocation requirement ran afoul of the 
principle that statutes should not be construed so as to create “ ‘an 
identifiable class of cases in which application of a statute will necessarily 
constitute a taking.’ ”294   
 The FCC responded to the Bell Atlantic decision by ceasing to make 
physical collocation mandatory and by giving the LECs the option of 
providing virtual collocation instead.  The FCC continued to maintain that 
mandatory physical collocation did not constitute a per se taking, but argued 
that, regardless of whether that were true, offering the LECs virtual 
collocation as an option eliminated any such constitutional infirmity.295  
Before the courts could address the validity of these revised regulations, the 
entire scheme was rendered moot by the collocation provisions of the 1996 
Act.296   
 b. The Local Competition Provisions of the 1996 Act — The local 
competition provisions of the 1996 Act were designed to “open[ ] all 
communications services to competition,” including local telephone service, 
by eliminating local providers’ bottleneck control over the elements needed 
to originate or terminate telephone calls.297  Rather than regulating the retail 
prices charged for local telephone service, the local competition provisions 
of the 1996 Act focused instead on regulating the price at which new entrants 
could obtain access to key elements of the incumbent LEC’s network.  As 
such, it represents a prime example of the shift from output regulation to 
input regulation taking place throughout regulated industries. 
 Congress envisioned that competition in local telephone markets might 
emerge through one of three paths.298  First, a new entrant might obtain all of 
                                                     
290 Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7482-83 ¶ 240; Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 
7475 ¶ 144. 
291 See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7374-75 ¶ 7 & nn.10-12. 
292 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
293 Id. at 1445-47. 
294 Id. (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 128 n.5 (1985)). 
295 Expanded Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 
F.C.C.R. 5154, 5163 ¶¶ 22-23 (1994). 
296 See Pac. Bell Co. v. FCC, 81 F.3d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (table) (opinion available at 1996 WL 
175198). 
297 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, pt. I, at 48-49, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 11-13. 
298 See Implementation of Local Competition Provisions of Telecomms. Act of 1996, First Report 
and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15509 ¶ 12 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”); Verizon 
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 1662 (2002);  
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the necessary elements from the incumbent LEC and resell them.299  Second, 
a new entrant might construct an entirely new network.  Because the inability 
to complete calls to the incumbent LEC’s customers would render any new 
network relatively unattractive, the 1996 Act required that incumbent LECs 
allow any requesting telecommunications carrier to interconnect with their 
networks “at any technically feasible point.”300  It also required that the 
interconnection be equal in quality to the interconnection that the incumbent 
LEC provides to itself301 and be provided according to “rates, terms, and 
conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.”302   
 Congress recognized, however, that not every facilities-based entrant 
would be able to have its entire network in place at the time it began to offer 
local service.303  In order to allow competition to emerge before entrants had 
fully established their networks, Congress established a third path for 
entering local telephone markets by requiring every incumbent LEC to 
provide other carriers with access to all of its network elements on an 
unbundled basis.  Such access must be provided at any technically feasible 
point under rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory.304   
 By their nature, both interconnection and access to unbundled network 
elements typically require the requesting carrier to place some of its 
equipment on the incumbent LEC’s property.  For example, mandatory 
interconnection necessarily presupposes that competitors will establish 
physical connections to the incumbent LEC’s network.305  In addition, access 
to elements of the incumbent LEC’s network necessarily presupposes some 
ability to combine those elements with facilities supplied by the new entrant.  
In either case, requesting carriers must be allowed to establish physical 
connections between their equipment and the incumbent LEC’s network.  
The element most likely to be accessed in this manner is the local loop, 
which possesses the characteristics of a natural monopoly more than perhaps 
any other network element.  A carrier who requests unbundled access to the 
local loop needs to be able to terminate that loop by connecting it to the 
requesting carrier’s switching equipment.   
 As result, the 1996 Act included collocation requirements that were quite 
similar to those adopted by the FCC in its Expanded Interconnection 
                                                     
299 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4). 
300 Id. § 251(c)(2)(B).   
301 Id. § 251(c)(2)(C). 
302 Id. § 251(c)(2)(D). 
303 S. CONF. REP. NO. 104-230, at 147 (1996). 
304 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).  In determining which network elements would be subject to the 
unbundled access requirement, the statute required the FCC to consider whether “access to such network 
elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary” and whether “the failure to provide access to such 
network elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the 
services that it seeks to offer.  Id. § 251(d)(2)(A) & (B) (emphasis added). 
305 See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15514 ¶ 26 (defining interconnection as “the 
physical linking of two networks for the mutual exchange of traffic”). 
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proceedings.306  Specifically, the statute requires incumbent LECs to permit 
“physical collocation of equipment necessary for interconnection or access to 
unbundled network elements.”307  When technical considerations or space 
limitations render physical collocation impractical, incumbent LECs need 
only provide virtual collocation.308   
 The 1996 Act required that prices for interconnection and access to 
unbundled network elements be determined through voluntary negotiations 
between the incumbent LEC and the requesting carrier, at times aided by 
mediation by a state public utility commission.309  If the parties are unable to 
reach a voluntary agreement, the statute gives state public utility 
commissions the authority to set rates through binding arbitration, which 
would be governed by one of two statutory mandates.  First, rates for 
interconnection and access to unbundled network elements set by arbitration 
shall be “based on the cost . . . of providing the interconnection or network 
element,” provided that cost is “determined without reference to a rate-of-
return or other rate-based proceeding.”310  Second, the statute required that 
compensation for traffic originating on the network of one LEC and 
terminating on the network of another be governed by the principle of 
“reciprocal compensation,”311 which “provide[s] for the mutual and 
reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs associated with the transport and 
termination on each carrier’s network facilities of calls that originate on the 
network facilities of the other carrier.”312  Such costs must be determined “on 
the basis of a reasonable approximation of the additional costs of terminating 
such calls.”313   
 c. Implementation of the 1996 Act — The FCC implemented the local 
competition provisions of the 1996 Act in a massive order issued just three 
months after the statute’s enactment.314  Although that order dealt 
encyclically with a wide range of implementation-related issues, including 
the scope of the unbundling requirements that gave rise to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd.,315 for our purposes it is 
                                                     
306 See supra Part II.A.1.a. 
307 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6). 
308 Id.; see also supra notes 287, 295 and accompanying text (describing similar virtual collocation 
provision with respect to CAPs). 
309 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1). 
310 Id. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i).  The statute further requires that rates must be “nondiscriminatory,” id. 
§ 252(d)(1)(A)(ii), and “may include a reasonable profit, id. § 252(d)(1)(B). 
311 Id. § 251(b)(5). 
312 Id. § 252(d)(2)(A)(i).   
313 Id. § 252(d)(2)(A)(ii).  The statute specifically allowed carriers to waive mutual recovery in favor 
of other arrangements, such as bill-and-keep systems.  Id. § 252(d)(2)(B)(i). 
314 Implementation of Local Competition Provisions of Telecomms. Act of 1996, First Report and 
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15509 ¶ 12 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”). 
315 525 U.S. 366 (1999).  The FCC initially defined the elements subject to unbundled access broadly 
without considering whether equally cost-effective inputs were otherwise available.  Local Competition 
Order, 11 F.C.C.R.. at 15642 ¶ 283, 15643 ¶ 285.  The FCC gave a similarly broad interpretation to the 
equipment subject to physical collocation.  Id. at 15628 ¶ 250, 15794 ¶ 579.  The Supreme Court struck 
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sufficient to focus on the aspects of that decision regarding the methodology 
for setting rates for interconnection, unbundled access, and physical 
collocation. 
 The FCC has implemented the provisions governing rates for 
interconnection and access to unbundled network elements by adopting a 
methodology known as Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost 
(TELRIC).  TELRIC bases rates on the element’s “economic costs,” which 
the FCC defined as the sum of the incremental costs directly attributable to 
the specified element and a reasonable allocation of common costs.316  
TELRIC’s most distinctive feature was the fact that it assessed both the 
incremental and common costs on a forward-looking basis by focusing on 
what it would cost to replace a particular network element rather than its 
historical cost.317  The FCC believed that basing rates on forward-looking 
incremental cost represented the best way to replicate, to the extent possible, 
the conditions of a competitive market.318  In addition, TELRIC further 
accommodates technological change by requiring that costs be determined on 
the basis of the most efficient technology available and the lowest cost 
network configuration given the existing location of the incumbent LEC’s 
current wire centers.319  It declined to incorporate an element to reflect the 
opportunity cost borne by the network owner providing unbundled access to 
network elements to competitors.320 
 Although the statutory mandate underlying TELRIC on its face applied 
only to compensation for interconnection and access to unbundled network 
elements, the FCC determined that compensation for physical collocation 
                                                                                                                             
the FCC’s interpretation of the scope of the unbundled access requirements as an improper construction of 
the statutory requirement that a network element must be “necessary” to providing telecommunications 
service before it is subject to unbundled access and that withholding access to that element would 
“impair” the requesting carrier’s ability to provide such service.  Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 387-92.  The 
D.C. Circuit applied similar reasoning in striking down the FCC’s initial collocation orders.  GTE Serv. 
Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 422-24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 389-90).  On 
remand, the FCC reinterpreted the “necessary” and “impair” standards in a way designed to give 
substance to those terms.  Implementation of Local Competition Provision of Telecomms. Act of 1996, 
Third Report and Order and Fourth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 3712 ¶ 22 (1999) 
(“UNE Remand Order”).  The FCC also revised its rules to limit collocation to equipment whose primary 
purpose is to provide the requesting carrier either with interconnection that is “equal in quality” to the that 
provided by the incumbent LEC for its own services or with “nondiscriminatory access” to an unbundled 
network element.  Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Fourth 
Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 15435, 15452-60 ¶¶ 32-44 (2001) (“Collocation Remand Order”).  A 
judicial challenge to the revised collocation rules is pending before the D.C. Circuit.  See Verizon Cal., 
Inc. v. FCC, No. 01-1371 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 23, 2001).   
316 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(a).  TELRIC properly refers only to the first of these two components.  For 
simplicity, however, we will refer to both parts of the methodology collectively as TELRIC. 
317 Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15857-59 ¶¶ 704-707 (citing 47 U.S.C. 
§ 252(d)(1)(A)(i)).  TELRIC avoids the problems caused by the distinction between fixed and variable 
costs by measuring incremental costs from a “long run” perspective, which is defined to be a period long 
enough that all of a firm’s costs become variable or avoidable.  Id. at 15845 ¶ 677, 15851 ¶ 692. 
318 Id. at 15847 ¶ 679. 
319 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1). 
320 Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15859 ¶ 709. 
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should also be governed by the same pricing rules.321  In addition, the FCC 
determined that TELRIC represented the appropriate interpretation of the 
“the additional costs of terminating such calls” that govern reciprocal 
compensation.322  TELRIC thus governs all of the important pricing aspects 
of the access regime created by the 1996 Act.   
 In so ruling, the FCC rejected arguments that imposition of TELRIC 
violated the Takings Clause.  In contrast to the reasoning advanced in its 
Expanded Interconnection proceedings, which argued that takings of public 
utility property are governed by the Court’s regulatory takings 
jurisprudence,323 the FCC argued that the guiding principle for determining 
whether regulation of public utilities violates the Constitution depends on 
whether the rates are confiscatory.324  Alternatively, assuming for the sake of 
argument that physical collocation constitutes a physical taking, the FCC 
found that its ratemaking methodology satisfies the just compensation 
standard, since the constitutional requirement that the government pay the 
fair market value of the property taken as compensation did not permit 
recovery of monopoly rents.325  The FCC reaffirmed this reasoning in its 
Collocation Order and its Collocation Reconsideration Order.326  
 The Supreme Court upheld TELRIC as a matter of statutory construction 
in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC.327  As several lower courts had 
done previously,328 the Court declined to reach the merits of the underlying 
                                                     
321 Id. at 15816 ¶ 629.  The FCC reasoned that physical collocation is simply a method of obtaining 
interconnection and access to unbundled network elements and, as such, should be priced in the same 
fashion.  Id. 
322 Id. at 16025-26 ¶ 1058 (ruling that that a reasonable allocation of common costs represent an 
appropriate “additional cost” under the standard for reciprocal compensation); 47 C.F.R. § 51.705(a)(1) 
(requiring that reciprocal compensation be determined on the basis of forward-looking economic costs 
pursuant to the methodology governing pricing for interconnection and access for unbundled network 
elements).  The FCC allowed for two alternatives.  State public utility commissions could either adopt a 
proxy range set by the FCC (at 0.2 and 0.4 cents per minute for termination) or impose “bill and keep” 
arrangements where the traffic flowing in each direction is roughly equal.  Id. at 16024 ¶ 1055, 16026-28 
¶¶ 1060-62, 16054-58 ¶¶ 1111-18.  The Eighth Circuit struck down the use of proxy prices in Iowa 
Utilities Board v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744, 756-57 (8th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Verizon 
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 122 S. Ct. 1646 (2002).  This portion of the Eighth Circuit’s decision does 
not appear to have been challenged before the Supreme Court. 
323 See supra notes 289, 295 and accompanying text. 
324 Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15869-70 ¶ 733 (citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 
488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989)). 
325 Id. at 15872 ¶ 740 (citing Lord Mfg. Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 748, 755-56 (Ct. Cl. 
1949)); see also id. at 15811 ¶ 617, 15811 ¶ 818. 
326 Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, First Report and 
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761, 4778-79 ¶ 31 (1999) (“Collocation 
Order”); Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Order on 
Reconsideration and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 98-147 and Fifth 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 96-98, 15 F.C.C.R. 17806, 17838 ¶ 68 (2000) 
(“Collocation Reconsideration Order”). 
327 122 S. Ct. 1646 (2002). 
328 See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 818 (8th Cir. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds 
sub nom. AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); Tex. Off. of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 
F.3d 393, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 530 U.S. 1213, cert. 
dismissed, 531 U.S. 975 (2000); US West Communications, Inc. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 55 F. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
75
takings claim.  Instead, it explicitly adopted the clear implication of its 
previous decisions and held that takings challenges to ratemaking 
methodologies were generally inappropriate until the methodology in 
question had been embodied in an actual rate order.  Although the Court 
entertained the possibility that a ratemaking methodology might have such 
sweeping implications that would justify addressing the constitutionality of a 
methodology on its face, the facts of the case before the Court did not justify 
doing so.329 
2. Economic Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing 
 As Part I demonstrated, the best way to promote economic efficiency 
when compelling access to an input is to price the input at its market value.  
Doing so promotes allocative efficiency by providing the signals that firms 
need in order to calibrate the amount of each input purchased and to ensure 
that they are employing the optimal mix of possible inputs.  Employing 
market-based pricing also promotes dynamic efficiency by signaling 
incumbents and new entrants alike of the need to invest in additional 
capacity.  As Justice Breyer noted in his separate opinion in Iowa Utilities 
Board: 
[A] sharing requirement may diminish the original owner’s 
incentive to keep up or to improve the property by depriving 
the owner of the fruits of value-creating investment, 
research, or labor.  And as one moves beyond the sharing of 
readily separable and administrable physical facilities, say, 
to the sharing of research facilities, firm management, or 
technical capacities, these problems can become more 
severe. . . . [One cannot] guarantee that firms will undertake 
the investment necessary to produce complex technological 
innovations knowing that any competitive advantage 
deriving from those innovations will be dissipated by the 
sharing requirement.  The more complex the facilities, the 
more central their relation to the firm’s managerial 
responsibilities, the more extensive the sharing demanded, 
the more likely these costs will become serious. And the 
more serious they become, the more likely they will offset 
                                                                                                                             
Supp. 2d 968, 990 (D. Minn. 1999); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. AT&T Communications of Southwest, 
Inc., No. A. 97-CA-132 SS, 1998 WL 657717, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 1998).   
329 Verizon, 122 S. Ct. at 1679-80. 
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any economic or competitive gain that a sharing requirement 
might otherwise provide.330  
 In addition, “compulsory sharing can have significant administrative and 
social costs inconsistent with the Act’s purposes.”331  If taken to an extreme, 
“[r]ules that force firms to share every resource or element of a business 
would create, not competition, but pervasive regulation, for the regulators, 
not the marketplace, would set the relevant terms.”332 
 The best way to promote economic efficiency would thus be to base 
access rates on the price the input in question would command on the open 
market.  Such prices are easy to determine when comparable inputs are 
purchased in external markets.333  Although local telephone service has long 
been regarded as a natural monopoly in which direct competition is 
impossible, technological convergence has begun to provide a wide range of 
possible external markets that can serve as bases for determining market 
value.  Over the last several years, providers of wireless telephone services, 
which carry the formal designations of Commercial Mobile Radio Services 
(CMRS), have emerged as the most successful direct competitor to the 
incumbent LECs.  Because wireless telephone providers are not considered 
“local exchange carriers,” the 1996 Act does not govern the terms under 
which they provide interconnection and access to their networks.334  
Although Congress has given the FCC the authority to regulate the terms 
under which wireless carriers interconnect with each other, the FCC has 
declined to do so.335   
                                                     
330 525 U.S. at 428-29 (Breyer, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (citation omitted); accord 
Verizon, 122 S. Ct. at 1693 (Breyer, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (noting that compelling 
incumbents to share the cost-reducing benefits of a successful innovation destroys the incumbent’s 
incentives to innovate in the first place). 
331 Iowa Utils Bd., 525 U.S.. at 428. 
332 Id. at 429. 
333 SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 31, at 275, 319, 321. 
334 Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15995 ¶ 1001, 15995-96 ¶¶ 1004, 1006.  Although 
CMRS providers are under no obligation to provide interconnection or access to their network elements, 
the FCC has ruled that CMRS providers are “telecommunications carriers” who are eligible to request 
interconnection and access to unbundled network elements from the incumbent LECs.  Id. at 15998-16000 
¶¶ 1012-13. 
335 Interconnection & Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Servs., Fourth 
Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 13523, 13534 ¶ 28 (2000) (“CMRS Interconnection Order”).  This order 
culminated protracted regulatory proceedings dating back to 1993, when the FCC issued a notice 
requesting comment whether it should require CMRS providers to provide interconnection to other CMRS 
providers.  Implementation of Sections 3(n) & 332 of Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of 
Mobile Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 F.C.C.R. 7988, 8001-02 ¶ 71 (1993).  When the FCC 
issued the order resulting from this notice, however, it declined to resolve the issue.  Implementation of 
Sections 3(n) & 332 of Communications Act & Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Servs., Second Report 
and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 1411, 1499-1500 ¶¶ 237-238 (1994).  Instead, the FCC opted to seek further 
comment on the issue in a subsequent proceeding.  Equal Access and Interconnection Obligations 
Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Serv., Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Notice of Inquiry, 9 
F.C.C.R. 5408, 5458-69 ¶¶ 121-143 (1994).  In the interim, the FCC indicated that it would entertain 
requests for interconnection on a case-by-case basis.  Id. at 5458 n.213.  When these proceedings also 
matured into a formal decision, the FCC again postponed ruling on the issue on the grounds that, although 
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 As a result, the terms of interconnection between wireless carriers are 
determined through arms-length negotiations that can provide precisely the 
type of external benchmark needed to determine the market value of 
transport and call termination services.  Admittedly, interconnection between 
wireless carriers does involve somewhat different considerations than 
interconnection with incumbent LECs.  Direct comparisons are complicated 
by the significant differences in utilization rates as well as the emergence of 
wireless pricing schemes that do not differentiate between local and long 
distance service.  The analysis is further obscured by the fact that such 
interconnection between wireless carriers is often accomplished indirectly 
through the LECs.336  Still, as wireless and other facilities-based competitors 
grow, rates charged for interconnection between wireless competitors will 
continue to emerge as a market-based reference point that can be used to 
resolve most pricing problems.  The number of external benchmarks will 
only continue to grow as local cable operators and other types of broadband 
providers begin to offer local telephone service. 
 On a more fundamental level, technological convergence raises serious 
questions about whether compelling access to local telephone networks 
represents sound economic policy.  To the extent that substitute networks are 
available, it is far from clear that the facilities of the incumbent LEC can 
properly be regarded as a monopoly bottleneck.337  Even setting such 
considerations aside and conceding the existence of compelled access, the 
emergence of alternative facilities capable of providing the same functions 
has a dramatic impact on the manner in which such access should be priced.  
Simply put, the emergence of comparable transactions provides external 
benchmarks that should enable regulatory authorities to establish access rates 
based on market prices that are more likely to promote efficiency. 
                                                                                                                             
requiring wireless-to-wireless interconnection would appear to promote efficiency, such regulation was 
premature.  Interconnection & Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Servs., Second 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 10666, 10681-82 ¶¶ 28-29 (1995).  An association of 
equipment manufacturers brought suit to compel the FCC to act.  Although the D.C. Circuit expressed 
dismay over the fact that five years had lapsed while the FCC continued to investigate the issue, the court 
nonetheless upheld the FCC’s decision to defer resolution of the issue.  Telecomms. Resellers Ass’n v. 
FCC, 141 F.3d 1193, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  Final resolution did not occur until issuance of the CMRS 
Interconnection Order two years later.  15 F.C.C.R. at 13534 ¶ 28.  It thus took seven years before these 
proceedings were finally resolved.  For an overview of the early history of these somewhat protracted 
proceedings, see PETER HUBER, MICHAEL KELLOGG, & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
LAW 953-55 (2d ed. 1999). 
336 CMRS Interconnection Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 13533-34 ¶¶ 26-27.  Historically, such comparisons 
were complicated still further by the FCC’s decision to award one of the two available first-generation 
cellular licenses to the incumbent LEC, which in turn produced reasons to question whether in fact 
interconnection agreements between wireless carriers in fact represented arms-length transactions.  The 
deployment of competitive wireless network on a national scale, the subsequent emergence of PCS, and 
the impending arrival of third-generation wireless devices should eliminate this problem in the near 
future, if it has not done so already. 
337 See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 389 (holding that the FCC must consider whether a network 
element is available from other sources before compelling access to that element under the 1996 Act). 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art38
78
 In the absence of external benchmarks based on actual market 
transactions, resort to some cost-based, second-best measure of market value 
becomes necessary.  As noted earlier, economic theory suggests that cost 
based measures should follow ECPR, which sets rates as the sum of the 
direct incremental costs of providing an input and the opportunity costs that 
the incumbent incurs when the new entrant provides the services instead of 
the incumbent.338  TELRIC includes elements designed to reflect the first of 
these two components.339  The key problem with the FCC’s analysis is its 
refusal to include any factor to reflect opportunity cost.  In setting prices 
without considering the value of foregone alternatives, TELRIC in essence 
ignores the insights of neoclassical economics by basing value solely on cost 
without taking any demand-side effects into consideration.  As such, 
TELRIC is fundamentally inconsistent with the insights of the neoclassical 
approach that serves as the foundation for all modern economic theory.   
 Although the FCC considered and rejected arguments that it should base 
access rates on ECPR, its reasons for doing so do not withstand analysis.  
The first reason was that it believed that the statutory requirement that prices 
be based on “cost” precluded it from considering opportunity cost.340  The 
Court specifically rejected this reasoning when it found the term, “cost,” to 
be “too protean” to support any such plain language argument.341  If 
anything, the FCC’s argument is directly undercut by the fact that it is now 
an economic truism that opportunity costs represent a true economic cost 
borne by the incumbent LEC.342  Indeed, the Supreme Court in effect 
recognized as much when cited “opportunity cost” as an example of a 
forward-looking “cost” that fell within the purview of the statute.343   
 The FCC’s second reason for rejecting ECPR is equally misplaced.  The 
FCC asserted that because ECPR calculates opportunity cost on the basis of 
current retail prices, it simply locks in monopoly rents without providing a 
mechanism for moving prices towards competitive levels.344  This argument 
suffers from two fundamental flaws.  First, it ignores the fact that the 
                                                     
338 See supra Part I.C.3.  One of us has elsewhere advanced the argument that, in addition to ECPR, 
the rates charged for access to unbundled network elements should also include a nonbypassable end-user 
charge to compensate incumbent LECs for costs stranded by deregulatory innovations that caused 
investment-backed expectations to fail.  See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 31, at 334-35.  Extended 
discussion of these issues fall outside the scope of this Article.  For the time being, it suffices to point out 
that the argument advanced in this article, while consistent with the imposition of such user charges, does 
not require it.   
339 See id. at 320. 
340 Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15859 ¶ 709. 
341 Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 1667 (2002).; accord id. (calling the 
term, “cost,” “a chameleon” and a “virtually meaningless term” that “say[s] little about the method 
employed to determine a particular rate” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
342 See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 31, at 322-23, 404-10. 
343 Verizon, 122 S. Ct., at 1666 n.17. 
344 Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15859 ¶ 709; see also Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 
at 7426 ¶ 123, 7430 ¶ 129 (rejecting the use of “net revenue” test proposed by Alfred Kahn in setting 
interconnection rates in the FCC’s Expanded Interconnection proceeding). 
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emergence of competition will cause retail prices to drop and that as this 
occurs, ECPR will dynamically readjust the opportunity-cost factor to reflect 
those changes in retail price.  Second, the existence of any monopoly rents in 
retail prices is more properly regarded as the result of the failure of rate 
regulation at the state level rather than any theoretical flaw in ECPR.  Such a 
failure would justify improving the manner in which state regulatory 
authorities establish retail prices.  It does not provide a justification for 
incurring the myriad problems that would result from distorting access 
prices.345 
 Although the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s ratemaking methodology 
in Verizon,346 it would be a mistake to construe Court’s action as a specific 
endorsement of TELRIC and a rejection of ECPR as a matter of economic 
policy.  On the contrary, the Court carefully eschewed expressing any 
opinion about the relative merits of any particular economic approach to 
ratemaking.347  Instead, the Court based its decision on the deferential 
standard of review that gives agencies a wide range of discretion in resolving 
any interpretive ambiguities that exist in the statutes that they administer so 
long as the construction advanced falls within a wide zone of 
reasonableness.348  As a result, the Court’s decision does not necessarily 
foreclose the possibility that the FCC might justifiably apply a ratemaking 
approach based on market prices or ECPR in the future.349 
3. Constitutional Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing 
 In addition to the problems with the FCC’s implementation of the 1996 
Act as a matter of economic theory, the adoption of a methodology focused 
solely on replacement cost also raises serious constitutional problems.  The 
takings implications of the interconnection and unbundled access provisions 
of the local competition provisions have largely escaped significant attention.  
Like most forms of rate regulation, for the most part TELRIC simply limits 
the prices that can be charged for the use of the incumbent LECs’ network 
elements.  As such, although courts and the FCC have generally stopped 
short of resolving the issue directly until a state regulatory issues an actual 
                                                     
345 See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 31, at 351-58, 362-63. 
346 122 S. Ct. at 1666-78. 
347 See id. at 1670 (“As a reviewing Court we are, of course, in no position to assess the precise 
economic significance of [various economic aspects of the incumbent LECs’ arguments].  Instead it is 
enough to recognize that the incumbents’ assumption may well be incorrect.”), 1678 (“We cannot say 
whether the passage of time will show competition prompted by TELRIC to be an illusion, but TELRIC 
appears to be a reasonable policy for now, and that is all that counts.”). 
348 Id. at 1667 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 
(1984)). 
349 See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 426 (Breyer, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (noting 
that in rejecting ECPR, the FCC “did not claim, nor did its reasoning support the claim, that the use of 
such a system would be arbitrary or unreasonable”).   
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rate order, they have suggested that the principles of confiscatory 
ratemaking350 or regulatory takings351 are likely to govern such challenges. 
 The problem with this analysis is that it focuses on TELRIC as a general 
matter without focusing on the unique constitutional implications of the 1996 
Act’s physical collocation provisions.  As the FCC has itself recognized, 
both interconnection and access to unbundled network elements typically 
require the network owner to permit requesting carriers to place equipment in 
its central office on an indefinite basis.  As a matter of first principles, the 
physical collocation associated with interconnection and unbundled access 
provisions represent the type of permanent physical invasion deemed to 
constitute a per se taking under Loretto.352  This conclusion is reinforced 
from the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Bell Atlantic holding that the physical 
collocation regime upon which the FCC modeled its implementation of the 
1996 Act constituted a physical taking.353  This conclusion draws further 
support from the D.C. Circuit’s decision overturning the FCC’s Collocation 
Order in GTE Service Corp. v. FCC,354 in which the court repeatedly 
emphasized its concern that the FCC’s interpretation of the physical 
collocation provisions may result in “unnecessary takings” of LEC 
property.355   
 Most instructive of all is the decision of the Court of Federal Claims in 
Qwest Corp. v. United States,356 which is one of the few decisions to address 
the merits of a takings challenge to the 1996 Act.  In that case, a requesting 
carrier obtained access to fourteen loops that served one particular customer 
and connected those loops to its own switching equipment contained in a 
collocation cage located in the incumbent LEC’s central office.  The 
incumbent LEC brought a takings challenge arguing the compensation that it 
received was constitutionally insufficient.  The incumbent did circumscribe 
its argument in one, somewhat unusual way.  It conceded that it was already 
receiving adequate compensation for the space occupied by the collocation 
cage.  As a result, it restricted its takings claim to the loops leased by the new 
entrant.357   
                                                     
350 See Verizon, 122 S. Ct. at 1679; MFS Intelenet, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1236; Local Competition Order, 
11 F.C.C.R. at 15871-72 ¶¶ 737-738. 
351 See Tex. Off. of Pub. Util. Counsel, 183 F.3d at 429 n.59; Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 
7479-81¶¶ 235-237. 
352 See supra notes 147-164 and accompanying text.  Even scholars who are skeptical of broader 
readings of Loretto accept that regulations that require physical collocation effect per se takings.  See 
Leonard M. Baynes, Swerving to Avoid the “Takings” and “Ultra Vires” Potholes on the Information 
Superhighway:  Is the New York Collocations and Telecommunications Policy a Taking Under the New 
York Public Service Law?, 18 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 51, 73-74 (1995); Chen, supra note 46, at 1551. 
353 See supra notes 292-294 and accompanying text. 
354 205 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
355 Id. at 421, 423, 426 
356 48 Fed. Cl. 672 (2001). 
357 Id. at 689-90, 691, 693. 
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 The court resolved the case by relying on the distinction between 
physical and nonpossessory takings.  In particular, the court accepted the 
notion that “government-mandated co-location of one party’s equipment on 
another party’s premises constitutes a physical taking of the occupied 
space.”358  As a result, it acknowledged that requesting carrier’s collocation 
cage “is analogous to the rooftop equipment in Loretto” and emphasized that 
it would have had little trouble holding that the restriction represented a per 
se taking had the incumbent LEC focused on the collocation cage itself.359  In 
contrast to the equipment contained in the collocation cage, however, the 
leasing of loops by the new entrant by itself simply involved restrictions on 
the use of the incumbent LEC’s property and did not require the incumbent 
LECs to submit to the permanent physical occupation of its property by any 
equipment.  As a result, the court concluded that the claim based on the loops 
did not constitute a physical taking.360  The court once again emphasized that 
in holding that access to the loops did not constitute a physical taking did not 
negate its prior conclusion that “the implementation of mandatory access 
provisions requiring a telecommunications provider or utility to make space 
available on its premises for a competitor to affix its own equipment . . . 
constitut[ed] a physical taking under Loretto.”361  
 The FCC has attempted to avoid this conclusion by asserting that takings 
claims involving public utility property are governed by the more permissive 
principles embodied in the Supreme Court’s confiscatory ratemaking362 and 
regulatory takings363 precedents.  The fundamental problem with this 
analysis is that ignores the distinction between physical and nonpossessory 
takings drawn by the Supreme Court in Loretto and Florida Power and 
reaffirmed in Tahoe-Sierra.364  Since the 1996 Act’s physical collocation 
mandate unambiguously requires incumbent LECs to permit competing 
carriers to place equipment on their property, it constitutes a classic physical 
taking under Loretto.  Thus, in sharp contrast to what would be true under 
the Court’s confiscatory ratemaking or regulatory takings jurisprudence, the 
magnitude of the regulation’s economic impact and the public purposes 
served by the regulation are of no consequence. 
 It thus follows that the owners of local telephone networks are entitled to 
just compensation for the physical invasion mandated by the 1996 Act.  As 
discussed above, to the extent that external markets for a particular input 
exist, the principles of just compensation require that the incumbent LECs 
are entitled to the market value of the inputs that are physically taken.365  
                                                     
358 Id. at 694. 
359 Id. at 691. 
360 Id. at 691, 693. 
361 Id. at 693. 
362 See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15871-72 ¶¶ 737-738. 
363 See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7479-81¶¶ 235-237. 
364 See supra notes 162-163, 169, 202 and accompanying text. 
365 See Part II.B.2.a. 
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Although the absence of direct competition in local telephony previously 
deprived regulators of any such market-based benchmarks,366 the emergence 
of cellular telephony and other forms of wireless communications as direct 
competitors to local telephone companies has now created an external basis 
for determining the value of the services provided by the local loop.367  
Under such circumstances, basing access pricing on replacement cost 
contradicts the Court’s established takings jurisprudence.  Perhaps sensing 
the weakness of its position, the FCC offered the alternative argument that, 
assuming that a taking had occurred, fair market value does not properly 
include monopoly rents.368  The legal support for this claim, however, is 
suspect.369  And even if the FCC’s legal conclusion were somehow proven to 
be sound, there is also reason to doubt the factual premises underlying the 
argument.  The emergence of direct facilities-based competition and the fact 
that retail prices for local telephone service are subject to rate regulation 
indicate that it is unlikely that there were any monopoly rents included in the 
prices set by the open market. 
 Although we find the conclusion that the physical collocation 
requirements of the 1996 Act effect a physical taking inescapable, we 
recognize that virtual collocation poses a much closer question.  The 
Supreme Court specifically reserved this in Loretto, observing that 
regulations requiring property owners to install certain types of network-
related equipment might present a different question.  In such a case, the 
property owner would own the equipment, which would give it full authority 
                                                     
366 See Leonard M. Baynes, How Much Is the Toll to Access the Information Superhighway?  An 
Analysis of the Appropriate Measure of Compensation for the Partial Taking of Public Utility Property, 
62 TENN. L. REV. 141, 149-50, 163-64 (1994). 
367 See supra notes 334-336 and accompanying text. 
368 Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15872 ¶ 740; see also Baynes, supra note 366, at 173-
76. 
369 The FCC cites but a single lower court decision as its authority for the proposition that just 
compensation does not permit recovery of monopoly rents.  See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 
15872 ¶ 740 (citing Lord Mfg. Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 748 (Ct. Cl. 1949)).  A perusal of Lord 
Mfg. reveals that it does not in fact stand for the proposition for which the FCC cites it.  In that case, a 
manufacturer of patented rubber and metal mountings critical to allowing aircraft to fly in adverse weather 
conditions had developed a dominant market position that allowed it to earn profits ranging from fifty-
nine to one hundred forty-seven percent.  During World War II, the federal government ordered the 
manufacturer to sell its products to the government at prices determined by the government to be “fair and 
reasonable,” which allowed the manufacturer a profit of only ten and one-half percent.  The manufacturer 
challenged the action under the Takings Clause.  84 F. Supp. at 751-54.  The court conceded that “[i]f 
these were ordinary times,” the manufacturer would have been allowed to earn supracompetitive profits.  
Id. at 755.  “[T]hese were not ordinary times,” however, because the war had in effect caused the free and 
untrammeled market necessary for a fair market value determination to disappear.  The true holding of 
Lord Mfg. is thus that circumstances may exist during which current market price is no longer a good 
indicator of fair market value, which is defined as the price to which a willing seller and a willing buyer 
would agree after ample time to find a purchaser.  See also BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 
537-38 (1994) (discussing how transient exigencies can force prices below or above fair market value).  
Lord Mfg. assuredly does not stand for the proposition that monopoly profits are not properly considered 
part of fair market value.  On the contrary, in the language quoted above, the Court of Claims explicitly 
recognized that the opposite was true.  See also City of Tucson v. El Rio Water Co., 415 P.2d 872, 875 
(Ariz. 1966) (recognizing that monopoly profits are properly regarded as part of fair market value). 
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over the placement, manner, use, and possibly the disposition of the 
equipment outside of the mandate of the specific regulation in question.  In 
addition, the property owner would have the latitude to decide how to 
comply with the applicable regulations and therefore “could minimize, the 
physical, esthetic, and other effects of the installation.”370  The FCC followed 
this reasoning in its Expanded Interconnection proceeding.  Without 
conceding that that mandatory physical collocation would constitute a per se 
taking, the FCC argued that offering the LECs virtual collocation as an 
option eliminated any remaining constitutional infirmities.371   
 Unfortunately, the courts have never had the opportunity to address 
whether virtual collocation effects a physical taking, since before the courts 
could address the issue, the virtual collocation provisions of the Expanded 
Interconnection proceeding were rendered moot by the physical collocation 
provisions contained in the 1996 Act.372  The 1996 Act, however, obviated 
any need to resolve whether a bare virtual collocation requirement 
constituted a physical taking, since section 251(c)(6) clearly gives requesting 
carriers the right to physically collocate their equipment in most 
circumstances.373  As a result, it is directly analogous to the type of regime 
found to constitute a physical taking in Loretto, Qwest, and Bell Atlantic. 
 Language in the D.C. Circuit’s Bell Atlantic opinion, moreover, suggests 
that virtual collocation poses the same takings concerns as physical 
collocation.  Both virtual and physical collocation allow CAPs to physically 
connect their networks to the LECs’ networks.  Requiring a physical 
interconnection is enough to constitute a physical taking, regardless of who 
owns the property on which the interconnection occurs.374  Indeed, a 
subsequent court drew largely the same conclusion when it held that that an 
administrative order requiring an incumbent LEC to reconfigure the wires it 
was using to provide telephone service to a multi-building complex in order 
to accommodate an competitive service provider constituted a physical 
taking.375  The fact that the owner of the apartment complex rather than the 
LEC owned the land on which the LEC was obligated to build its wires 
played no role in the decision.   
                                                     
370 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 n.19 (1982); see also GTE 
Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Virtual collocation therefore minimizes the 
takings problem, because competitors do not have physical access to a LEC’s property.”).   
371 Expanded Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 
F.C.C.R. 5154, 5163 ¶¶ 22-23 (1994); see also Baynes, supra note 352, at 74-75. 
372 See supra note 296 and accompanying text. 
373 See supra notes 307-308 and accompanying text. 
374 24 F.3d at 1446. 
375 GTE Southwest Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 10 S.W.3d 7, 9, 11 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000). 
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B. Access to Networks of Utility Poles 
 The analysis we have developed helps illuminate the economic and 
constitutional considerations underlying the second emerging policy problem 
that we would like to address:  compelled access to networks of utility poles.  
This subpart will describe the manner in which regulations requiring such 
access have been implemented and then apply the analytical framework that 
we have developed to evaluate that regime from the standpoint of both 
economic policy and constitutional law.  As was the case in the first policy 
problem we address, we conclude that the current manner in which the 
government has compelled access to networks of utility poles conflict with 
basic economic theory as well as with the Supreme Court’s takings 
jurisprudence.  As a result, we argue that the extant pricing regime should be 
replaced by an approach that bases access rates on market prices. 
1. Regulatory Framework  
 As discussed earlier, in much of the country, cable television systems 
depended upon networks of utility poles to establish the wireline connections 
to individual homes and businesses needed to provide their services.376  
Congress became concerned that the electric and telephone companies who 
owned the poles were charging monopoly prices that tended to retard cable’s 
deployment.  As a result, it enacted legislation known as the Pole 
Attachments Act of 1978 that gave the FCC the power to regulate the rates 
charged for pole attachments by cable television systems in any state that did 
not already regulate such agreements.377  As originally enacted, the Pole 
Attachments Act required that the rates, terms, and conditions for pole 
attachment be just and reasonable378 and established methodologies for 
determining the minimum and maximum rates that could be charged.379  As 
implemented by the FCC, the so-called “Cable Formula” allowed the pole 
owner to recover approximately 7.4 percent of the total costs of the pole 
from each attaching entity.380  As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court held 
                                                     
376 See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text; Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 122 
S. Ct. 782, 784 (2002). 
377 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1). 
378 Id.  
379 The statute required that at a minimum the rates established by the FCC allow the utilities to 
recover “the additional costs of providing pole attachments.”  Id. § 224(d)(1).  The maximum rate was set 
by multiplying percentage of the total “usable space” occupied by the attachment by the sum of the 
operating expenses and actual capital costs attributable to the pole.”  Id.  The resulting formula is: 
Rate Charge
Carrying x Pole Bare






Amendments of Comm’n’s Rules & Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Consolidated Partial 
Order on Reconsideration, 16 F.C.C.R. 12103, 12131 ¶ 53 (2001) (“Consol. Reconsideration Order”).   
380 The FCC established the standard presumptions that the total amount of usable space is limited to 
thirteen and one-half feet and that each attaching entity occupies one foot of usable space.  See 47 C.F.R. 
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in Florida Power that the statute as originally enacted did not constitute a per 
se taking under Loretto.  Because the Act did not require that any utility enter 
into such agreement, it represented nothing more than a form of rate 
regulation, which violated the Takings Clause only if confiscatory.381   
 A provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 modified the Pole 
Attachments Act.  As the Supreme Court’s decision in National Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co.382 confirmed, one of the key 
changes implemented by the 1996 amendments was to broaden the scope of 
the regulatory scheme to cover telecommunications carriers, including 
wireless telephony providers, as well as cable television systems.  Two other 
features of the 1996 amendments merit more extended discussion.  First, the 
amendments made access to poles compulsory rather than voluntary.383  
Second, the amendments established a new pricing mechanism to govern 
attachments by telecommunications carriers that differed from the regime 
governing attachments by cable television systems.384   
 a. The Shift to Compulsory Access — The most important feature of the 
1996 amendments for our purposes is the transformation of Pole 
Attachments Act into a compulsory access provision.  As noted previously, 
prior to the 1996 amendments, the fact that Pole Attachments Act did not 
compel any utility to allow any other entity access to its network of utility 
poles played a critical role in the Supreme Court’s refusal in Florida Power 
to treat the Pole Attachments Act as a per se taking under Loretto.385  
Although the Court explicitly declined to address what would follow if the 
statute were modified to compel access to utility poles, the Court’s reasoning 
strongly suggested that such a change would bring the Pole Attachments Act 
squarely within the ambit of its physical takings jurisprudence.386 
 The Eleventh Circuit followed the reasoning of Florida Power to its 
logical conclusion when it held in Gulf Power Co. v. FCC (“Gulf Power 
I”)387 that the 1996 amendments turned the Pole Attachments Act into a per 
se taking under Loretto.  Reaffirming the distinction between physical and 
nonpossessory takings, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Court’s 
confiscatory ratemaking jurisprudence had no application to cases involving 
the permanent physical occupation of property.  Although the Gulf Power I 
court found that a taking had occurred, it anticipated the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion in Verizon and held that the logically subsequent question 
                                                                                                                             
§§1.1404(l), 1.1402(c).  As a result, the pole owner could recover 1/13.5 of the total costs of the pole from 
each attaching entity, an amount approximately equal to 7.4 percent. 
381 See also supra Part II.A.3 (offering additional analysis of Florida Power). 
382 122 S. Ct. 782, 785 (2002). 
383 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(1).  The statute created exceptions for situations in which there is insufficient 
capacity or when refusal to provide access is justified by safety, reliability, or other engineering concerns.  
Id. § 224(f)(2). 
384 Id. § 224(e). 
385 See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text. 
386 See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
387 187 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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whether the statute provided for just compensation was not yet ripe for 
judicial resolution.388  The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed these conclusions 
when rejecting a facial challenge to the regulations implementing the 1996 
amendments the following year in Gulf Power II.389  Although the Supreme 
Court later vacated this subsequent decision,390 its action did not call into 
question the reasoning of Gulf Power II on this point and did not weaken the 
precedential effect of Gulf Power I.  In addition, the Court’s reasoning did 
not raise any questions about the propriety of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
resolution of the takings issues. 
 b. The Compensation Regime — The 1996 amendments also provided 
for a different basis for compensation for telecommunications carriers than 
for cable television systems, commonly known as the “Telecom Formula.”391  
Although the details of the various formulas are somewhat involved,392 for 
                                                     
388 Id. at 1338.  In so holding, however, the court did express some skepticism about whether it 
would ultimately be persuaded by the utility’s takings argument.  Id.  This dicta should carry little weight, 
since it attempted to employ the Court’s confiscatory ratemaking precedents to dispose of a case involving 
a physical taking without betraying any awareness of the Court’s frequent admonitions underscoring the 
separateness of these two lines of jurisprudence.  See supra notes 162-163, 169, 202 and accompanying 
text. 
389 Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Gulf Power II”), rev’d on 
other grounds sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 122 S. Ct. 782 (2002). 
390 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 122 S. Ct. 782 (2002). 
391 47 U.S.C. § 224(e).  The separate mythology governing telecommunications carriers became 
effective after February 8, 2001, after which point the Telecom Formula began to phased in over a period 
of five years.  Until that date, the Cable Formula governed pole attachments by telecommunications 
carriers.  Amendment of Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 
6453, 6457-58 ¶ 5 (2000) (“Fee Order”). 
392 In contrast to the methodology governing attachments by cable television systems (known as the 
“Cable Formula”), which established uniform rates of compensation for all portions of the pole, the 
methodology governing attachments by telecommunications carriers (known as the “Telecom Formula”) 
allowed for different rates of recovery for the “usable” and “unusable” portions of the pole.  Although 
rates associated with usable portions of the pole follow the approach of the Cable Formula and allocate 
costs in accordance with the percentage of usable space occupied, 47 U.S.C. § 224(e)(3), recovery rates 
associated with the unusable portion of the pole are allocated in accordance with the number of attaching 
entities.  Id. § 224(e)(2).  Specifically, one-third of the costs of the unusable space would be borne by the 
pole owner, with the remaining two-thirds divided among all attaching entities (with the pole owner being 
considered one of the attaching entities).  Id. § 224(e)(3); Implementation of Section 703(e) of 
Telecomms. Act of 1996, Report and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 6777, 6799-6800 ¶ 43 (1998).  The FCC 
originally established two different formulas to calculate each part separately.  For simplicity, they 
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our purposes it suffices to note that the Cable Formula and the Telecom 
Formula can lead to significant differences in compensation.393  For example, 
in recent litigation Alabama Power has asserted that while application of the 
Cable Formula leads to an annual compensation rate of $6.30 per pole, 
application of the Telecom Formula would result in an annual compensation 
rate of $20.41 per pole.394 
FIGURE 2 
COMPARISON OF RECOVERY RATES UNDER THE POLE ATTACHMENTS ACT 
Percentage of Pole Costs Recoverable Number of 
Attaching Entities Cable Formula Telecom Formula 
1    7.4% 24.0% 
2 14.8% 33.8% 
3 22.2% 40.0% 
4 29.6% 44.8% 
5 37.0% 48.9% 
6 44.4% 52.6% 
7 51.9% 56.0% 
8 59.3% 59.3% 
 It is also noteworthy that both the Cable and the Telecom Formulas are 
based on historical cost rather than forward-looking cost.  The FCC orders 
implementing the 1996 amendments reasoned that that the Supreme Court 
upheld the use of such an approach in Florida Power.  The FCC further 
argued that the policies underlying the Pole Attachments Act, the static 
nature of the technology underlying utility poles, and the fact that utility pole 
networks were in fact impossible to duplicate justified adopting a 
methodology that was less focused on stimulating competitive entry.  In 
addition, the FCC emphasized the administrative convenience of maintaining 
the previous regime.395   
 The FCC declined to resolve whether basing its methodology on 
historical costs violated the Takings Clause on the grounds that such as-
applied takings challenges were not ripe until the methodology was 
embodied in a specific rate order.  Until that occurred, the only type of 
challenge that could be raised was a facial challenge, and the FCC rejected 
that challenge because it could not conclude that its methodology would 
                                                                                                                             
Id. at 12132 ¶ 56.  The FCC subsequently established a rebuttable presumption that the average 
number of attaching entities in nonurbanized areas was three and that the average number of attachers in 
an urbanized area was five.  Id. at 12139-40 ¶¶ 71-72. 
393 Because the Telecom Formula allows for more generous rates for unusable space, it in effect 
allows for greater recovery than the Cable Formula for any reasonable number of attaching entities.   
394 Brief of Alabama Power Company and Gulf Power Company, Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, Nos. 00-
14763-I & 00-15068-D, at 23 (11th Cir. filed Mar. 5, 2001). 
395 Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12116-17 ¶¶ 20-22, 12119 ¶ 25; Fee Order, 15 
F.C.C.R. at 6460-61 ¶ 9. 
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deny just compensation in all cases.396  The FCC reiterated these principles 
when applying the approach established by its general orders in particular 
cases.397  Because these cases arose out of actual rate orders, the FCC 
addressed the takings issue directly.  Citing Florida Power, the FCC ruled 
that the constitutionality of its actions turned solely on whether the rates 
established were confiscatory.  Even assuming that the 1996 amendments 
constituted a taking for which just compensation must be paid, it was 
impossible to apply any of the three conventional methodologies for 
determining fair market value.398  Appeals of these decisions are currently 
pending before the Eleventh Circuit.399 
2. Economic Arguments in Favor of Market Value 
 Basic economic theory indicates that the most efficient way to 
implement the Pole Attachments Act would be to base access rates on 
market-based prices.  Using external benchmarks to set access rates would 
promote allocative efficiency, since market-based pricing provides those who 
obtain access with the signals they need to make sure that they purchase 
optimal quantity and overall mix of inputs and tends to help inputs find their 
way into the hands to those buyers who obtain the greatest benefit from 
them.  Reliance on market prices also promotes dynamic efficiency by 
providing the appropriate incentives for investment and innovation.   
 Basing access rates on the price that would be paid for access on the 
open market thus represents the best way to promote economic efficiency.  
Although it is arguable that such external benchmarks once did not exist,400 
technological convergence and the shift from output regulation to input 
regulation as well as improvements in technology have made it possible for 
regulatory authorities to infer market prices from two different types of 
transactions.  First, regulators may consider the revenue that could be earned 
from other attaching entities.  Second, they may infer market value from the 
price of any substitute technologies of which an attaching entity can avail 
itself. 
                                                     
396 Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 1215-16 ¶ 18; Local Competition Order, 11 
F.C.C.R. at 16087-88 ¶ 1192. 
397 See Ala. Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Ala. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 12209 (2001); Teleport 
Communications Atlanta, Inc. v. Ga. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 20238, 20240-41 ¶ 7 (2001).  The 
FCC subsequently ordered that a series of identical complaints against Georgia Power be held in abeyance 
pending attempts to negotiate a mutually acceptable rate using the information provided by the FCC’s 
opinion in this opinion.  See Knology, Inc. v. Ga. Power Co., Order Granting Temporary Stay, 16 
F.C.C.R. 20413 (2001); City of Sanderville v. Ga. Power Co., Order Granting Temporary Stay, 16 
F.C.C.R. 20417 (2001); City of Dublin v. Ga. Power Co., Order Granting Temporary Stay, 16 F.C.C.R. 
20421 (2001). 
398 Ala. Power, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12229-35 ¶¶ 46-57. 
399 Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, Nos. 00-14763-I & 00-15068-D (11th Cir. filed Sept. 13, 2000); Ga. 
Power Co. v. FCC, No. 02-10222-B (11th Cir. filed Jan. 11, 2002).   
400 Baynes, supra note 366, at 177. 
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 a. Unregulated Pole Attachments — The years since the enactment of 
the Pole Attachments Act have witnessed periods during which the rates for 
certain types of pole attachment were determined through arms-length 
transactions.  For example, the Pole Attachments Act as originally enacted 
only extended to cable television systems.  It was not until 1996 that it was 
extended to cover telecommunications carriers as well.  As a result, pole 
attachment agreements negotiated by local telephone companies seeking 
access to utility poles owned by electric companies were unregulated by the 
federal government prior to 1996.  Indeed, such agreements were necessarily 
quite common, since electric companies owned the majority of utility 
poles.401  Thus, until 1996 the terms of pole attachment agreements obtained 
by local telephone companies in states that did not regulate such contracts 
necessarily represented market-based transactions that regulatory authorities 
could use to establish efficient pricing.  Proceedings before the FCC suggest 
that these rates were substantially higher than those authorized under the 
Pole Attachments Act.402 
 In addition, it is possible that some arms-length transactions might have 
been negotiated during regulatory gaps following judicial challenges to the 
Pole Attachments Act.  For example, it appears that uncertainty about the 
constitutionality of the Cable and Telecom Formulas in the aftermath of Gulf 
Power I led the FCC to make statements that many parties believed indicated 
that it would not require that pole attachment rates comply with the Cable 
and Telecom Formulas until after the courts had made a final determination 
of what constituted just compensation.403  Until the FCC subsequently 
disavowed that position,404 the parties negotiating pole attachment 
agreements may well have believed that such agreements were temporarily 
unregulated and negotiated arms-length transactions during that time.405 
 Interestingly, the fact that such market benchmarks are no longer 
available underscores the extent to which the absence of a well-established 
market is the direct result of state and federal regulation.406  The absence of a 
market, however, does not imply that a product or service would lack market 
value, only that the market value has yet to be determined.   
                                                     
401 See S. REP. NO. 95-580, at 21 (1977). 
402 Compare Ala. Power, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12224 ¶ 35 (reporting that joint use agreements between 
local telephone companies and electric companies incorporated rates ranging between $26.29-$30 per 
pole), with Brief of Alabama Power Company and Gulf Power Company, Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, Nos. 
00-14763-I & 00-15068-D, at 23 (11th Cir. filed Mar. 5, 2001) (arguing that the Cable Formula and the 
Telecom Formula allowed for rates of $6.30 and $20.41 respectively). 
403 See Ala. Power, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12221-23 ¶ 23. 
404 See id. at 12221-23 ¶¶ 29-31. 
405 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Gulf Power II holding that the Pole Attachments Act did not 
cover Internet services could have created a window during which arms-length transactions could have 
been negotiated between broadband providers and pole owners.  Apparently, the Eleventh Circuit 
immediately stayed the mandate of Gulf Power II pending Supreme Court review.  See Ga. Power, 16 
F.C.C.R. at 12213 ¶ 9; Ala. Power, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12214-15 ¶¶ 11-12. 
406 For a discussion of the problems with allowing other features of a regulatory regime to render a 
particular restriction constitutional, see Yoo, supra note 31, at _. 
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 b. Alternative Network Technologies — Regulatory authorities may 
also infer market prices from the rates charged for access to alternative 
technologies that provide the same functionality as networks of utility poles.  
This is because, according to basic economic theory, the prices for 
substitutes for a particular good represent useful proxies for determining 
market value of that good. 
 Attachments by Wireless Carriers—For example, wireless carriers who 
wish to attach their equipment to utility poles have the option of attaching 
their equipment to a wide variety of alternative facilities.  In fact, tall 
buildings, communications towers, and indeed any location that is 
sufficiently high can provide a direct substitute for the pole owner’s 
facilities.  It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has questioned whether 
attachments by wireless carriers truly fall within the economic rationale of 
the Pole Attachments Act, which is directed towards preventing monopoly 
pricing in bottleneck facilities.407  In addition to raising questions whether 
access represents good economic policy, the existence of substitutes also 
provides an external benchmark for setting rates in the event that policy 
makers nonetheless decide to impose access requirements.  Given that 
surveys suggest that the rental rates charged to wireless companies for the 
placement of attachments on communications towers exceed the rates 
allowed by the Pole Attachments by several hundred percent,408 there is 
reason to question whether the cost-based rates currently in place are 
effectively promoting either allocative or dynamic efficiency. 
 Multichannel Video Programming Distributors (MVPDs)—In addition, 
the emergence of viable spectrum-based technologies for delivering video 
programming to the home is making it possible to estimate the value of 
access to networks of utility poles by cable television systems.  Although 
technologies that provide multichannel video programming distribution via 
spectrum, up until recently none has been able to provide effective 
competition with cable television.409  It is only in the last few years that 
digital broadcast satellite systems (DBS) have emerged as a viable 
competitor to cable television.  DBS penetration has approaching the levels 
                                                     
407 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 122 S. Ct. 782, 790 (2002).  The Court 
nonetheless held that the plain language of the statute included wireless carriers within its scope.  Even if 
some ambiguity existed, the Court would defer to the FCC’s construction of the statute.  Id. 
408 Fryer’s TowerSource, The TowerSource/Tower Summit Survey, at 
http:://www.towersource.com/survey.html (last visited May 16, 2002) (reporting survey indicating that as 
of October 31, 2000, communications towers receive an average annual rent of over $12,000 from each 
attaching entity). 
409 Early spectrum-based MVPD technologies include multichannel multipoint distribution services 
(MMDS), which employ microwave transmission facilities to provide multichannel programming; 
satellite master antenna television systems (SMATV), which establish private cable systems that service 
individual apartment buildings; home satellite dishes (HSD), comprised of the large, C-band satellite 
dishes that were the first to be deployed.  Annual Assessment of Status of Competition in Market for 
Delivery of Video Programming, Eighth Annual Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 1244, 1277-82 ¶¶ 67-77 (2002) 
(“Eighth Annual Report on Video Programming Delivery”). 
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that, under current law, would represent sufficient competition to justify 
eliminating rate regulation of basic cable services.410  Recent empirical 
studies have confirmed that consumers are beginning to regard DBS as a 
substitute for cable.411   
 The value of the transmission service provided by DBS can thus provide 
an external benchmark that can be used in determining the market value of 
access to networks of public utility poles.  There are a number of factors that 
will complicate any direct comparison.  The geographic structure of the two 
media is, of course, quite different, since DBS, by its very nature, is 
necessarily national in scope, while cable television service is necessarily 
limited to serving specific localities.  In addition, the quality of the various 
services differs somewhat.  That said, the existence of these substitutes can 
provide useful guidance as to the value of the services being provided under 
a regime of compelled access. 
 Broadband—Furthermore, a wide array of alternative technologies are 
emerging through which broadband providers can reach consumers without 
using pole attachments.412  Although cable modem and digital subscriber line 
(DSL) providers have taken the early lead in the broadband race, there are a 
number of alternative broadband technologies that are in various stages of 
deployment.413  DBS providers are already offering satellite-based broadband 
technologies that are beginning to vie directly with wireline broadband 
services.414  Again, by its very nature, DBS is necessarily national in scope, 
while cable television service is necessarily limited to serving specific 
localities.  In addition, the quality of the various services differs somewhat.  
Although these differences can make direct comparisons difficult to make, 
they do not completely vitiate the usefulness of these substitutes in helping to 
determine the value of the services being provided through utility pole 
networks.  Other providers are deploying spectrum-based technologies 
whose geographic footprints are similar to that of cable operators.  For 
example, providers of Personal Communications Services (PCS) are already 
providing mobile wireless broadband services, and other companies are 
preparing to use Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS) to provide fixed 
wireless broadband services.415  Digital television broadcasters are 
                                                     
410 See Yoo, supra note 9, at 228-30. 
411 See Implementation of Section 3 of Cable Television Consumer Protection & Competition Act of 
1992, Report on Cable Industry Prices, 16 F.C.C.R. 4346, 4363 ¶ 48, 4364-65 ¶ 53 (2001). 
412 See generally Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3037-38 ¶¶ 36-37 (2002); Yoo, supra note 9, at 253-
58. 
413 Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Ams. in Reasonable 
& Timely Fashion & Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of 
Telecomms. Act of 1996, Third Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 2864 ¶ 44, 2865 ¶ 48 (2002) (“Third § 706 
Report”). 
414 Id. at 2869 ¶ 60, 2879-80 ¶ 85, app. B at 2926-27 ¶¶ 45-49. 
415 Id. at 2867-69 ¶¶ 55-59, 2901 ¶ 146, app. B at 2921-26¶¶ 31-44; Inquiry Concerning Deployment 
of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Ams. in Reasonable & Timely Fashion & Possible Steps to 
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considering proposals to use part of the increased efficiency provided by 
digital transmission to provide broadband services.416  And finally, the 
promise of third generation wireless devices (3G) hangs over the entire 
competitive arena.417  Each of these technologies provide network 
transmission services on a geographic scale that is much more comparable to 
utility poles than DBS. 
 The growth of direct facilities-based competitors to utility poles raises 
serious questions about whether compelling access represents sound 
economic policy.  This is because access harms dynamic efficiency both by 
forcing the pole owner to share any benefits that result from investments in 
its own facilities and by rescuing those who need access to such facilities 
from having to invest in alternative networks capable of providing similar 
functions.  Thus access both attenuates the pole owner’s incentives to invest 
its own facilities as well as deprives the owner’s of substitute facilities of 
their natural strategic partners.  In so doing, access requirements can forestall 
the emergence of alternative facilities-based competition to utility poles, 
which represents the only viable solution to any bottleneck problem.   
 If access is to be compelled, however, the best way to mitigate these 
effects is through the establishment of access rates that mimic market-based 
pricing.  Doing so not only encourages existing participants to employ 
appropriate levels of network inputs, it also provides appropriate signals to 
those deciding on whether to enter particular markets and those deciding 
whether to invest in network facilities.  Granting access to utility poles at 
submarket rates, in contrast, threatens to make those alternative transmission 
technologies appear artificially unattractive.  Regulation threatens to cause 
investment in those technologies to fall below efficient levels.   
 Finally, with respect to broadband, it is possible that the rates allowed 
under the Telecom Formula can serve as a reference point for market-based 
pricing for cable television systems.  Admittedly, the prices determined by 
the Telecom formula are not established in open markets.  Nonetheless, the 
fact that application of the Cable Formula will typically lead to a significant 
shortfall compared to the Telecom Formula418 provides good reason to 
question whether the rates established under the Cable Formula can properly 
be regarded as fair market value.  Indeed, the net result impairs allocative 
efficiency by establishing significantly different cost structures for cable 
modem service and DSL and impedes dynamic efficiency by distorting the 
                                                                                                                             
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of Telecomms. Act of 1996, Second Report, 15 
F.C.C.R. 20913, 20932-37 ¶¶ 42-55 (2000) (“Second § 706 Report”); Eighth Annual Report on Video 
Programming Delivery, 17 F.C.C.R. at 2873-74 ¶¶ 69-71. 
416 Advanced Television Sys., Fifth Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12809, 12820-21 ¶ 29 (1997) 
(authorizing digital television stations to provide “ancillary and supplementary services,” including data 
transmission); Annual Assessment of Status of Competition in Market for Delivery of Video 
Programming, Seventh Annual Report 16 F.C.C.R. 6005, 6052 ¶ 102 (2001). 
417 Third § 706 Report, 17 F.C.C.R. at 2878 ¶ 80, 2900 ¶¶ 141-143, 2901-02 ¶ 147. 
418 See supra notes 393-394 and accompanying text. 
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investment and entry decisions of these two types of providers.  Allowing 
such a significant differential to persist allows the government far too great a 
role in determining which of these platforms will eventually emerge as the 
technological winner. 
 c. ECPR as a Second-Best Valuation Method — The growing 
availability of alternative telecommunications networks is making it 
increasingly possible for regulatory authorities to base access pricing on 
actual transactions for comparable services.  We acknowledge, however, that 
many of these technologies are not yet fully deployed and that differences in 
utilization levels and geographic scope may further limit the current 
usefulness of transactions involving these technologies as external 
benchmarks.  If that is the case, the appropriate step would be for regulators 
to base rates on ECPR, which requires that rates be set equal to the sum of 
the direct incremental costs and the opportunity costs associated with 
providing access.419 
 The methodologies currently employed to set rates for pole attachments 
deviates from ECPR in two significant ways.  First, the current approach to 
pole attachments calculates direct incremental costs on the basis of historical 
cost rather than forward-looking cost.  The FCC has itself acknowledged that 
reliance on forward-looking costs would better promote allocative efficiency.  
As the FCC observed, “a firm compares forward-looking costs with existing 
market prices, in making decisions about entry, expansion, and price”; as a 
result, ratemaking methodologies based on forward-looking cost help “to 
ensure the efficient use of telecommunications network facilities, and to 
encourage new entrants to make economically rational decisions about 
whether or how to enter a local telecommunications market.”420  In addition, 
“[a] forward looking cost pricing methodology reflects the cost of replacing 
the functions of an asset using the most efficient technology available so as 
to appropriately capture the technological changes that are occurring.”421  
Use of forward-looking costs would also promote dynamic efficiency, since 
setting prices on the basis of forward-looking economic costs would “giv[e] 
the appropriate signal for new entrants to invest in network facilities.”422 
 Despite its acknowledged benefits that would result from applying a 
methodology based on forward-looking cost, the FCC nonetheless offered 
several justifications for continuing to rely on historical cost.  For example, 
the FCC reasoned that the Pole Attachments Act was designed to stem 
anticompetitive pricing and not to stimulate competitive entry.423  The FCC 
                                                     
419 See supra Part I.C.2. 
420 Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12103, 12116 ¶ 20. 
421 Id. at 12118-19 ¶ 24. 
422 Id. at 12119 ¶ 25 (citing Fee Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 6453, 6460-61 ¶ 9); accord id. at 12118-19 
¶ 24  (noting that methodologies based on forward-looking costs give new entrants “the proper cost 
signals to decide whether to construct their own networks or to use the incumbent’s”). 
423 Id. at 12116-12117 ¶¶ 20-21; see also Baynes, supra note 366, at 177. 
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also suggested that continued application of a historical cost methodology 
was justified in part by the fact that the technology underlying utility poles 
was relatively static.424  In addition, the FCC pointed out that investment 
incentives are less important in the pole attachment context, since local 
zoning and other right of way restrictions prevent the construction of 
duplicative networks of poles.425   
 The problem with the FCC’s reasoning is that it fails to accord sufficient 
weight to the arrival of alternative technologies that compete directly with 
utility pole networks.  In terms of static efficiency, the FCC’s reliance on the 
need to control monopoly pricing ignores the fact that the emergence of 
substitute facilities will generally cause any monopoly rents to dissipate.  In 
focusing too narrowly on the network of utility poles as a universe unto 
itself, the FCC’s approach ignores the fact that substitute facilities, such as 
digital broadcast satellite (DBS) systems and to a lesser extent wireless cable 
systems, exist that can support transmission of both multichannel video 
program distribution.  In addition, wireless telephony has emerged as a 
viable alternative to wireline communications.  Over time, the growing 
importance of these substitute media grow in importance will erode any 
monopoly power possessed by utility pole owners, if it has not done so 
already.  The most dramatic illustration of this point exists with respect to 
wireless providers, which the FCC and Supreme Court have concluded fall 
within the ambit of the Pole Attachments Act.426  In fact, wireless providers 
have readily available an extensive array of alternative places in which to 
locate their equipment, including communications towers and rooftop 
placements, that eliminates any supposed monopoly power possessed by 
utility pole owners.  In forcing pole owners to provide access to wireless 
carriers at rates below those that they would reach through arms-length 
negotiations, current regulatory policy is interfering with allocative 
efficiency. 
 More importantly, the FCC’s reasoning ignores the impact that pricing of 
access to utility poles has on dynamic efficiency by disregarding the impact 
that the price of access to utility poles can have on the levels of investment in 
alternative technologies.  For example, it is true that because reconstructing 
the existing network is very costly and not desirable, high access prices to 
utility poles may not spur any additional investment in duplicate networks of 
poles.  The price of access to poles does, however, have a direct impact on 
the level of investment in communications towers and other spectrum-based 
technologies that operate as substitutes for utility poles.  This is true even if 
the technology underlying utility poles remains relatively static, since the 
dramatic changes in substitute technologies will influence the economics of 
                                                     
424 Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12118-19 ¶ 24. 
425 Id.; see also Fee Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 6460-61 ¶ 9. 
426 See supra note 382 and accompanying text. 
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distributing telecommunications services to individual residences and 
businesses even if the technology underlying utility poles does not change.  It 
is only by taking an artificially truncated view of the scope of the relevant 
technologies that makes these considerations seem unimportant.   
 This effect will be particularly dramatic with respect to broadband 
technologies.  As noted earlier, companies are in the process of deploying a 
wide range of broadband technologies, including PCS, fixed wireless 
broadband systems, 3G wireless devices, and ancillary and supplementary 
services provided via spectrum assigned to digital television broadcasting.427  
The manner in which access to pole attachments are priced will have a direct 
and dramatic impact on the timing and level of investment in deploying these 
new technologies. 
 The second way in which the current methodology used to set rates for 
pole attachments deviates from ECPR is the absence of any element that 
reflects opportunity cost.  This omission reflects the FCC’s failure to 
understand that, since networks are a capital asset that is not consumed, the 
price for using of the assets is properly based is the value of the services 
created with those assets and not the costs used to construct them.  In 
addition, focusing solely on historical costs fails to reflect the contribution of 
the demand-side of the economic equation that has become a fundamental 
consideration ever since neoclassical theory emerged as the consensus 
economic paradigm.  In addition, opportunity costs would be relatively easy 
to implement in this context, since the all of the relevant markets—wireless 
telephony, MVPDs, and broadband—are or are becoming extremely 
competitive.428   
 Together these arguments underscore the extent to which access 
regulations represent something of an anomaly in competition policy.429  
Rather than breaking up a monopoly position, compelled access simply 
forces a monopolist to share an input, which has the effect of rescuing other 
firms from having to invest in developing an alternative source of supply of 
that input.  In effect, then, compelled access cuts off emerging alternative 
network technologies from their natural strategic partners.  As a 
consequence, it preempts the development of a viable alternative to the 
bottleneck facility, which represents the only viable long-term solution to the 
monopoly problem.  This is particularly problematic in technologically 
dynamic industries such as wireless telephony, video distribution, and the 
Internet, in which the prospects of developing new ways either to circumvent 
or to compete directly with the bottleneck are the greatest.   
                                                     
427 See supra notes 412-417 and accompanying text.  One of the parties in Alabama Power has also 
offered expert testimony asserting that railroad and highway rights of way have emerged as still another 
way in which broadband providers can bypass the network of utility poles.  See 16 F.C.C.R. at 12224 
¶ 34. 
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 Indeed, access requirements applied in industries characterized by high 
fixed costs can represent a form of regulatory opportunism.  Firms deciding 
whether to enter such industries ex ante will, of course, do so only if they can 
expect to recover their fixed cost investments.  Economists have long 
recognized that once fixed costs are sunk, firms remain vulnerable to ex post 
opportunistic behavior that can push them down towards marginal cost 
pricing, since once costs are sunk, they are no longer taken into account.  
Such opportunism is mitigated in competitive markets by the law of 
contracts, the desire to maintain business relationships, and market reputation 
effects.  To the extent that regulators access requirements push prices below 
the levels needed to guarantee full investment, they remain problematic. 
 The FCC’s attempts to evade this logic are unpersuasive.  In arguing that 
the relatively static nature of utility pole technology and the practical 
impossibility of replacing the network renders investment incentives less 
important, the FCC focuses too narrowly on utility poles as a distinct 
technological universe and fails to give appropriate significance to the 
ongoing emergence of substitute technologies.  The relevant investment 
incentives go as much to stimulating investment in alternative networks as it 
does to stimulating investment in alternative sets of poles.  Pricing access to 
networks of poles below market for cable television, for example, threatens 
to reduce the incentives for television networks to invest in DBS and other 
alternatives to cable television below efficient levels.  Similarly, allowing 
broadband providers to obtain transmission via utility poles threatens to 
deprive non-wireline broadband technologies of the support that they need to 
finance their deployment.  
 In the end, the only justification for the FCC’s position is administrative 
convenience.  The FCC argued that the historical cost approach had 
“provided a stable and certain regulatory framework, that may be applied 
‘simply and expeditiously’ requiring ‘a minimum of staff paperwork and 
procedures consistent with fair and efficient regulation’ ” for over two 
decades, and Congress had not given any indication that it wanted the FCC 
to deviate from it.430  The FCC further argued that switching to a 
methodology based on forward-looking cost would cause significant 
disruption and would force the FCC to undertake extensive proceedings to 
establish the new approach.431   
 The alleged simplicity of historical costs is far from an argument for 
accuracy.  As Justice Breyer has acknowledged, although continued reliance 
on historical costs may provide some administrative advantages, “[w]hen the 
economic problems created by the use of historical cost valuation become 
serious, special modifications must be made in the process.”432  Specifically, 
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in making this evaluation, the proper inquiry for the FCC is whether the 
administrative advantages of retaining the existing regulatory regime 
outweigh the long-term benefits of efficient pricing in current transactions as 
well as in fostering the emergence of direct facilities-based competition to 
utility poles, which remains the only solution to the problems of bottleneck 
control that is truly viable in the long run.  Under such circumstances, the 
FCC should be very careful not to let what would amount to transient, short-
term inconvenience exert too great an influence over the substantial benefits 
that would accrue in the long run.433  Indeed, allowing the FCC to adhere to 
outmoded methodologies in the name of administrative convenience would 
ignore the fact that the shift from rate regulation to access regulation was 
intended to revolutionize the approach to utility regulation.  Maintaining the 
status quo runs the risk of causing cause all of the benefits resulting from the 
transformation of regulatory policy to come to naught. 
3. Constitutional Arguments in Favor of Market Value 
 The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence provides another 
consideration cutting against the FCC’s decision to base pole attachment 
rates on historical cost.  As the FCC concedes, the 1996 amendments are 
“not reasonably susceptible of a reading that gives the pole owner the choice 
of whether to grant telecommunications carriers or cable television systems 
access.”434  As the Eleventh Circuit recognized in Gulf Power I, by 
transforming the Pole Attachments Act from a rate regulation scheme into a 
compulsory access requirement, the 1996 amendments brought the entire 
scheme squarely within the ambit of Loretto.435  It makes no difference that 
the pole owners may have originally taken the property in question with the 
understanding that they would have to put it to a public use.436  Nor did the 
fact that the utilities knew that its property would be subject to extensive 
regulation for the public use justify forcing the utilities to subject themselves 
to physical invasions without just compensation.  On the contrary, the court 
concluded that such an argument had things “backwards,” in that “[a] 
                                                     
433 For other examples in which the FCC has inhibited the emergence of competition by permitting 
itself to be unduly swayed by one-time costs associated with regulatory change, see Yoo, supra note 31, at 
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434 See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 16087 ¶ 1191. 
435 See supra notes 387-389 and accompanying text. 
436 Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 187 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Gulf Power I”) (citing W. 
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property owner is entitled to expect that the property it acquired via eminent 
domain . . . came with the right that all property has—not to be subject to 
government-coerced, permanent, physical occupation without just 
compensation.”437   
 The FCC contended that this argument was foreclosed by Florida 
Power, which they construed as establishing the constitutional sufficiency of 
the compensation provided by the existing approach to setting pole 
attachment rates.438  Indeed, the FCC maintained that Florida Power 
definitively established that the proper standard for resolving takings 
challenges to all pole attachments was the confiscatory ratemaking standard 
as elaborated in Duquesne Light and Hope Natural Gas.439  The FCC’s 
position ignores the sharp distinction between physical and nonpossessory 
takings drawn by the Supreme Court.440  In the words of the Eleventh 
Circuit: 
Characterizing the mandatory access provision as a 
regulatory condition, even one allegedly designed to foster 
competition, cannot change the fact that it effects a taking by 
requiring a utility to submit to a permanent, physical 
occupation of its property.  However laudatory its motive, 
Congress’ power to regulate utilities does not extend to 
taking without just compensation the right of a utility to 
exclude unwanted occupiers of its property.441   
Indeed, the Supreme Court underscored this precise point when it explicitly 
recognized that “ ‘[a] permanent physical occupation authorized by 
government is a taking without regard to the public interest that it may 
serve.’ ”442   
 More specifically, the FCC’s conclusion was inconsistent with the 
binding precedents holding that the principles of confiscatory ratemaking had 
no application in determining whether a physical taking had occurred.  As 
the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, “Duquesne’s discussion of utilities was not in 
the context of a takings case dealing with the permanent occupation of 
property.  Nothing in Duquesne suggests a utility’s property is less subject to 
protection against permanent, physical occupation than anyone else’s 
property.  It is not.”443  Nor could the 1996 amendments be upheld under a 
regulatory taking analysis.  “[A]lthough property is subject to broad 
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regulatory power, a regulation becomes a taking when the government 
authorizes permanent, physical occupation by a third party.444  Since the 
1996 Act effects a per se taking, the government is obligated to ensure that 
the pole owners receive compensation that reflects the earning potential of 
the property taken, and fair market value represents the accepted basis for 
determining what that earning potential is.445   
 In apparent recognition of the weakness of its position, the FCC 
entertained the possibility that the Takings Clause required that pole owners 
receive market value as compensation for access to their poles.  Even so, the 
FCC concluded that “the unusual nature of pole attachments, and the nature 
of the property interest conveyed,” made it impossible to apply the standard 
techniques for determining market value.446  Specifically, the absence of 
viable alternatives to the networks of utility poles made it impossible base 
market value on comparable sales, since the actual market transactions that 
existed either included monopoly rents or involved property rights that were 
“too different to draw any meaningful conclusions.”447  In addition, the FCC 
found the income capitalization approach too speculative, since access to 
utility poles represented only one of many inputs needed to provide cable 
television and telecommunications services, a fact that made it virtually 
impossible to determine how much of the income earned to attribute to any 
one particular input.448  Finally, the FCC rejected the replacement cost 
approach in part on the grounds that access did not completely destroy the 
pole owner’s property interests, but instead simply imposed an occupation 
that was “restricted in duration, primacy, exclusivity, and physical manner of 
use.”449  The FCC also reasoned that the replacement cost approach should 
not be used because it is infeasible to replace the existing network of utility 
poles. 
 None of the FCC’s arguments are convincing.  As discussed earlier, the 
emergence of substitute network technologies has made it possible to 
establish access rates that are a reflection of actual market transactions.  
Indeed, in the context of attachments by wireless carriers, it is possible to 
compare what amount to identical transactions.  The FCC’s objection to the 
income capitalization approach ignores the fact that the Supreme Court has 
sanctioned its use under circumstances in which an asset was simply one of 
many inputs in a productive process.450  Furthermore, the grounds offered by 
the FCC for rejecting the replacement cost approach are factually incorrect in 
one important respect.  The access requirement is not limited in the manner 
                                                     
444 Id. at 1328 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 439-40). 
445 See supra notes 212-220 and accompanying text. 
446 Ala. Power, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12233 ¶ 53. 
447 Id. at 12234 ¶ 55. 
448 Id. at 12234 ¶ 56. 
449 Id. at 12234-35 ¶ 57. 
450 See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text. 
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in which the FCC envisions.  It in fact authorizes occupations that are 
indefinite, not temporary, and that in effect deprive the pole owner of the 
right to possess, use, and dispose of the property occupied.  Thus, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that access requirements do in fact 
completely destroy all of the property owner’s interests with respect to that 
particular portion of the property occupied.451  The fact that replicating a 
network of utility poles was infeasible might have been relevant had no 
technological alternatives existed.  Under such circumstances, investment 
incentives might well be largely irrelevant.  In this case, however, numerous 
alternative technologies exist that can perform the same functions as utility 
poles.  Thus, the fact that direct replication of utility poles is impossible does 
not justify the disruption of investment signals that occurs when access rates 
are based on historical cost. 
 In short, the only way the FCC could justify its position is by making 
two fundamental analytical errors.  First, it ignored the fundamental change 
in the takings analysis required by the shift to access regulation recognized in 
Gulf Power I and II.  Second, it ignored the fundamental change in the just 
compensation analysis required by the emergence of facilities-based 
competition to networks of utility poles.  To date, courts have properly 
declined to address the merits of the just compensation argument, since all of 
the challenges to date have occurred in facial challenges to the regulatory 
scheme rather than in the context of an actual rate.  It thus remains to be seen 
whether the principles we advance will emerge in the judicial challenges 
currently pending before the Eleventh Circuit.452 
C. Access to Broadband Networks 
 The Internet has emerged as a significant development of the last several 
years and has exerted an ever-growing influence on telecommunications 
media, competing variously as a substitute for telephones, fax, television, 
radio, postal services, and private data transmission networks.  Initially, the 
vast majority of U.S. households received Internet service through 
“narrowband” technologies employing an analog modem attached to a 
conventional telephone line.  Although conventional telephone-based 
connections permit theoretical connection speeds of 56.6 thousand bits per 
second (kbps), in practice typical connection speeds fall in the neighborhood 
of thirty kbps.453   
 More and more, however, U.S. consumers have been turning to 
“broadband” technologies that allow subscribers to achieve actual speeds in 
                                                     
451 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-36. 
452 See supra note 399 and accompanying text. 
453 Although most conventional modems are technically capable of carrying up to 56.6 kbps, the 
physical characteristics of the telephone lines that those modems use to connect to the Internet limit 
speeds to the 30-40 kbps range. 
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excess of one million bits per second (1 Mbps).454  Broadband transmission 
facilities provide advantages for customers seeking telecommunications and 
Internet access services including speeds of up to 100 times faster than 
standard dial-up services.  Moreover, broadband services will permit 
bandwidth-intensive multimedia content with enriched entertainment 
features such as video and interactive computer games.  The high-bandwidth 
system will further allow “always on” service without the inconvenience of 
repeatedly logging on to connect to the Internet.  The FCC estimated in 2000 
that over one-third of all U.S. households would subscribe to some form of 
broadband service in a matter of a few years.455  Econometric studies indicate 
that broadband is not simply a substitute for dial-up service, but instead 
constitutes a separate market.456  The FCC declared that the widespread 
deployment of broadband infrastructure was a central communications policy 
objective.457   
 There is one key difference between narrowband and broadband 
connections to the Internet that has emerged as the flash point for these 
policy debates.  In the narrowband world, customers can use their telephone 
lines to connect to any one of a large number of Internet service providers 
(ISPs).  Broadband providers, in contrast, typically require their customers to 
employ a proprietary ISP.458  Policy makers and commentators have begun to 
explore whether they should compel broadband providers to allow 
unaffiliated ISPs to employ their transmission networks.  Thus, of all the 
issues surrounding broadband deployment, the controversy over this issue 
has made access to broadband networks “among the most compelling issues 
in the communications industry.”459 
 This subpart explores the manner in which any such access requirement 
should be implemented.  It begins by reviewing the existing regulatory 
                                                     
454 Most DSL and cable modem users can expect speed somewhere in the neighborhood of 1.5 
Mbps.  Theoretical speeds are much higher.  See Speta, supra note 87, at 52, 56 (noting that ADSL and 
cable modems have a theoretical maximum of 10 Mbps and 27 Mbps respectively). 
455 Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Ams. in a 
Reasonable & Timely Fashion, & Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 
of Telecomms. Act of 1996, Second Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 20,913, 20,983 ¶ 186 (2000) (“Second § 706 
Report”). 
456 Jerry A. Hausman et al., Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Residential 
Customers, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 302, 303-04 (2001). 
457 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3020-21 ¶ 1 (2002). 
458 For example, before its collapse, Excite@Home, which was the largest ISP serving cable modem 
subscribers, was owned by such major cable modem providers as AT&T, Comcast, Cox Communications, 
Cablevision Systems, and Shaw Cablesystems, and was the exclusive ISP for those systems.  Time 
Warner, which is the second largest high-speed broadband provider, has previously required all of its 
users to use a proprietary ISP called “RoadRunner.”  See Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control 
of Licenses & Section 214 Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., 
Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 9816, 9863 ¶ 107 (2000) (“AT&T-MediaOne 
Merger”). 
459 DEBORAH A. LATHEN, BROADBAND TODAY:  A STAFF REPORT TO WILLIAM E. KENNARD, 




regimes governing the two principal broadband technologies:  digital 
subscriber lines (DSL) and cable modem systems.  It then explores the 
proper manner in which access to such systems should be priced.  We 
conclude that economic and constitutional considerations both indicate that 
such access should be priced at market value. 
1. Regulatory Framework 
 a. Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL) — As noted earlier, DSL represents 
one of the two principal current technologies for delivering broadband 
services to residential customers.  DSL takes advantage of the fact that 
conventional voice communications only occupy the lower transmission 
frequencies (typically those ranging from 300 to 3400 hertz).  It is thus 
possible to use the higher frequencies (i.e., those above 20,000 hertz) to 
convey data communications through the same telephone line without 
interfering with voice communications.  Although there are numerous types 
of DSL technology,460 for simplicity, we shall use the term “DSL” as the 
generic reference to all of the various DSL technologies. 
 Several technical changes must be made to a local telephone network 
before it can be used for DSL.  First, the loops used for DSL must be 
“conditioned.”  This is because it is not uncommon for incumbent LECs to 
have added devices to their loops, such as bridge taps, low-pass filters, and 
range extenders, which designed to improve the performance and 
functionality of their networks for transmitting voice calls.  Unfortunately, 
these devices also cause the quality, and in particular the speed, of DSL 
service to degrade.  Thus, before loops can be used for DSL, all devices that 
have accumulated on the loop must be removed.  In addition, if a single 
telephone line is to be used for both voice and data traffic, the carrier must 
install equipment in its central office that can separate voice traffic from data 
traffic.  This typically involves the installation of a device known as a digital 
subscriber line access multiplexer (DSLAM) in the incumbent LEC’s central 
office.  The relevant loops are connected to the DSLAM, which routes voice  
 
                                                     
460 The most popular form of DSL is asymmetric DSL (“ADSL”), in which download transmission 
rates are higher than upload rates.  Other forms include high bit-rate DSL (“HDSL”), which has the same 
data transmission capacity in each direction and provides the same capacity as a T1 line; very-high-speed 
DSL (“VDSL”), which is the fastest DSL technology, fast enough to deliver digital video programming, 
but is expensive to deploy and cannot function over sustained distances; Rate-Adaptive DSL (“RADSL”), 
which allows software to adjust the rate of data transmission.  See LATHEN, supra note 459, at 20-21 & 
tbl.2.  The newest form is G.SHDSL, which is a new standard recently announced by the International 
Telecommunications Union that allows for a symmetric, multi-rate service capable of reaching speeds up 
to 2.3 Mbps in both directions as well as deployment nearly twice as far form the central office as other 
forms of DSL.  Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Ams. in 
Reasonable & Timely Fashion & Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 
of Telecomms. Act of 1996, Third Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 2879 ¶ 83 (2002) (“Third § 706 Report”).  
The FCC refers to these various technologies as “xDSL,” with the “x” serving as a generic placeholder for 
the designation of the particular type of DSL involved.   
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FIGURE 3 




















communications into a conventional circuit-switched network and routes 
data communications into a packet-switched network.   
 This scenario changes somewhat in situations in which incumbent LECs 
have deployed fiber optics to increase the efficiency of their networks 
through a technology known as digital loop carriers (DLCs).461  Instead of 
using a all-copper loop to transmit analog signals between the central office 
and the customer’s premises, DLC systems use fiber optics to establish a 
digital connection between the central office and a satellite facility known as 
a remote terminal, where the transmission is converted into an analog format 
and distributed to the customer’s premises through a copper subloop.462  The 
improved efficiency and range provided by the fiber optic connection greatly 
enhances the performance and quality of voice transmissions.  DLCs, 
however, can impede the deployment of DSL.  This is because DSL depends 
on the ability to send and receive signals in an analog format through an all-
copper connection.  Since the portion of the DLC system between the central 
office and the remote terminal employs digital transmissions through a fiber 
optic connection, carriers who wish to provide DSL services on a network 
that employs DLCs must either deploy DSLAMs in remote terminals or find 
an alternative copper loop running between the customer and the central 
office. 
                                                     
461 See William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications, the Principle of 
Regulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for Investment and Innovation, 2000 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 125, 141-42 (2000). 























 Policy makers have created two different sets of regulations that provide 
for some degree of access to elements of a LEC’s DSL network.  The first 
has its origins in a series of FCC proceedings known as the Computer 
Inquiries.463  The second was created by the section of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 requiring incumbent LECs to provide 
unbundled access to certain network elements.464 
 The Structural and Nonstructural Safeguards Enacted by the Computer 
Inquiries — The first regulatory regime implemented by the FCC to govern 
broadband services provided by local telephone companies is the one created 
during the FCC’s Computer Inquiries.  Telecommunications companies 
began to do more than just provide customers with a pure transmission path, 
a function that came to be known as “basic services.”465  Instead, companies 
began to offer what became known as “enhanced services,” which used 
computer processing to modify the information provided by the customer 
before routing it to its final destination.466  Common contemporary examples 
                                                     
463 See generally Robert Cannon, Where Internet Service Providers and Telephone Companies 
Compete:  A Guide to the Computer Inquiries, Enhanced Service Providers and Information Service 
Providers, 9 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 49 (2001). 
464 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6). 
465 The regulations define “basic telecommunications services” as “the offering of a pure 
transmission capability over a communications path that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction 
with customer supplied information.”  Amendment of Section 64.702 of Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations 
(Second Computer Inquiry), Order, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 419-20 ¶¶ 95-96 (1980) (“Computer II Final 
Decision”), aff’d sub nom. Computer & Communications Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).   
466 The regulations define “enhanced services” as “services, offered over common carrier 
transmission facilities used in interstate communications, which employ computer processing applications 
that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted 
information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured information; or involve subscriber 
interaction with stored information.”  47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a).   
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include voice mail, electronic mail, electronic store-and-forward, fax store-
and-forward, and gateways to online databases such as Westlaw, Lexis, and 
the Internet.  Although the LECs were in a position to offer both the 
additional functionality provided by the computer processing and the 
transmission of those services to the end users as a single, integrated product, 
other enhanced service providers (ESPs) could not offer the 
telecommunications services to deliver the modified information to the end 
users.  These “pure ESPs” instead depended on the incumbent to provide 
such transmission services.   
 Policy makers soon became concerned that the incumbent LECs who 
were formally part of the Bell network (known as the Bell Operating 
Companies or “BOCs”)467 would be able to use their monopoly control over 
basic services to favor their own, proprietary enhanced services over those 
offered by unaffiliated ESPs in much the same manner that AT&T had 
favored its own long distance offerings prior to its breakup.  The FCC’s 
response in its First and Second Computer Inquiries (“Computer I and II”) 
was to require that BOCs wishing to provide enhanced services do so 
through a separate corporate subsidiary.468  The order that memorialized the 
                                                     
467 The regulatory regime established by Computer III applied only to those LECs who were 
originally part of the Bell system.  The FCC initially applied the Computer III rules to both AT&T and the 
BOCs.  Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer 
Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (“Computer III Phase I Order”).  The FCC 
eventually relieved AT&T of most Computer III requirements.  See, e.g., Amendment of Sections 64.702 
of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), Memorandum Opinion and Order 
on Reconsideration, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987) (“Computer III Phase I Reconsideration Order”); 
Competition in Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Report and Order, 67 F.C.C.R. 5880 (1991); 
Competition in Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Memorandum Opinion and Order on 
Reconsideration, 10 F.C.C.R. 4562 (1995).  But see Filing & Review of Open Network Architecture 
Plans, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 2449 (1988) (“AT&T ONA Order”) (ruling that 
AT&T remains subject to a modified ONA plan the FCC approved in 1988).  The FCC later extended 
some ONA requirements to GTE.  Application of Open Network Architecture & Nondiscrimination 
Safeguards to GTE Corp., Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 4922 (1994) (“GTE ONA Order”).  The FCC 
never imposed CEI requirements on GTE.  See Computer III Further Remand Notice, 13 F.C.C.R. at 6049 
n.30. 
468 In its First Computer Inquiry, the FCC drew a distinction between “communications services” 
and “data processing services.”  Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of 
Computer & Communication Servs. & Facilities, Tentative Decision of the Commission, 28 F.C.C.2d 
291, 295 ¶ 15(a) (1970).  The FCC also required common carriers aside from AT&T who wished to 
furnish data processing services do so through a separate corporate subsidiary.  Regulatory & Policy 
Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer & Communication Servs. & Facilities, Final 
Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 270-74 ¶¶ 11-22, 391 n.2 (1970), aff’d sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. 
v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973).  AT&T was precluded from offering data processing services 
altogether by the 1956 consent decree that terminated antitrust litigation against it.  Id. at 282 ¶ 39 & n.13. 
 The FCC redefined the relevant regulatory categories in its Computer II to distinguish between 
“basic services,” which it defined to be pure transmission capability with little or no interaction with 
customer supplied information, and “enhanced services,” which it defined to be communications services 
which employ computer processing that interacts with information provided by the customer.  Computer 
II Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d at 387 ¶¶ 5-7.  The FCC ruled that the 1956 consent decree did not 
preclude AT&T from providing enhanced services, but required AT&T to do so through a separate 
corporate subsidiary.  Id. at 475-86 ¶¶ 233-60.  Following divestiture, the FCC extended the separate 
subsidiary requirement to the BOCs.  Policy & Rules Concerning Furnishing of Customer Premises 
Equip., Enhanced Servs. & Cellular Communications Equip. by Bell Operating Cos., Report and Order, 
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breakup of AT&T similarly prohibited the BOCs for providing “information 
services,”469 a category determined by the courts and the FCC to be 
coterminous with “enhanced services,”470 and ordered the BOCs to 
nondiscriminatory access to all information service providers.471 
 The FCC eventually concluded in its Third Computer Inquiry 
(“Computer III”), however, that the costs of the separate subsidiary 
requirement outweighed the benefits and that nonstructural safeguards would 
protect against anticompetitive activity just as effectively.472  Consequently, 
it created a two-phase system of nonstructural restrictions that would allow 
the BOCs to avoid the separate subsidiary requirement and provide enhanced 
services on an integrated basis.  The first phase, known as comparably 
efficient interconnection (CEI), required LECs who wished to provide 
enhanced services without establishing a separate corporate entity to provide 
unaffiliated ESPs with access to the same basic services employed by the 
LEC in providing its own enhanced service offerings.473  The second phase, 
known as open network architecture (ONA), in essence required unbundled 
access to all of the LEC’s network elements.  ONA is substantially broader 
than CEI in that it is not limited to LECs who are offering advanced 
services.474  It also requires the LECs to provide access to all of its network 
elements and not just those that the LECs were using to provide its own 
enhanced services.475   
                                                                                                                             
95 F.C.C.2d 1117, 1120 ¶ 3 (1984) (“BOC Separation Order”), aff’d sub nom. Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 
740 F.2d 4765 (7th Cir. 1984).  Carriers not associated with the Bell system were not subject to the 
separate subsidiary requirement. 
469 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 189-90 (D.D.C. 1982) (“MFJ”), aff’d 
mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).  The MFJ defined information services 
as “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, 
utilizing or making available information which may be conveyed via telecommunications.”  Id. at 179, 
229.  Although the MFJ absolutely prohibited the BOCs from offering information services, the MFJ did 
allow AT&T to offer most information services after the local telephone companies had been divested.  
The only exception was electronic publishing, from which AT&T was to be barred for seven years.  Id. at 
178-85. 
470 Id. at 178 n.198; Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 21955-56 ¶ 102.  As a result, 
the FCC has used the terms interchangeably.  See, e.g., Computer III Further Remand Proceedings:  Bell 
Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040, 
n.4, 6040, 6042 n.4, 6066 ¶ 40 (1998) (“Computer III Further Remand Notice”); Computer III Further 
Remand Proceedings:  Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 
4289, 4291 n.3 (1999). 
471 MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 141 n.40, 195-97. 
472 Amendment of Sections 64.702 of Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 
Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 1002-11 ¶¶ 79-97 (1986) (“Phase I Order”), on reconsideration, 2 
F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) (“Phase I Reconsideration”), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990S). 
473 Computer III Phase I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1035-42 ¶¶ 147-166.   
474 Ameritech’s Comparably Efficient Interconnection Plan for Elec. Vaulting Serv., Order, 13 
F.C.C.R. 80, 85 n.18 (1997); BOC’s Joint Petition, 10 F.C.C.R. at 13763 ¶ 26. 
475 Amendment of Sections 64.702 of Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 
Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 1064-66 ¶¶ 214-217 (1986) (“Computer III Phase I Order”), on 
reconsideration, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987) (“Computer III Phase I Reconsideration Order”), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).  As originally conceived, ONA 
appeared to offer their networks to unaffiliated ESPs on an element-by-element basis.  The FCC 
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 In requiring LECs to provide unbundled access to elements of their 
networks, the FCC refused to require physical collocation under either CEI 
or ONA.476  Instead, the FCC simply mandated that the LECs minimize 
transmission costs.  Although the FCC recognized that collocation would 
often represent the most efficient form of equal access available, when space 
was extremely limited other means might well prove to be more cost 
effective.477   
 During 1992 and 1993, the FCC lifted the structural separation 
requirement as soon as individual BOCs had shown that the plans that they 
had filed met the various ONA requirements.478  A series of judicial 
challenges has failed to resolve the legality of the FCC’s Computer III 
regime.479  In the meantime, the FCC has continued to require the BOCs and 
                                                                                                                             
eventually stopped short of such “fundamental unbundling,” instead approving a “common ONA model” 
that did not require the LECS to disaggregate its network into individual facilities and instead allowed the 
LECs to provide access of somewhat larger aggregations of network elements.  BOC ONA Order, 4 
F.C.C.R. at 13 ¶¶ 5-8, 41 ¶ 69. 
476 See Computer III Phase I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1037 ¶¶ 151-153, 1042 ¶ 164 (ruling that CEI 
did not require mandatory collocation); id. at 1066 ¶ 218 (extending the same principles to ONA); accord 
Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 1, 
41 ¶ 69 (1988) (“BOC ONA Order”) (recognizing that the Computer III Phase I Order did not order 
“mandated interconnection on carriers’ premises of faculties owned by others”), on reconsideration, 5 
F.C.C.R. 3084, 3092 ¶¶ 69-72 (1990), aff’d sub nom. California v. FCC, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(“California II”). 
477 See Computer III Phase I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1037 ¶¶ 151-153, 1042 ¶ 164 (ruling that CEI 
did not require mandatory collocation); id. at 1066 ¶ 218 (extending the same principles to ONA).  The 
FCC has reaffirmed this decision on numerous occasions.  See, e.g., Application of Open Network 
Architecture and Nondiscrimination Safeguards to GTE Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 
F.C.C.R. 1388, 1414 ¶ 57 (1995); Computer III Remand Proceedings:  Bell Operating Co. Safeguards & 
Tier 1 Local Exchange Co. Safeguards, Report and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571, 7600-01 ¶ 64 (1991); Filing 
and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 1, 94 
¶¶ 181-183 (1988), on reconsideration, 5 F.C.C.R. 3084, 3092 ¶¶ 69-72 (1990), aff’d sub nom. California 
v. FCC, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993) (“California II”). 
478 See Computer III Further Remand Notice, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8366 n.22 (citing cases). 
479 The Ninth Circuit initially overturned the Computer III regime as arbitrary and capricious on the 
grounds that the FCC had not adequately justified its decision to rely on nonstructural safeguards.  See 
California I, 905 F.2d at 1230-39.  In response, the FCC strengthened ONA by imposing mandatory price 
cap regulation on the BOCs and by establishing new cost accounting rules that would make 
anticompetitive activity easier to detect.  The FCC also reaffirmed its conclusion that nonstructural rather 
than structural safeguards should govern BOC participation in the information services industry.  
Computer III Remand Proceedings:  Bell Operating Co. Safeguards & Tier 1 Local Exchange Co. 
Safeguards, Report and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571, 7578-88 ¶¶ 14-41, 7617-25 ¶¶ 98-109 (1996), vacated 
and remanded in part sub nom. California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California III”), cert. 
denied, 514 U.S. 1050 (1995).  As noted earlier, the FCC also simultaneously weakened ONA somewhat 
by shifting from a “fundamental unbundling” approach in which ISPs could obtain access to the BOCs’ 
networks on an element-by-element basis to a less granular approach to unbundling in which unbundling 
was defined in terms of network services rather than facilities.  See supra note 475.  The Ninth Circuit 
again partially vacated the FCC’s ONA regime on the grounds that the FCC had failed to explain its shift 
away from fundamental unbundling.  California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 925-30 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California 
III”).  The FCC has issued a series of notices attempting to address the concerns raised by the Ninth 
Circuit.  See Computer III Further Remand Proceedings:  Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced 
Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 8360 (1995); Computer III Further Remand 
Proceedings:  Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
14 F.C.C.R. 6040 (1998) (“Computer III Further Remand Notice”).  These proceedings, however, have 
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GTE to comply with the ONA plans already filed with and approved by the 
FCC.480  Furthermore, courts rejected the FCC’s attempt to preclude states 
from imposing more stringent access requirements on the LECs.481  States 
were free to impose more stringent requirements over enhanced services that 
were provided intrastate.  As will be discussed in greater detail later, certain 
states, such as Oregon, enacted their own ONA regimes that did mandate 
physical collocation.482 
 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 — As noted earlier, the 1996 Act 
requires incumbent LECs to interconnect with other telecommunications 
carriers on just and reasonable terms and to provide other 
telecommunications carriers with access to all of its network elements on an 
unbundled basis.483  In a series of orders, the FCC has determined that these 
statutory obligations apply to many of the elements needed to provide DSL 
service.  Specifically, the FCC initially ruled that the interconnection 
obligations of the 1996 Act apply to facilities and equipment used to provide 
data services as well as voice services484 and declined to use its forbearance 
authority to exempt advanced services from those requirements.485  In 
addition, the FCC concluded that the high frequency portion of the loop used 
to carry DSL is a network element subject to unbundled access,486 as well as 
most attached electronics.487  As with all network elements subject to the 
1996 Act’s unbundled access requirement, the FCC ruled that access to DSL 
                                                                                                                             
yet to be completed.  See Computer III Further Remand Proceedings:  Bell Operating Co. Provision of 
Enhanced Servs., Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 4289, 4292 n.6 (1999). 
480 Bell Operating Cos.’ Joint Petition for Waiver of Computer II Rules, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 1724 (Common Carrier Bur. 1995) (“Interim Waiver Order”); accord Computer III 
Further Remand Proceedings:  Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 8360, 8369 ¶ 11 (1995).  
481 California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1239-45 (9th Cir. 1990) (“California I”). 
482 See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 860-035-0110; infra notes 551 and accompanying text. 
483 See supra notes 11, 35, 304-310 and accompanying text.  The 1996 Act also initially prohibited 
BOCs from offering in-region alarm monitoring services, 47 U.S.C. § 275(a)(1), and temporarily required 
the BOCs to offer information services and electronic publishing through a separate subsidiary.  Id. 
§§ 272(a)(2)(C), 274(a).  These restrictions have since expired.  Id. §§ 272(f)(2), 274(g)(2), 275(a)(1). 
484 Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 24012, 24034-35 ¶¶ 46-47 (1998) 
(“Advanced Servs. Order”), remanded sub nom. US West Communications, Inc. v. FCC, No. 98-1410 
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 25, 1999) (unpublished disposition available at 1999 WL 728555). 
485 Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 15280 (1998). 
486 Advanced Servs. Order, 13 F.C.C.R.. at 24036-38 ¶¶ 52-54; Deployment of Wireline Servs. 
Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Third Report and Order in CC Docket No. 98-147 and Fourth 
Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-98, 14 F.C.C.R. 20912 (2000) (“Line Sharing Order”); 47 C.F.R. 
§ 51.319(h).  The FCC later clarified In addition, incumbent LECs must condition (i.e., remove equipment 
from) loops upon request.  47 C.F.R. § 51.319(a)(3), (h)(5); Implementation of Local Competition 
Provisions of Telecomms. Act of 1996, Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 3775 ¶ 172, 3783-84 ¶¶ 190-194 (1999) (“UNE Remand Order”).  The 
D.C. Circuit affirmed that incumbent LECs’ DSL-based advanced services are subject to 47 U.S.C. 
§ 251(c).  WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 246 F.3d 690, 693-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  The court did vacate and 
remand the order so that the FCC could determine whether DSL-based advanced services constituted 
“exchange access” or “telephone exchange service.”  Id. at 695-96. 
487 UNE Remand Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 3776-77 ¶ 175. 
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components would be governed by the forward-looking incremental cost 
approach embodied in TELRIC.488 
 The FCC stopped short of mandating unbundled access to the packet 
switching technology owned by the incumbent LEC, including DSLAMs.  
While unbundled access to routing and switching capability was appropriate 
in the circuit switched market, in which the higher utilization rates enjoyed 
by the incumbent LECs allowed them to achieve significant economies of 
scale, incumbent LECs did not maintain a monopoly position in packet 
switching.  In addition, the FCC recognized that investments in facilities 
used to provide service to nascent markets such as broadband carried 
significantly greater risks than those in established markets.  Therefore, 
despite the fact that the failure to mandate unbundled access in effect 
required new entrants to incur the costs associated with collocating their own 
equipment, the potential adverse effect on investment incentives led the FCC 
to refuse to mandate unbundled access to DSLAMs and other related 
technology.489   
 The FCC did allow for one exception to this ruling.  The FCC ruled that 
incumbent LECs that employ DLCs must provide unbundled access to 
packet switching equipment when the incumbent LEC has placed a DSLAM 
in a remote terminal without allowing other carriers to do the same through 
physical collocation.490  In addition, although incumbent LECs need not 
provide unbundled access to its own DSLAMs, they must allow requesting 
carriers to collocate DSLAMs and other equipment needed to route data 
communications into the requesting carrier’s packet switched network.491   
 The FCC’s conclusions with respect to collocation largely paralleled its 
conclusions with respect to interconnection and unbundled access.  
Transmission and termination equipment, including multiplexers, could be 
collocated on LEC premises.  New entrants were not permitted, however, to 
collocate packet switches and other equipment used solely to provide 
                                                     
488 Line Sharing Order, 14 F.C.C.R. at 20973 ¶ 132, 20974-81 ¶¶ 135-157. 
489 UNE Remand Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 3835-37 ¶¶ 306-309, 3839-40 ¶¶ 314-317; see also Local 
Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15713 ¶ 427.   
490 The regulations also require that no spare copper loops capable of providing DSL service be 
available.  UNE Remand Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 3838 ¶ 313; 47 C.F.R. § 51.319(a)(5).   
491 Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Fourth Report and 
Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 15435, 15460-63 ¶¶ 45-51 (2001) (“Collocation Remand Order”), petition for review 
pending sub nom. Verizon Cal., Inc. v. FCC, No. 01-1371 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 23, 2001).  The FCC 
originally ruled that new entrants were also entitled to physically collocate any equipment that was “used 
or useful” for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements, regardless of other functionalities 
inherent in such equipment.  Collocation Order, 14 F.C.C.R. at 4776 ¶ 28; Local Competition Order, 11 
F.C.C.R. at 15794 ¶ 579.  The D.C. Circuit struck this ruling down as a violation of the statutory 
requirement limiting collocation to equipment that is “necessary” for interconnection or unbundled access.  
GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  On remand, the FCC limited collocation to 
equipment whose primary purpose and function is to provide the requesting carrier with “equal in quality” 
interconnection or “nondiscriminatory access” to an unbundled network element.  Collocation Remand 
Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 15452-60 ¶¶ 32-44.  Stand-alone switching and routing equipment fell within this 
standard.  Id. at 15460-63 ¶ 45-51.  The new collocation provisions would not extend to computer servers, 
databases, and other equipment used to support a requesting carrier’s network.  Id. at 15463-64 ¶ 53. 
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enhanced services, since such equipment was unrelated to the transmission 
and termination of telephone exchange service and exchange access.492  The 
FCC later clarified the manner in which these rules applied to multifunction 
equipment by explaining that incumbent LECs must permit collocation of 
any equipment that was “used” or “useful for interconnection or access to 
unbundled network elements, regardless of any other functionalities that may 
be offered by that equipment.493  As a result, competitors had the right to 
collocate such equipment as DSLAMs, routers, ATM multiplexers, and 
remote switching modules, which are designed both to terminate and switch 
broadband traffic.494 
 The D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s decision permitting the 
collocation of multifunction equipment.495  Invoking the Supreme Court’s 
admonition that the term “necessary” must be construed according to its 
ordinary meaning, which is limited to what is required to achieve a desired 
goal and is not so broad as to apply to anything that simply increases the 
costs faced by the requesting carrier,496 the court reasoned that the FCC’s 
decision to mandate collocation of any equipment “used” or “useful” for 
interconnection or access to unbundled network elements conflicted with the 
statutory requirement that collocation be limited to equipment that was 
“necessary to achieve reasonable collocation.”497   
 A subsequent D.C. Circuit decision also struck down the FCC’s decision 
requiring unbundled access to the high frequency portion of local loops.498  
The court based this decision on the FCC’s own findings recognizing that 
DSL faced robust competition from cable modem providers and (to a lesser 
extent) satellite broadband providers.  In fact, cable modems had established 
the early lead, having captured fifty-four percent of the market for high-
speed lines, with DSL having captured only twenty-eight percent.499  At this 
point of the race, however, “ ‘no competitor has a large embedded base of 
paying residential customers,’ ” and as a result the “ ‘record does not indicate 
                                                     
492 Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15794-96 ¶¶ 580-581. 
493 Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, First Report and 
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761, 4776-79 ¶¶ 28-31 (1999) (“Collocation 
Order”). 
494 Id. at 4776-77 ¶¶ 27-28. 
495 GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  For an earlier discussion of this case, 
see supra notes 315, 354, 370 and accompanying text. 
496 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1999). 
497 Id. at 422-24.  In so holding, the D.C. Circuit invoked the Supreme Court’s admonition that the 
term “necessary” must be construed according to its ordinary meaning, which is limited to what is 
required to achieve a desired goal and is not so broad as to apply to anything that simply increases the 
costs faced by the requesting carrier.  Id. at 423 (citing Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 389-90). 
498 United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428-29 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
499 Id. at 428-29 (citing Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All 
Ams. in Reasonable & Timely Fashion, & Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to 
Section 706 of Telecomms. Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 2864 ¶ 44, 
2865 ¶ 48 (2002)). 
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that the consumer market is inherently a natural monopoly’ ”500  Drawing 
guidance from Justice Breyer’s observation that mandatory unbundling 
creates disincentives in both innovation and investment and requires network 
owners to become embroiled in the tangled management inherent whenever a 
system of well defined property rights is into a common resource subject to 
shared use,501 the D.C. Circuit concluded that compelling access to the high 
frequency portions of loops exceeded the “necessary” and “impair” 
requirements of the 1996 Act.502 
 The FCC has revised its rules to limit collocation of multifunction 
equipment to equipment whose primary purpose is to provide the requesting 
carrier either with interconnection that is “equal in quality” to the that 
provided by the incumbent LEC for its own services or with 
“nondiscriminatory access” to an unbundled network element.503  The FCC 
asserted that even if the collocation effected a per se taking, any issues 
relating to just compensation are more properly addressed after the 
methodology in question had been implemented in an actual rate order.504  A 
judicial challenge to the revised collocation rules is pending before the D.C. 
Circuit.505 
 Reconciling the Two Regimes — Although some commentators have 
suggested that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 superseded the 
Computer III regime,506 both regimes continue to govern in slightly different 
spheres.  For example, the range of entities that must provide access under 
the 1996 Act is broader than the range of entities that must provide access 
under Computer III, since the relevant provisions of the 1996 Act cover all 
incumbent LECs whereas ONA applies only to BOCs and GTE.507  In 
addition, the range of entities that may request access under the 1996 Act is 
somewhat narrower than those entitled to access under Computer III.  
Because the interconnection and unbundled access provisions of the 1996 
Act only extend to “telecommunications carriers,”508 which are defined to 
include only those who offer pure transport services to the public without 
                                                     
500 Id. (quoting Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Ams. in 
Reasonable & Timely Fashion, & Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 
of Telecomms. Act of 1996, Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 2423 ¶ 48 (1999)). 
501 Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 428-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
502 United States Telecom Ass’n, 290 F.3d at 429 (holding that the FCC’s Line Sharing Order was 
tainted by the same error as the provisions discussed in the earlier portions of the opinion, which focused 
on the “necessary” and “impair” standards).  For a more complete description of the “necessary” and 
“impair” standards, see supra notes 315, 500-501 and accompanying text. 
503 Collocation Remand Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 15452-60 ¶¶ 32-44. 
504 Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Order on 
Reconsideration and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 8-147 and Fifth 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 96-98, 15 F.C.C.R. 17806, 17839 ¶ 69 (2000) 
(“Collocation Reconsideration Order”). 
505 See Verizon Cal., Inc. v. FCC, No. 01-1371 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 23, 2001).   
506 See Cannon, supra note 463, at 681. 
507 See supra note 467.   
508 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2), (3). 
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making any change in the form or content of the information as sent and 
received,509 it does not cover pure ESPs, who use computer processing to 
modify user-supplied information without providing transmission services to 
end users.510  In addition, the two regimes have a different geographic 
scope.511   
 The FCC launched a series of ongoing proposals reconsidering various 
features of the current regulatory regime.  For example, in one proceeding, 
the FCC reevaluated whether the high-frequency portion of the loop should 
continue to be a network element subject to unbundled access.512  Another 
proceeding considered comments on the rules governing the unbundling513 
and physical collocation rules of DSLAMs at remote terminals.514  Finally, 
the FCC opened a sweeping inquiry attempting to rationalize these two 
regulatory regimes.  In particular, this proceeding explored whether 
technological changes or the enactment of the 1996 Act justify or require the 
modification or elimination of part or all of the CEI and ONA regime created 
by Computer III.515 
 For our purposes, the key fact is that, in contrast the federal ONA 
regime, the local competition provisions of the 1996 Act and certain state 
ONA regimes gives requesting carriers the right to physically collocate 
DSLAMs and switching and routing equipment on the incumbent LECs 
property, whether in central offices or remote terminals.516  Like all 
unbundled network elements governed by the 1996 Act, the rates that 
incumbent LECs may charge for conditioned loops and physical collocation 
are governed by TELRIC.   
                                                     
509 See id. § 153(43), (44), (46).  The FCC determined telecommunications carriers remain within the 
scope of the interconnection and unbundled access provisions of the 1996 Act even if they also offer 
information services through the same arrangement.  Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15988-90 
¶¶ 992-995. 
510 Computer III Further Remand Notice, 13 F.C.C.R. at 6061 ¶ 32, 6090 ¶ 92. 
511 The separate subsidiary requirements for BOC provision of information services under the 1996 
Act are limited to interLATA information services, 47 U.S.C. § 271(a)(2)(C), except for electronic 
publishing services, which must be provided through a separate subsidiary regardless if offered on an 
interLATA or an intraLATA basis, 47 U.S.C. § 274(a).  The separate subsidiary requirements enacted by 
Computer II and the nonstructural safeguards enacted by Computer III do not distinguish between 
interLATA and intraLATA information services.  As a result, interLATA information services are subject 
to both section 271 of the 1996 Act and ONA/CEI.  IntraLATA services (aside from electronic 
publishing) are subject only to CEI and ONA.  Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 21969-
71 ¶¶ 132-134.   
512 Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 22781, 22805-06 ¶ 53 (2001) (“Triennial UNE Review Notice”). 
513 Id. at 22809 ¶ 61 (opening up to reconsideration the rule requiring unbundled access to DSLAMs 
in remote terminals where collocation is impossible and alternative copper loops are unavailable); 
Collocation Reconsideration Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 17851-54 ¶¶ 103-112 (opening general inquiry into 
unbundled access at remote terminals).   
514 See Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Order on 
Reconsideration and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 17044 (2000). 
515 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3040-43 ¶¶ 43-53 (2002). 
516 See supra notes 286-287, 295, 307-308, 481 and accompanying text. 
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 b. Cable Modem Systems — Cable modems represent the other 
principal technology for providing broadband services to residential 
customers.517  Cable modem systems provide data communications through 
the network of coaxial cables originally designed to provide a uniform 
stream of video programming in one direction running from the network to 
all subscribers.  Before a cable network can be used to provide cable modem 
service, it must be transformed from the typical tree-and-branch 
infrastructure associated with transmitting television programming into a 
ring or star-type infrastructure.  This is usually accomplished through a 
hybrid fiber-coaxial (HFC) architecture that is quite similar to the DLC 
architecture discussed above.518  In an HFC architecture, fiber optic cables 
are used to connect the cable headend to a satellite facility known as a 
neighborhood node.  The final connection between the neighborhood node 
and the subscribers is made through copper-based coaxial cables.  Cable 
modem service also requires special equipment at the headend known as a 
Cable Modem Termination System to manage the flow of data between cable 
subscribers and various types of broadband services, such as e-mail, IP 
telephony, content cached locally, and content residing on the World Wide 
Web. 
FIGURE 5 
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 The principal access-related policy question with respect to cable modem 
systems has been the extent to which the government should ensure that 
cable modem customers have some degree of choice among ISPs, an issue to 
which litigants and commentators have variously referred as either “open 
access” or “forced access,” depending on the particular biases of the party 
                                                     
517 The ensuing regulatory history draws on the discussion in Yoo, supra note 9, at 175-76, 250-51. 
518 See supra note 461 and accompanying text. 
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using the term.519  In an apparent attempt to sidestep the political overtones 
associated with either designation, the FCC opted to refer to the issue as 
“multiple ISP access.”520   
 Questions about multiple ISP access first arose during the FCC’s review 
of AT&T’s proposed acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne.  In those 
proceedings, a number of parties argued that allowing AT&T to bring both 
physical transmission and ISP services under the same corporate umbrella 
would allow AT&T to use its control over cable to harm competition in the 
market for ISPs.  As a result, these parties asked the FCC to force AT&T to 
allow independent ISPs to interconnect with AT&T’s cable modem service 
network on nondiscriminatory terms.521  Consistent with its longstanding 
policy of nonregulation of computer-based services,522 the FCC refused to 
impose multiple ISP access as a merger condition in either case.523   
 Since cable operators are subject to municipal as well as federal 
regulation, advocates of multiple ISP access pressed their arguments before 
municipal regulators.  Some of these municipal authorities were more 
accommodating than was the FCC, either mandating open access by 
municipal ordinance524 or requiring it as a condition for the transfer of a 
license needed to complete AT&T’s acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne.525  
This municipal-based strategy was soon cut short by a series of judicial 
decisions holding that municipal franchising authorities lacked the 
jurisdiction to compel multiple ISP access.526  
                                                     
519 See Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses & Section 214 Authorizations 
from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 
15 F.C.C.R. 9816, 9866 ¶ 114 (2000) (“AT&T-MediaOne Merger”). 
520 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet over Cable & Other Facilities, Declaratory 
Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4839 ¶ 72 (2002). 
521 See AT&T-MediaOne Merger, 15 F.C.C.R. at 9866 ¶¶ 114-115; Applications for Consent to 
Transfer of Control of Licenses & Section 214 Authorizations from Tele-Communications, Inc., 
Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3160, 3197-98 
¶ 75 (1999) (“AT&T-TCI Merger”). 
522 See, e.g., Amendment of Section 64.702 of Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations (Second Computer 
Inquiry), Order, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 432-33 ¶¶ 124-127 (1980) (“Computer II Final Decision”), aff’d sub 
nom. Computer & Communications Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 
U.S. 938 (1983); Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer & 
Communication Servs. & Facilities, Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 270 ¶ 11 (1970), aff’d 
sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973).   
523 AT&T-TCI Merger, 14 F.C.C.R. at 3205-08 ¶¶ 92-96; AT&T-MediaOne Merger, 15 F.C.C.R. at 
9872-73 ¶ 127. 
524 See Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 686-
87 (S.D. Fla. 2000). 
525 See MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356, 360 (4th Cir. 2001); AT&T Corp. 
v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2000).  See generally LATHEN, supra note 459, at 14-15. 
526 The Ninth Circuit’s decision followed from its conclusion that cable modem service constituted a 
“telecommunications service.  AT&T, 216 F.3d at 878-79.  The Fourth Circuit was more circumspect 
about the proper regulatory classification of cable modem service, holding instead that requiring open 
access violated the statutory provision contained in 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3)(D) prohibiting franchising 
authorities from requiring cable operators to provide telecommunications facilities.  MediaOne, 257 F.3d 
at 363-64. 
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 It was not until the merger between America Online and Time Warner 
that multiple ISP access advocates were able to garner sustainable victories.  
The order of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) approving the merger 
required that AOL Time Warner allow cable modem subscribers the option 
of choosing from among at least three unaffiliated ISPs in addition to its 
proprietary ISP, America Online and Roadrunner.527  The order also required 
AOL Time Warner to provide all of these unaffiliated ISPs with “Access,” 
which the order defined as the right to interconnect at the same connection 
points that AOL Time Warner provided to its own affiliated ISPs.528  In 
addition, the order required that AOL Time Warner not discriminate against 
the content provided by unaffiliated ISPs and that all ISP service agreements 
include a “most favored nation clause” that allowed unaffiliated ISPs to avail 
themselves of the most attractive terms obtained by AOL from other 
unaffiliated cable systems.529   
 In contradiction to its rejection of similar arguments in AT&T’s 
acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne, the FCC abruptly reversed course and 
endorsed the FTC’s requirement that Time Warner and America Online 
negotiate open access with at least three unaffiliated ISPs as a condition to 
their merger.530  Although the FCC claimed that its decision did not portend 
how it would eventually resolve multiple ISP access as a matter of general 
regulatory policy,531 the breadth of the reasoning contained in its decision 
approving the merger suggested that it might approve even more sweeping 
action in the future.532  Multiple ISP access has also emerged as an issue in 
the Comcast’s proposed acquisition of AT&T’s cable holdings.533  In fact, 
AT&T and Comcast have voluntarily undertaken to implement multiple ISP 
access in an apparent attempt to boost chances of regulatory approval for 
their transaction.534 
                                                     
527 The FTC order allowed AOL Time Warner to begin providing cable service in twenty 
specifically identified geographic areas so long as cable modem subscribers had the option of subscribing 
to Earthlink, so long as AOL Time Warner provided at least two additional unaffiliated ISP options within 
ninety days.  America Online, Inc., No. C-3989, slip op. at 6-7 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2000) (Decision and 
Order), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aoldando.pdf.  In all other geographic areas, the order did not 
condition the initial offering of services on the availability of Earthlink as an option.  Instead, it simply 
required AOL Time Warner to provide at least three unaffiliated ISPs within ninety days of making its 
own, proprietary ISP services available.  Id. at 8.  The FTC also authorized the appointment of a trustee to 
monitor compliance with its order.  Id. at 12-17. 
528 Id. at 11; see also id. at 2 (defining “Access”). 
529 Id. at 9, 11. 
530 Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses & Section 214 Authorizations by 
Time Warner, Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner Inc., Transferee, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, 6568-69 ¶ 57 (2001) (“AOL-Time Warner Merger”). 
531 Id. at 6569 ¶ 58. 
532 See id. at 36-57 ¶¶ 81-127. 
533 See Yochai J. Dreazen, AT&T, Comcast Likely to Get Regulators’ Nod, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 
2001, at A3; Yochai J. Dreazen, AT&T, Comcast Assert Benefits of Cable Union Outweigh Risks, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 24, 2002, at D4. 
534 Julia Angwin, AT&T to Offer EarthLink Inc. on Cable Lines, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2002, at B7; 
Julia Angwin, Comcast, United Online Set Deal for Internet, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2002, at B4. 
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 Since then, however, the FCC’s initial reticence to impose multiple ISP 
access seems to have reasserted itself.  The FCC concluded that cable 
modem service is an interstate “information service.”535  This decision has 
twofold significance.  First, in rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that 
cable modem services constituted “telecommunications services,” the FCC 
removed cable modem service from the interconnection, unbundled access, 
and physical collocation requirements contained in the 1996 Act.536  Second, 
the FCC’s decision placed cable modems in a regulatory category 
traditionally associated with nonregulation.  Classifying cable modem 
service as an information service was thus generally regarded as a signal that 
the FCC was unlikely to mandate multiple ISP access.537  That said, the FCC 
explicitly acknowledged that multiple ISP access remained an open issue and 
specifically requested comments on the relative merits of imposing multiple 
ISP access538 and specifically requested comments on the free speech and 
takings implications of compelling such access.539   
2. Economic Arguments in Favor of Market Value 
 If access to broadband inputs is to be mandated, economic theory 
indicates that access rates should be market price.  As we have repeatedly 
emphasized, doing so would promote allocative efficiency by giving 
purchasers and providers alike the appropriate signals for calibrating 
consumption and production levels.  In addition, basing access rates on 
market prices would enhance dynamic efficiency by providing the incentives 
need to attract the investments needed to finance the deployment of the 
various broadband technologies.  As the FCC has repeatedly recognized, 
issues surrounding investment and innovation are of the utmost importance 
when the market involved is nascent one.540 
 Although market prices might have previously been difficult to 
determine, the emergence of new technologies capable of providing high-
speed broadband services are making this task increasingly easy.  As noted 
earlier, communications companies are providing preparing to provide 
broadband services through a wide variety of wireless technologies, 
                                                     
535 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet over Cable & Other Facilities, Declaratory 
Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4820-39 ¶ 34-69 (2002) (“Cable Modem 
NPRM”).   
536 Interestingly, classifying cable modem service as an information service to some extent reopened 
the possibility that it might be subject to municipal regulation, as demonstrated by the fact that the FCC 
actively sought comments on this specific point.  Id. at 4849 ¶ 100. 
537 Yochai J. Dreazen, FCC Ruling Frees Cable-TV Firms from Sharing Wires, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
15, 2002, at B2. 
538 Cable Modem NPRM, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4840-41 ¶ 74, 4843-47 ¶¶ 83-93. 
539 Id. at 4843 ¶¶ 80-81. 
540 See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet over Cable & Other Facilities, 
Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802 ¶ 5 (2002); Deployment 
of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, First Report and Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761, 4763 ¶ 2 (1999) (“Collocation Order”). 
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including PCS, MDS, ancillary and supplemental service provided via digital 
television, and 3G mobile wireless devices.541  These services are similar in 
geographic scope to those provided by cable modem and local telephone 
systems.  Although these services are still in their nascent stages, when fully 
operational they should provide a ready basis for determining the value of 
the transmission of services. 
 In addition, DBS companies have begun to provide broadband service 
via satellite that is beginning to compete directly with cable modem systems 
and ADSL.542  These too can provide a market-based benchmark for the 
value of the network services.  Again, the fact that DBS is necessarily 
national in scope and differences in the quality of the broadband services 
provided can complicate any direct comparison between DBS and other 
wireline broadband services that are more regional in scope.  That said, the 
existence of these substitutes can provide useful guidance as to the value of 
the services being provided under a regime of compelled access. 
 Should these alternative technologies be insufficiently developed to 
allow direct determination of market prices, economic theory indicates that 
regulatory authorities should base rates on ECPR, which sets rates as the sum 
of the forward-looking incremental cost and the opportunity cost associated 
with providing access.  The opportunity cost of providing network access is 
determined by subtracting direct incremental costs from the retail price in the 
final goods market.  The primary reason that the FCC has been reluctant for 
allowing this issue in the context of DSL has been because the retail prices 
supposedly reflected monopoly returns.  Although this position is at least 
arguable in the case of local telephony,543 it is unsupportable in the case of 
broadband.  The FCC and the courts have recognized that vibrant 
competition exists, and the impending arrival of additional competitors 
should only cause it to intensify.544 
 Indeed, the presence of this competition raises serious questions whether 
compelling access to high-speed broadband facilities represents sensible 
economic policy.  Access requirements only make sense if there is a true 
bottleneck facility that in effect gives a company a natural monopoly.  When 
competition exists, compelling access at best accomplishes nothing, since 
parties who negotiate agreements on other terms will simply negotiate 
around access rates that are set too high.545  Access rates that are set too low, 
however, can harm allocative efficiency by creating the shortages and 
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545 This presumes that access rates will follow the model established by the 1996 Act and allow 




distortions inevitably associated with prices that are not calibrated to balance 
supply and demand.   
 Even worse, compelling access can harm dynamic efficiency, by 
eliminating the need for firms to invest in substitute facilities.  By rescuing 
those who need alternative means of transmission from having to invest in 
alternative capacity, access requirements can forestall the emergence of 
competition by depriving other facilities-based competitors of their natural 
strategic partners.  Access requirements can thus have the perverse effect of 
cementing the existing technologies into place.  Indeed, that is the clear 
import of the FCC’s recent notice of proposed rulemaking underscoring the 
importance of taking a more functional approach from the consumers’ 
perspective546 and recognizing the emergence of multiple options in 
providing broadband service, including cable, telephony, wireless, and 
satellite.547  Indeed, it was the emergence of this competition that led the 
FCC to seek comment on whether access requirements should be 
foregone.548 
 There is thus good reason to question whether the FCC should compel 
access to broadband networks.  If such access requirements are to be 
imposed, however, economic theory indicates that rates for such access 
should be based on market prices.  Any attempt to base access prices solely 
on direct cost, as is currently done under TELRIC, fails to acknowledge that 
market value of network access is determined by the value of the services 
sold through the network, not the cost of the network itself.  Not only is this 
appropriate in light of the fact that networks are capital assets that are not 
consumes; it also reflects the demand-side considerations that underlie 
neoclassical economics.  The presence of substitute facilities should permit 
market value to be determined through a comparison to actual market 
transactions or through the opportunity cost component mandated by ECPR.  
The presence of direct competition makes it unlikely that prices set in this 
manner will allow network owners to recover supracompetitive returns.   
3. Constitutional Arguments in Favor of Market Value 
 The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence provides another reason for 
requiring that any access requirement imposed by the FCC be priced at 
market value.  The issues are the clearest with respect to DSL.  Although the 
D.C. Circuit vacated the regulations providing that the high frequency 
portion of the loop constituted a network element that was subject to 
unbundled access under the 1996 Act, it left intact the regulations giving 
requesting telecommunications carriers the right to physically collocate 
                                                     
546 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3023 ¶ 7 (2002). 
547 Id. at 3037-38 ¶¶ 36-37. 
548 Id. at 3040-42 ¶¶ 44-48. 
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DSLAMs and other routing equipment on the incumbent LEC’s property.549  
It seems clear as a matter of first principles that such a requirement 
constitutes the type of permanent physical occupation held to constitute a per 
se taking in Loretto. 
 Lower court precedent supports this conclusion as well.  A similar issue 
arose in GTE Northwest, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission.550  At issue in 
that case was the regulatory provision enacted by the Oregon Public Utility 
Commission (PUC) similar to the ONA regime created by the FCC in 
Computer III.  The key difference was that Oregon’s regime required local 
telephone companies to permit ESPs to physically collocate on their 
property.551  After reviewing the relevant takings analysis contained in 
Loretto, Florida Power, and Yee v. City of Escondido, the court concluded 
that the physical collocation requirement was property characterized as the 
type of permanent physical invasion held to be a per se taking in Loretto.  In 
so holding, the court rejected the argument that the fact that the PUC had 
already placed restrictions on the telephone company’s ability to use its 
property deprived it of any historically rooted expectation of compensation.  
As the court reasoned, “the facts that an industry is heavily regulated, and 
that a property owner acquired the property knowing that it is heavily 
regulated, do not diminish a physical invasion to something less than a 
taking.”552  The court also rejected the argument that physical collocation 
represented nothing more than a restriction on the use of the telephone 
company’s property that was more properly analyzed as a regulatory 
taking.553  According to the court, the PUC lacked the statutory authority to 
exercise the power of eminent domain.  As a result, the Oregon Supreme 
Court invalidated the PUC’s collocation regulations as beyond the PUC’s 
statutory authority.554   
 The analysis with respect to cable modem systems is slightly more 
ambiguous.  Unless it mandates multiple ISP access as a general matter, the 
FCC need not address precisely how and where the interconnection needed 
for multiple ISP access should occur or how such access should be priced.555  
None of the municipal ordinances requiring multiple ISP access set forth the 
                                                     
549 See supra notes 498-502 and accompanying text. 
550 900 P.2d 495 (Or. 1995).  The litigants in GTE Northwest framed their challenge in terms of the 
Takings Clauses embodied in both the federal and the Oregon Constitutions.  The court assumed without 
deciding that the analysis would be the same under either provision.  Id. at 501 n.6. 
551 See supra note 482 and accompanying text. 
552 Id. at 504. 
553 Id. at 505-06. 
554 Id. at 499-501.  Note that sections 251 and 252 enacted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
explicitly give state public utility commissions the right to enforce physical collocation provisions.  47 
U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(6), 252.  See generally Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for 
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 676-77 (2001).  Although this in effect overturned the 
Oregon Supreme Court’s holding with respect to the PUC’s authority to enforce physical collocation, it 
did not in any way undercut the court’s conclusion that the physical collocation provisions of the Oregon 
regulatory scheme constituted a per se taking under Loretto. 
555 LATHEN, supra note 459, at 36  
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parameters for interconnection or pricing guidelines, no consensus has 
emerged among industry participants as to where the interconnection needed 
for multiple ISP access should occur.556  Accordingly, the only operative 
multiple ISP access requirements are those imposed as part of the regulatory 
approval of the AOL-Time Warner merger, which gives certain unaffiliated 
ISPs the right to interconnect at the same points as AOL Time Warner’s 
proprietary ISPs.557  As a result, contrary to the suggestion of some 
scholars,558 multiple ISP access to cable modem systems will likely require 
the type of permanent physical invasion held to constitute a per se taking.  
Consequently, cable modem system operators who are made subject to 
multiple ISP access requirements would be entitled to fair market value as 
compensation.  As noted in the discussion regarding access to DSL networks, 
the proliferation of technological alternatives is in the process of greatly 
simplifying such a determination.559 
CONCLUSION 
 There can be little question that compelling access to networks has 
tremendous intuitive appeal as a potential regulatory response to the growing 
influence of network technologies.  Compelling access would seem to 
increase the number of options presented to consumers and would appear to 
offer the prospect of lowering the prices at which network services are 
available.  It goes without saying, however, that there is no free lunch:  every 
regulatory effort that seeks to promote the availability of any particular good 
necessarily carries costs.  Specifically, direct government intervention in 
establishing access rates all too often fosters allocative inefficiency by 
                                                     
556 Id. at 38-39.  Most of these ordinances simply required that cable modem systems provide 
nondiscriminatory access by allowing unaffiliated ISPs to obtain carriage on the same terms as affiliated 
ISPs.  Although the ordinances in question failed to address the point, such schemes generally require 
elaborate accounting and nonaccounting rules to ensure that the terms of the access agreements with 
affiliated ISPs does not include any cross subsidies.  See id. at 38, 44 (citing Implementation of Non-
Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, First 
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21905 (1996); and 
Implementation of Telecomms. Act of 1996:  Accounting Safeguards Under Telecomms. Act of 1996, 
Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 17539 (1996)).  Thus contrary to the suggestion of some advocates of 
multiple ISP access, see, e.g., Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate Broadband Internet Access over 
Cable, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 677, 716 (2001), it is likely that any such scheme would require a 
significant degree of public utility regulation.. 
557 See supra notes 527-529 and accompanying text.  It should be noted that the multiple ISP access 
scheme mandated by the FTC originally anticipated  that the unaffiliated ISPs would place their own 
routing and backbone access facilities within the cable headend in a manner that closely resembled 
physical collocation.  As actually implemented, however, multiple ISP access bears a greater resemblance 
to virtual collocation, with all of the traffic exiting the headend via AOL’s backbone and interconnecting 
with the unaffiliated ISPs network at some location outside the headend.  As we have argued earlier, this 
shift does not take the access regime outside the realm of physical takings, since multiple ISP access 
would still require every cable modem system operator either to permit unaffiliated ISPs to establish a 
physical connection to its network.  See supra notes 370-375 and accompanying text. 
558 See, e.g., Chen, supra note 556, at 716. 
559 See supra note 544 and accompanying text. 
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interfering with the mechanism through which consumers of network access 
calibrate their overall level of purchases.  Interference with market pricing 
simultaneously causes secondary distortions in the markets for substitute 
inputs by making the regulated input seem artificially attractive.  This effect 
further causes firms to adjust their production functions farther and farther 
away from the most efficient mix of inputs. 
 What is even less obvious but no less important is the manner in which 
government regulation of access pricing can impede dynamic efficiency.  
Market prices play a critical role in encouraging firms who need access to 
telecommunications networks to make the financial commitments needed to 
deploy alternative network technologies.  Compelling access at below-
market rates only serves to dampen the price signal that normally would 
stimulate investment in additional network capacity.  In addition, by rescuing 
those firms from having to make such investments, compelled access starves 
firms seeking to deploy substitute technologies of the financial resources 
needed to support the buildout of their networks.  The arguments that 
networks are unique economic phenomena to which ordinary economic 
analysis does not apply simply do not withstand analysis.   
 Given the economic support for basing access rates on market pricing, it 
should come as little surprise that the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence 
supports the same conclusion.  The only reason that policy makers and the 
courts have sanctioned the use of cost-based rather than market-based rates is 
that until recently the lack of competition among different network facilities 
rendered market-based pricing of network access impossible.  The 
emergence of technological alternatives capable of serving as substitutes and 
the overarching shift in regulatory policy from output regulation to input 
regulation has in effect caused the justifications for failing to base access 
rates on market prices to fall away.  Indeed, our discussion of the current 
status of local telephone networks, utility pole networks, and wireline 
broadband networks identifies the way in technology is now providing the 
external benchmarks needed to support market-based access pricing that 
were previously unavailable.   
 Numerous technical obstacles to implementing such a solution no doubt 
remain.  Many of the technologies to which we refer are only now in the 
process of being deployed, and if previous policy making in other 
technologies is any guide, numerous technical and accounting-related 
difficulties doubtless remain, the final resolution of which exceeds the scope 
of this Article.  The economic and constitutional validity of market-based 
pricing of access to networks should be sufficient to overcome these 
administrative costs.  Market-based rates correctly identify both the 
economic costs and the just compensation for takings in the “age of access.” 
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